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






# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



# THESIS

Military Dictatorship in Greece  
(1967-1974):  
The Genesis of Greek Anti-Americanism

by

Donald C. Munn

June 1980

Thesis Advisor:

D. P. Burke

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The Genesis of Greek Anti-Americanism

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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June 1980

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## ABSTRACT

The years following the April 21, 1967 Greek coup d'etat have been marked by a considerable degree of anti-American sentiment felt and expressed by people in Greece who have been staunch allies of the United States since the end of the Second World War. A major consequence of this anti-American sentiment has been a serious degradation in relations between the United States and Greece. This thesis examines the American relationship with the military rulers of Greece between 1967 and 1974 in order to better understand the origins of Greek grievances with the U.S., the cause of the present estranged relations, and the implications Greek anti-American sentiment may have on future Greek-American relations.



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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMAG	American Mission for Aid to Greece
ASPIDA	<u>Aksiomatikoi Sosate Patridhan Idhanika Demokra-</u> <u>tia Aksiokratia</u> (Officers Save the Country, Ideals, Democracy, Meritocracy)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DA	<u>Demokratiki Amyna</u> (Democratic Defense)
DCA	Defense Cooperation Agreement
EA	<u>Eniaea Aristera</u> (United Left)
EAM	<u>Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo</u> (National Liberation Front)
EC	European Community
EDA	<u>Eniaea Demokratiki Aristera</u> (United Democratic Left)
EDE	<u>Ethniki Demokratiki Enosis</u> (National Democratic Union)
EEC	European Economic Community
EENA	<u>Ethniki Enosis Neon Aksiomatikon</u> (National Union of Young Officers)
EK	<u>Enosis Kentrou</u> (Center Union)
EKKE	<u>Epanastatiko Kommounistiko Komma Elladhas</u> (Maoist Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece)
ELAS	<u>Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos</u> (National Popular Liberation Army)
ENA	<u>Enosis Neon Aksiomatikon</u> (Union of Young Officers)
EP	<u>Ethniki Parataxis</u> (National Rally)





EPEK	<u>Ethniki Proodheftiki Enosis Kentrou</u> (National Progressive Union of the Center)
ERE	<u>Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis</u> (National Radical Union)
ES	<u>Ellinikos Synagermos</u> (Greek Rally)
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FIDIK	<u>Fileleftheron Demokratikon Kentrou</u> (Liberal Democratic Center)
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
GNP	Gross National Product
HAI	Hellenic Aerospace Industry
IDEA	<u>Ieros Desmos Ellinon Aksiomatikon</u> (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers)
JUSMAAG	Joint United States Military Assistance Advisory Group
JUSMAGG	Joint United States Military Assistance Group, Greece
KKE	<u>Kommounistikon Komma Elladhos</u> (Communist Party of Greece)
KKE/ML	<u>Kommounistikon Komma Elladhos/Marxismos-Lenin</u> (Communist Party of Greece/Marxist-Leninist)
KP	<u>Komma Proodeftikon</u> (Progressive Party)
KYP	<u>Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion</u> (Central Intelligence Service or Agency)
MAP	Military Assistance Program
NADGE	NATO Air Defense Ground Environment radar system
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ND	<u>Nea Demokratia</u> (New Democracy)
ND	<u>Nees Dynameis</u> (New Forces)



OECD            Organization for Economic Cooperation and  
                 Development

OMLE           Organosi Marxiston Leniniston Elladhas  
                 (Organization of the Marxist-Leninists of  
                 Greece)

OPEC           Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PAM            Patriotiko Metopo  
                 (Patriotic Front)

PASOK          Panellinion Sosialistikon Kinima  
                 (Panhellenic Socialist Movement)

SIPRI          Stockholm International Peace Research Institute



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For the authorship of this thesis, for any errors, omissions or inaccuracies, I alone am responsible.





## INTRODUCTION

In April 1967, the countries of the free world, particularly the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Council of Europe, were shocked and dismayed to witness the abrupt termination of democratic government in Greece, the birthplace of democracy and the cradle of Western civilization. The fact that Greece had experienced a coup was not surprising, for the coup in April 1967 was only one in a succession of military interventions in Greece in the twentieth century. However, Greece was the first nation in the noncommunist, post-World War Two world to fall prey to military intervention. Furthermore, the 1967 coup broke tradition with previous twentieth century coups in that the leaders attempted to retain power after restoring order rather than relinquishing control to civilian political elites as in the past.

As weeks turned into months and then into years, the traditionally close and warm relations between Greece and the U.S. were strained to the breaking point. One visible manifestation of the estrangement in relations was a growing anti-American sentiment among Greeks, even among segments of society typically considered sympathetic to, if not pro, America. The cause of that sentiment was the American relationship with the military leaders of the junta.





Since the demise of the junta in 1974, Greek resentment of America for its actual and perceived role in the seven and one-half year dictatorship, has been exacerbated by the Cyprus crisis in mid-1974, the perceived American 'tilt' toward Turkey and the dispute between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean Sea. In all these cases, the U.S. is blamed for its inability to ameliorate the situations.

Today, Greek antipathy toward the U.S. is still widespread, but largely latent. However, it is still exploited by politicians on the left with considerable success, and it remains a stumbling block in the efforts of the conservative government of Greece to strengthen its ties with the U.S.

It is out of concern for future Greek-American relations that this thesis examines the American relationship with the regime of the Greek colonels in an effort to identify the origin of Greek anti-American sentiment.

Greek citizens did not accept the curtailment of democratic practices and civil liberties by the junta with complacency or resignation. Despite a history of military intervention in the past 150 years of modern Greece, the resolution of political and social difficulties by military coup d'etat is not viewed with favor by the vast majority of Greeks. As in the past, most Greeks resisted the regime of the colonels. Physical resistance, characterized by acts of violence, was not uncommon. For most Greeks, however, resistance took the more passive form of



non-cooperation and nonsupport. The plight of the Greek people elicited the support and sympathy of people of Greek ancestry throughout the world. In the United States, the highly influential Greek Lobby was split between pro-junta and anti-junta segments. While the anti-junta segments of the Greek Lobby registered some victories in Congress, it was the pro-junta segment and Administration preferences which governed the American stance vis-à-vis the Greek colonels.

The events following the demise of the junta and the restoration of democracy testify to the failure of American policies pursued after the military coup: (1) The rule of the colonels came to an ignominious conclusion in the July 1974 Cyprus debacle, which resulted in the Turkish invasion and subsequent occupation of some forty percent of the island. The U.S. was blamed for not preventing the attempted overthrow by the colonels of Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios, and the subsequent Turkish invasion. Furthermore, the U.S. was unable to resolve the confrontation which nearly brought the two NATO allies to the brink of war. (2) The August-September 1978 lifting of the arms embargo against Turkey, imposed in the immediate aftermath of the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, signalled to the Greeks a 'tilt' toward Turkey by the U.S. (3) In August 1974, the Prime Minister of Greece, Constantine Karamanlis, reacting to popular pressure, withdrew Greek armed forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization military command



structure while remaining a member of the alliance. Subsequent efforts to reintegrate Greek forces have failed in the face of Turkish intransigence. (4) Stemming in part from the Cyprus debacle and Greek absence from NATO, disputes between Greece and Turkey over Aegean Sea airspace, territory and seabed mineral rights have been a major stumbling block in the easing of tensions between the two rivals, and ultimately with the U.S. Many Greeks as well as Turks blame the U.S. for both the existence of these disputes and the inability to settle them.

Little, if any, progress has been made in resolving these issues during the past six years. With the passing of time, the ability of the U.S. to ameliorate these situations has decreased. Some aspects of the problems may now be virtually insoluble, such as the Greek refugees on Cyprus most of whom have resettled and are building new lives. Even so, bitter feelings have left a festering sore that could erupt. While American policy makers may regard these issues, and the larger issue of the U.S. relationship with Greece, as secondary in importance, the Greeks certainly do not. It is outside the scope of this thesis to postulate solutions to these imposing problems, a task which numerous statesmen have so far been unable to accomplish. Rather, the objective of this thesis is to provide the reader with an understanding of Greek-American relations during the junta, and the rise of Greek anti-American feelings, in order to better understand and deal with the present state





of relations between Greece and the U.S.

This thesis is divided into two major sections. The first section, composed of Chapters One through Three, examines the background of the coup, the coup itself, and its consequences for Greece. Chapters Four and Five examine the American relationship with the colonels and Greece, the reaction the relationship provoked, and several indicators of the character of the relationship. This analysis attempts to establish that American policy regarding the regime of the colonels was ill-advised, ill-conceived and, ultimately, a failure. The final chapter concludes by discussing the significance of the Greek estrangement from the United States in terms of several current issues in Greece: the political leadership of the country, geographical disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, and the Greek relation with NATO.





## I. BACKGROUND TO THE COUP: THE ACTORS AND FACTORS LEADING UP TO THE COUP

### A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Greece has been the scene of virtually constant turmoil since its independence from the Ottoman Empire in the late 1820's. It has been a republic three times (1827-1831, 1924-1935 and 1973 to the present) and a monarchy twice (1833-1863 and 1867-1973).<sup>1</sup> The monarchies never worked well. King Otho was expelled in 1862, King George I was assassinated in 1913, King Constantine I was twice deposed -- temporarily in 1917 and permanently in 1922. King Constantine's son reigned briefly before dying from a monkey bite. King George II was unseated in 1924 when a republic was proclaimed. He returned in 1935 and reigned with a great deal of difficulty until his death in 1947. He was followed by his brother King Paul, who died in 1964. King Constantine II was ousted by the coup d'etat in 1967 and lost his throne when the present Greek republic was proclaimed in 1973.<sup>2</sup>

Amidst all this turmoil the Greek army has acquired the sacred quality of being the instrument of national liberation and salvation. This has manifested itself in a proliferation of successful and unsuccessful revolutions and coups in the following years: 1843, 1862, 1909, 1916, 1922, 1923, 1925, 1926, 1933, 1935, 1936, 1943-1944 (in exile),



1951, 1967 and 1973.<sup>3</sup>

In addition, Greece has had eight constitutions (1844, 1864, 1911, 1927, 1952, 1968, 1973 and 1975), the Parliament has been dissolved at least forty-eight times and from 1844 to 1967 one hundred and fifty different governments have held office.<sup>4</sup>

With this kind of record before him an observer of Greek affairs could hardly call the coup d'etat of April 21, 1967 an atypical experience. In two ways, however, the coup was unusual. First, Greece was the first noncommunist European state since the end of World War Two to fall prey to a military dictatorship. Second, starting in 1909 the military had intervened in order to restore order after which rule of the country was returned to the civilian politicians. This remained the pattern until 1967 when the military officers who executed the coup opted to remain in power rather than return control to the civilian political elite once order was restored.<sup>5</sup>

## B. THE SECOND WORLD WAR

World War Two devastated Greece, especially in economic terms. Immediately after liberation, the British "stabilized" the drachma at 50,000 million old drachma to one new drachma, of which there were then 600 to the British pound sterling. It was lowered in mid-1945 to 2,000 to the pound, 20,000 by early 1946 and 32,000 to the pound sterling in 1948.<sup>6</sup> According to Constantine Tsoucalas, between 1940 and 1944, Greece lost 550,000 people or eight percent



of its population; 401,500 homes were totally destroyed leaving 1,200,000 people homeless; 1,770 villages were totally burnt down; seventy-three percent of cargo ship tonnage and ninety-four percent of passenger ships were sunk; fifty-six percent of roads were unusable; sixty-five percent of private cars, sixty percent of trucks and eighty percent of buses were destroyed; sixty percent of horses, sixty percent of cattle and eighty percent of small animals perished; twenty-five percent of forests were burnt down; and, in 1944, cereal production was down by forty percent, tobacco production by eighty-nine percent and currant production by sixty-six percent.<sup>7</sup> Despite this toll, the Greek contribution to the war effort was considerable. Winston Churchill estimated that the Greek resistance tied down six to seven German divisions on the mainland and the equivalent of four more in the islands.<sup>8</sup>

From the occupation by Germans, Italians and Bulgarians arose a much more damaging condition. On their entry into World War Two, the people of Greece had been divided over what is known as the National Schism, that is those Greeks who had supported the King versus those who had sided with the former Prime Minister, Eleutherios Venizelos, over the issue of involvement in World War One. The Greek experience in World War Two superimposed upon this division a new split -- those who supported the communists versus those who did not.





This new situation stemmed from the occupation. Greece was occupied by the Germans and their allies, on the one hand, and by the communists and their allies, on the other. Greece experienced two resistance efforts -- the communists formed the core of the active resistance movement and fought the Germans, while Greek nationalists resisted both the communists and the Germans and their allies.<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, Greece became a pawn in the power struggle between the leading allied powers during World War Two. Meeting in Moscow in October 1944, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill turned to the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and said:

Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?<sup>10</sup>

While this was being translated, Churchill wrote it down on paper and passed it to Stalin, who ticked his consent with blue pencil and returned it. In this fashion Greece became a British concern; it remained so until 1947 when the British relinquished control to the United States.

#### C. BRITAIN, THE COMMUNISTS AND THE CIVIL WAR

The major resistance effort in World War Two was organized and led by the Greek communists. As the war progressed they formed the National Liberation Front (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo - EAM) as the national resistance





movement. In April 1942 the military arm of the EAM, the National Popular Liberation Army (Ethnikos Laikos Apelftherotikos Stratos - ELAS) was established. Because of rigid communist hierarchy, the EAM/ELAS was the best organized and most successful resistance organization, and, not surprisingly, attracted the most recruits. However, most of the rank and file knew about or cared little for communist ideology, and were not communists. Yet enough were that on December 1, 1944 the EAM/ELAS launched a civil war with the aim of seizing control of the reins of government in Greece.

With considerable British effort this round of the EAM/ELAS uprising was halted and a treaty between the communists and the British was signed at Varkiza, Italy on February 12, 1945. Ironically the methods the British employed in putting down the rebellion were criticized and condemned by the American press and State Department. Churchill later wrote:

I little thought however at the end of 1944 that the State Department, supported by overwhelming American opinion, would in little more than two years not only adopt and carry on the course we had opened, but would make vehement and costly exertions, even of a military character, to bring it to fruition.<sup>11</sup>

The third and final round of the civil war, or "anti-bandit struggle," erupted again in 1946 and raged until mid-1949. It was more than just a continuation of the World War Two resistance movement. Several motives for the civil war have been offered: (1) that Stalin desired an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea, yet this motive was offset



by his desire to avoid a clash with the West; (2) that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria desired to annex Greek Macedonia, but this was offset by mutual rivalry between Tito and Dimitrov over the spoils; and (3) that the Slavophone minority in Greece desired autonomy and this objective was compatible with the Greek communist ambition for absolute power.<sup>12</sup>

There is little evidence to support the first two motives, whereas evidence does exist supporting the opposite views. Milovan Djilas, in his book Conversations With Stalin, quotes a conversation held between Stalin and the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Edvard Kardelj:

Stalin then turned to the uprising in Greece: "The uprising in Greece has to fold up." (He used for this the word svernut, which means literally to roll up.) "Do you believe" - he turned to Kardelj - "in the success of the uprising in Greece?"

Kardelj replied, "If foreign intervention does not grow and if serious political and military errors are not made."

Stalin went on, without paying attention to Kardelj's opinion: "If, if! No, they have no prospect of success at all. What do you think, that Great Britain and the United States - the United States, the most powerful state in the world - will permit you to break their line of communication in the Mediterranean Sea! Nonsense. And we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible."<sup>13</sup>

Once the northern communist neighbors of Greece withdrew their support, and the Greek communists could no longer obtain moral and material support, as well as sanctuary, the civil war took a downward turn. An additional major factor in the weakness of the communists at that time stemmed from the nature of Greek society. Greece had minimal industrial





capacity and, consequently, the industrial working class was small. In addition other political issues, such as suffrage and representation, that had contributed to social unrest in other countries, were absent in Greece. The early support for the communists came primarily from the large numbers of Greek refugees flowing into the country following the Greek debacle in Asia Minor in 1922. These factors, plus the mass disaffections from the EAM/ELAS after the war was over, and the increasing level of communist atrocities, eroded any possible base of support the communists may have had.

There are two opposing points of view on the role of the British intervention in Greece in 1944. The cold-war interpretation says that without British, and subsequently American, help Greece would today be a communist country. The opposing revisionist interpretation says that British intervention was a blunder based on misjudgement. Consequently, the British equated the liberal democratic forces in Greece with communism and, by aligning themselves with the conservative forces, the British neutralized the liberal center in Greece and contributed to a polarization in Greek society and politics. This in turn led to the civil war and subsequent events up to and including the April 21, 1967 coup.<sup>14</sup> The pertinent point here is that the British intervention was an important and critical factor.

The costs of the civil war were immense, especially following on the heels of World War Two. Between June 1945



and March 1949 the Greek communists suffered 28,992 killed, 13,105 prisoners, 27,931 surrendered and an estimated figure twice that size wounded. The Greek National Army casualties were 10,927 killed, 23,251 wounded, 3,756 missing, while about 4,000 civilians were executed, murdered or lost in combat-related accidents.<sup>15</sup> The Greek communists also abducted 28,000 Greek children and spirited them across the border into East European countries.

#### D. THE UNITED STATES AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

U.S. involvement in Greece began in February 1947 with the receipt of a British notice that, as of April 1, 1947, they could no longer afford the economic burden of keeping Greece free of the communists:

The United States Government will readily understand that His Majesty's Government, in view of their own situation, find it impossible to grant further financial assistance to Greece. Since, however, the United States Government have indicated the very great importance which they attach to helping Greece, His Majesty's Government trust that the United States Government may find it possible to afford financial assistance to Greece on a scale sufficient to meet her minimum needs, both civil and military.

His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to express the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that, if a joint policy of effective and practical support for Greece is to be maintained, the United States Government will agree to bear, as from the 1st April, 1947, the financial burden, of which the major part has hitherto been borne by His Majesty's Government.<sup>16</sup>

With little time to react, and the Greek civil war raging, President Harry S. Truman addressed the U.S. Congress on March 12, 1947 in a speech which evolved into the Truman Doctrine:





The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance.

. . . . .

...We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

. . . . .

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

. . . . .

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948....

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished....<sup>17</sup>

On May 22, 1947 Truman signed the Act to Provide Assistance to Greece and Turkey (Public Law 75) thereby establishing the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG). The first priority in this effort was defeating the communists, followed by reconstruction and recovery. U.S. interests in Greece soon evolved into essentially the following: (1) maintaining U.S. and NATO bases in Greece and denying Soviet access; (2) maintaining unrestricted military transit and overflight rights over Greek territory and waters; (3) keeping Greek-Turkish relations as



friendly as possible so as not to damage NATO; and (4) developing and maintaining a favorable trade and investment climate for American investment and economic concerns in Greece.<sup>18</sup>

The degree of U.S. intervention soon became apparent. An aide-memoire, dated June 21, 1947 from the Greek Embassy in Washington to the State Department, expressed Greek exasperation with U.S. interference:

It seems therefore expedient that it be made clear whether the United States Government considers that the Greek Government should be at liberty, without hindrance or diplomatic intervention, to suppress the Communists' activities in Greece. If so, it would be appreciated if appropriate instructions could be transmitted to the American Ambassador in Athens.<sup>19</sup>

The American point of view on U.S. involvement in Greek affairs is evident in the following extract of a telegram, sent by Governor Dwight P. Griswold of the U.S. Mission to Greece to the Secretary of State on October 24, 1947:

It is my considered opinion that it would be wrong for AMAG or for US Government to attempt to represent to world opinion that AMAG does not have great power or that it is not involved in Greek internal affairs....

. . . . .

I believe it was intent of Congress that this Mission act discreetly but forcefully to help in the rehabilitation of Greece to the end that Communism would be checked here. Congress also intended and visiting Congressmen have stressed that strict control over expenditure of American and Greek funds be exercised by the Mission. This means involvement in internal affairs and I see no advantage pretending it is something else.<sup>20</sup>

A further elaboration on U.S. involvement in Greek affairs was given by the State Department in its Position on Organization of American Activities in Greece, October 23, 1947:





Among the matters on which such high policy decisions would be required are:

- a) Any action by United States representatives in connection with a change in the Greek Cabinet;
- b) Any action by United States representatives to bring about or prevent a change in the high command of the Greek armed forces;
- c) Any substantial increase or decrease in the size of the Greek armed forces;
- d) Any disagreement arising with the Greek or British authorities which, regardless of its source, may impair cooperation between American officials in Greece and Greek and British officials;
- e) Any major question involving the relations of Greece with the United Nations or any foreign nation other than the United States;
- f) Any major question involving the policies of the Greek Government toward Greek political parties, trade unions, subversive elements, rebel armed forces, etc., including questions of punishment, amnesties and the like;
- g) Any question involving the holding of elections in Greece.

The foregoing list is not intended to be inclusive but rather to give examples.<sup>21</sup>

It is hardly surprising that Greeks then and now shared the opinion that nothing important could happen in Greece without the green light from Washington.

Between 1947 and 1952, the U.S. supported centrist and left-of-center political parties as the best hope for thwarting communism in Greece. This changed radically by 1952. A clear example of blatant U.S. interference in Greek elections is evident in a statement by U.S. Ambassador John Peurifoy published March 15, 1952 on page one of the Athens newspaper Eleftheria:



Because the American government believes that the reestablishment of the "simple proportional" election method, with its unavoidable consequences of the continuation of governmental instability, would have destructive results upon the effective utilization of American aid to Greece, the American Embassy feels itself obliged to make its support publicly known, for the patriotic position of the Prime Minister Plasteras with regard to this subject.<sup>22</sup>

A weakness in Greek politics since the early 1950's has been the support given to the conservative right by the U.S., while virtually no effort has been expended to cultivate favorable relations with center or center-left politicians and parties.

#### E. GREEK POLITICS: FROM PAPAGOS TO PAPADOPOULOS

##### 1. Political Parties in General

Since World War Two there have been at least ninety-five political parties on the Greek political stage. Of these, sixty-three participated only once in a general election. Only thirteen ever entered more than two electoral contests, either alone or in a coalition with others.<sup>23</sup>

Political parties in Greece are heavily personalistic, and are structured around the charisma and personality of individual political figures, rather than a political ideology or program. These major figures often shift parties, or form their own. The significance of a political party often boils down to the assistance it renders voters in dealing with the state bureaucracy and other power structures. Out of this situation arises a form of client-type relationship between the politicians





and the voters; thus, when a particular politician leaves the party, he takes along his loyal followers as a form of dowry.<sup>24</sup> This type of political system contains some basic weaknesses: (1) a tendency for liberal politicians to question the validity of the constitutional foundation, especially the King (while Greece was a monarchy); (2) conservative leaders accuse their liberal colleagues of being dupes or collaborators with the pro-communist left; (3) a deliberate inefficiency exists in the bureaucracy; (4) the press exploit the situation to increase circulation; (5) uncertainty exists around an ever changing electoral system; and (6) there is an inherent dishonesty in the frequently changing voting procedure.<sup>25</sup>

Since 1945 the body of Greek voters has traditionally been divided into three basic groupings: conservatives, liberals and leftists. The conservatives usually support stronger ties with the West, oppose communist ideology, are sympathetic to the King and have strong emotional attachments to the national interest. The liberals attach great importance to social improvements, are very sensitive to charges of submission to the West, are indifferent if not unsympathetic to the King, and favor more flexibility in dealing with the communists and other socialist countries. The third group either accepts Marxist-Leninism or, at least, favor a basic reorientation of the social-political structure toward a controlled economy and closer ties with the Soviet Union. Table 1 depicts the Greek voting



TABLE 1  
ELECTION RESULTS BY MAJOR POLITICAL  
GROUPINGS, 1946-1964

Election Date	Conservative		Liberal		Left	
	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats
31 Mar 1946	64.00	235	33.70	117	-	-
5 Mar 1950	38.37	93	46.97	139	9.7	18
9 Sep 1951	43.29	146	44.76	132	10.57	10
16 Nov 1952	50.22	242	34.88	51	9.15	0
19 Feb 1956	50.48	165	(49.52)*	(135)	(9.52)	18
11 May 1958	44.10	175	31.29	46	24.42	79
29 Oct 1961	49.60	174	34.30	103	15.10	23
3 Nov 1963	42.85	134	42.18	138	14.34	28
16 Feb 1964	35.26	105	52.78	173	12.00	22

SOURCE: D.G. Kousoulas, "Greek Politics," Balkan Studies 8 (1967): 418, Table A.

\*In this election the Liberals received approximately 40%, plus 9.52% for the Left (EDA), yielding a combined total of 135 seats.

patterns by major groupings for the years 1946 to 1964.

## 2. Papagos and the Greek Rally

Between 1952 and 1964 Greece was governed by a single party under Papagos, and then Karamanlis, winning four consecutive elections. Marshal Alexander Papagos formed the Greek Rally (Ellinikos Synagermos - ES) and



ran for Prime Minister with the urging of the U.S. The U.S. was successful in persuading enough defectors from the coalition government of Prime Minister Plasteras' National Progressive Union of the Center (Ethniki Proodh-eftiki Enosis Kentrou - EPEK) and the Liberal party of Sophocles Venizelos to join the Greek Rally in order to garner fifty percent of the vote and eighty percent of the seats in Parliament in the November 1952 elections.<sup>27</sup>

### 3. Karamanlis and the National Radical Union

Following the death of Papagos, Constantine Karamanlis, a relatively minor Minister of Public Works, was selected over the heads of more senior members of the Greek Rally to become the new Prime Minister. Karamanlis reorganized and renamed the Greek Rally as the National Radical Union (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis - ERE).

During his long tenure from 1955 to 1963, Karamanlis brought rapid economic growth and stability to Greece. To a considerable degree, however, this was attributable to the generally improved economic situation all over Europe, especially West Germany, which made it possible to export the Greek unemployed who then found jobs and sent their money home, as well as to the increasing levels of tourists from Northern Europe and the U.S.<sup>28</sup>

On the other hand, Karamanlis was not without fault. He continued traditional political practices of distributing favors, subsidies, tax privileges and foreign credits to buy support from people with extensive





influence networks.<sup>29</sup> Karamanlis was also criticized for agreeing to the Zurich and London Agreement of 1959 which created an independent republic of Cyprus.<sup>30</sup>

Following several conflicts, Karamanlis was forced to resign in 1963. First, the May 1963 murder of a left-wing deputy, Gregory Lambrakis, caused a public outcry. The ensuing trial of the accused murderer by the Karamanlis government was botched and this contributed to an erosion of public support for Karamanlis.<sup>31</sup> Secondly, several actions by Karamanlis regarding the royal family were criticized. The Karamanlis government had granted Princess Sophia, the eldest daughter of King Paul, a £107,000 dowry for her wedding to Prince Juan Carlos of Spain in May 1962. Then, in August 1962, the King's Civil List was increased from £137,000 to £202,000, and this coincided with a rise in sugar prices, a freeze on civil servant wages and the cessation of U.S. economic aid to Greece.<sup>32</sup> Finally, Karamanlis came into opposition with King Paul over a proposed visit to Britain in May 1963. All of these factors, combined with the relentless attacks of the opposition Center Union party, forced Karamanlis to resign June 11, 1963.

#### 4. Papandreou and the Center Union

The Center Union party (Enosis Kentrou - EK) was established September 19, 1961 by George Papandreou. At that time it was a coalition of splinter center parties. In the October 29, 1961 elections the EK won only 34% of





the vote, losing to Karamanlis and the ERE. Accusing Karamanlis of terrorizing voters, Papandreou launched a "relentless struggle" against Karamanlis, which, together with other factors, finally brought about his resignation.

In the 1963 elections, Papandreou was forced to accept assistance from the United Democratic Left (EDA), having failed to obtain an absolute majority. His party only received a fraction of a percent less than the coalition of the ERE with the center-right party of S. Markesinis. Finding this an unacceptable situation, Papandreou called for another election in February 1964 and gained 52.78% of the vote, an absolute majority, eliminating the necessity of relying on the leftist EDA, and placing his party well ahead of the right.

The policies and practices of George Papandreou impinged upon everything that Karamanlis had built. The defense budget was cut, imports were increased, income taxes were reduced by ten percent while the prices of most goods were increasing and inflation had set in. At the same time, Papandreou practiced most of the same politics as Karamanlis, providing supporters with civil service posts and new jobs, indiscriminate spending, etc.<sup>33</sup> The downfall of Papandreou and the role of his son will be discussed in a subsequent section.

##### 5. The Left Parties

The Greek communist party was outlawed in 1947. It did not resurface again as a legal party until 1974,



and by then the KKE (Kommounistikon Komma Elladhos) was divided into three factions. In 1951, the United Democratic Left (Eniaia Demokratiki Aristera - EDA) was legally established to fill the void, and it was commonly recognized as a front for the outlawed communist party.

Communist parties in Greece have traditionally drawn no more than ten to fifteen percent of the popular vote, with the exception of the 1958 election. There are at least six reasons why communism has remained so unpopular in Greece: (1) the KKE leadership is drawn mainly from the disenchanted, bitter, frustrated, semi-literate segment of society; (2) the KKE association with the Soviet Union and other communist nations gives rise to Greek fears of domination; (3) Greeks enjoy private ownership and freewheeling political activity and these conflict with communist command economy and single-party rule; (4) the KKE has a well-published record of brutality during World War Two and the civil war including the kidnaping of 28,000 Greek children; (5) the peculiar language and dogma of communism is not appealing; and (6) the presence of intraparty quarrels, infighting and intrigues keeps people away.<sup>34</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the Greek communist party is presently split into three main factions. There are, however, numerous other tiny cells such as the pro-Chinese Organization of the Marxist Leninists of Greece (OMLE), and the Greek Revolutionary Liberation Front (EEAM) and the Greek Communist Party/Marxist Leninist (KKE/ML), both of



which are Stalinist in their orientation.<sup>35</sup> The three main factions include the KKE (Exterior) which is pro-Moscow and supported financially and morally by the Soviet Union, the KKE (Interior) which split off in February 1968, and the third faction, which is called "Chaos" and blames the other two factions for the poor showing of the Left in Greece.<sup>36</sup>

On the night of the coup, April 21, 1967, most of the KKE leaders were arrested without the slightest resistance and its archives were found intact in the headquarters of the EDA.<sup>37</sup> This fact casts suspicion on the justification given by the junta of imminent communist takeover.

#### F. GEORGE PAPANDREOU, THE ASPIDA AFFAIR AND THE KING

Three main factors contributed to the political demise of George Papandreou: the ASPIDA affair, his son Andreas, and the attempt to fire the Defense Minister.

The first reports of the secret army organization called ASPIDA (Aksiomatikoi Sosate Patridhan Demokratikia Aksiokratia - Officers Save the Country, Ideals, Democracy and Meritocracy) and the involvement of Andreas Papandreou, came from General George Grivas on Cyprus. George Papandreou kept this information silent for a period, either because he doubted the authenticity of the information or because it implicated his son as an accomplice in the affairs of this secret left-wing army organization.<sup>38</sup>

While the ASPIDA incident was still being investigated, Papandreou attempted to fire his Defense Minister, Petros Garoufalias, a man who refused to allow Papandreou a free





hand with the army. This, combined with the fact that Papandreou wanted to assume the post himself, and the ongoing ASPIDA investigation, led to a constitutional crisis.

On July 15, 1965, Papandreou confronted the King over his attempt to fire the Defense Minister. Papandreou offered to resign; the King accepted on the spot. This incident led to a chaotic situation in the next twenty months and became a matter of great controversy. King Constantine felt that Papandreou had attempted to subordinate the military to the office of Prime Minister. This was considered treasonous by the King, since the armed forces were responsible to him, and it was his responsibility to maintain absolute control over the only instrument which could guarantee the well-being of the nation.<sup>39</sup>

The basic issue turned on Article 31 of the 1952 Constitution which said, "The King appoints and dismisses his Ministers." In practice, since 1875, this has meant that a government rules only with the confidence and support of Parliament. The King could not appoint Ministers not sure of having that confidence; nor could he dismiss them unless they had lost the confidence of Parliament.<sup>40</sup> Since, at the time, both the government of the center and the opposition of the right were loyal, and the party system was working, the crisis of July 1965 need not have been fatal, or even have happened, if cooler heads had prevailed.





G. BREAKDOWN OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY: 1965-APRIL 1967

Following the resignation or dismissal of George Papandreou, six governments came to power in rapid order, averaging about one every three or four months. Table 2 gives the chronology of Greek Governments from 1955 to the coup. The first two governments during this chaotic twenty-one month period, were formed by Center Union leaders George Athanasiades-Novas and E. Tsirimokos from Center Union defectors, and were called "Governments of Puppets" by George Papandreou. Both were short-lived. The third government, formed by S. Stephanopoulos, finally garnered enough Center Union defectors to obtain a vote of confidence. His government remained in power over a year.

The stability and legitimacy of parliamentary government was shaken by prevalent strikes and riots. Between 1965 and April 1967 there were an estimated 950 strikes, or about twenty-four a month.<sup>41</sup> Everything built during the stable years of the Karamanlis government was eroded by "strikes, chaos, anarchy, inflation, slanderous attacks upon institutions, the squandering of public funds, and the demolishing of all sense of hierarchy."<sup>42</sup> Andreas Papandreou even went so far as to announce that he would swear in a government of his choice in Constitution Square regardless of the outcome of the elections scheduled for May 28, 1967.<sup>43</sup>

Prime Minister Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, following riots in Athens by left- and right-wing students on



TABLE 2

## GREEK POLITICAL PARTIES, GOVERNMENTS AND ELECTIONS

Political Parties	Founded Political Spectrum	
Center Union (EK)	1961	Center
Liberal Democratic Center (FIDIK)	1965	Center-Right
National Radical Union (ERE)	1956	Right
Progressive Party (KP)	1955	Right
United Democratic Left (EDA)	1951	Left

## Governments

Prime Minister	From - To	Vote of Confidence
C. Karamanlis (ERE)	6 Oct 1955- 11 Jun 1963	Yes
P. Pipinelis (ERE)	19 Jun 1963- 25 Sep 1963	Interim Government
S. Mavrohihalis	28 Sep 1963- 8 Nov 1963	Caretaker Government
G. Papandreou (EK)	8 Nov 1963- 24 Dec 1963	Yes
J. Paraskevopoulos	31 Dec 1963- 19 Feb 1964	Caretaker Government
G. Papandreou (EK)	19 Feb 1964- 15 Jul 1965	Yes
G. Athanasiades-Novas (EK)	15 Jul 1965- 5 Aug 1965	No
E. Tsirimokos (EK)	20 Aug 1965- 29 Aug 1965	No
S. Stephanopoulos (FIDIK)	17 Sep 1965- 21 Dec 1966	Yes
J. Paraskevopoulos	22 Dec 1966- 30 Mar 1967	Caretaker Government
P. Kanellopoulos (ERE)	3 Apr 1967- 21 Apr 1967	Caretaker Government



TABLE 2 -- Continued

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Elections

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May 11, 1958

October 29, 1961

November 3, 1963

February 16, 1964

May 28, 1967 (scheduled but never held because of the coup d'etat on April 21, 1967)

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SOURCE: Stephen Rousseas, The Death of Democracy: Greece and the American Conscience (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967), p. 3.

April 4, 1967, and 2,000 leftist building workers April 12, dissolved Parliament on April 14 and scheduled elections for May 28.<sup>44</sup> From his self-imposed exile in Paris former Prime Minister Karamanlis issued a statement on the whole affair:

Democracy in Greece is bankrupt. Those responsible are the King, the Members of Parliament of all parties, and the press. If an army takeover is to come, it will merely be the coup de grace. Democracy has long been assassinated in Greece.<sup>45</sup>

On April 21, 1967 the colonels struck.

#### H. THE GREEK MILITARY

Obviously, when speaking of a military coup d'etat, a key variable is the armed forces, because they are the segment of society which executes the coup. In Greece this translates into the army, since it is the army that





traditionally seizes the reins of government. It is vital to know something about the attitudes and perceptions of the army before attempting to explain the rationale for the 1967 coup and the ensuing practices of the self-selected leaders of the coup.

While naval officers in the Greek military tend to come from a more narrow upper stratum of society, the army and air force have typically been vehicles of upward social mobility for the sons of middle and lower-middle class families. Table 3 presents a demographic breakdown of army

TABLE 3  
DEMOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF THE GREEK PROFESSIONAL  
OFFICER CORPS, 1916-1965

Population Group	Army**	Total Population
less than 1,000	32.1%	34.6%
1,000-5,000	25.9%	20.2%
5,000-10,000	6.2%	3.2%
10,000-50,000	18.0%	12.0%
50,000 or more*	4.2%	3.5%
Thessaloniki & Athens	13.6%	26.5%

SOURCE: James Brown, "Military Intervention and the Politics of Greece," in Soldiers in Politics, eds. Steffen W. Schmidt and Gerald A. Dorfman (Los Altos, CA: Geron-X Inc., 1974), p. 231, Table 7.

\*Does not include Thessaloniki and Athens

\*\*Greek army officers consist of about 65-70% of total officer corps



officer origins based on the size population group from which they are recruited. The close approximation to the total population distribution is a notable indicator of the less well-to-do origins of army officers. It can be seen that significantly fewer army officers come from the urban centers of Athens and Thessaloniki.

A critical factor in understanding the motivation of army officers in seizing control of the government is the aspect of self-image. Professor George Kourvetaris has conducted several in-depth studies into precisely this factor. He says that "the modal self-image of the Greek officer is a synthesis of a primitive and indigenous heroic value system with a managerial ethic derived from the contemporary Western model."<sup>46</sup> From interviewing one hundred Greek officers of varying ranks and experience the primary quality of "ethics and character" was cited as the key necessary attribute of the good officer. This was chosen above other choices of ethical and psychic qualities, such as command and leadership qualities, professional competence or expertise, health and bodily qualities, combat experience and other qualifications. This characteristic is expressed in the word philotimo which literally means "one who loves honor." Philotimo corresponds with Greekness: the greater the intensity of philotimo the greater the degree of Greekness.

Recurring throughout his interviews, Kourvetaris found that ideally the army should never intervene in politics,



but when things get too bad it is the duty of the army to save the nation from extreme peril, be it internal or external. He observed that some of the interviewed officers said the politicians had lost their philotimo and, consequently, their legitimacy to rule. A strain of "puritanism" is revealed in the response of one Greek officer: "The officer is popular; he represents the real Greek. The revolution spoke to the hearts of the Greeks. The officer commands souls and dies in the fire; his profession is unique."<sup>47</sup>

Prevalent in the Greek military, but certainly not unique to it, is the presence of secret military societies. A major clandestine society was the Sacred Bond of Greek Officers (Ieros Desmos Ellinon Aksiomatikon - IDEA) which was a larger, expanded version of the Union of Young Officers (Enosis Neon Aksiomatikon - ENA) set up by elements of the Greek officer corps in the Middle East in August 1943.<sup>48</sup> The purpose of IDEA is expressed in three areas: (1) anti-communism, (2) loyalty to the King, and (3) support of conservative, nationalistic political leaders such as Constantine Karamanlis.<sup>49</sup> After World War Two, IDEA declined in significance, only to be revitalized following the 1958 elections and the dramatic electoral gains of the leftist EDA party.

Approximately ten years before the coup some of the more junior officers in IDEA formed the National Union of Young Greek Officers (Ethniki Enosis Neon Aksiomatikon -





EENA).<sup>50</sup> The chief organizer of this small band was Colonel George Papadopoulos who, coincidentally, played a key role in IDEA as the main figure responsible for passing the order executing any coup that might be staged by IDEA. Consequently, the night of April 21, military officers who received orders originating from Papadopoulos to execute the coup, readily complied, believing the coup was IDEA-inspired rather than an act of the smaller EENA.<sup>51</sup>

A final secret organization was ASPIDA. This organization has already been discussed in connection with the role of Andreas Papandreu and the downfall of George Papandreu from his position as Prime Minister in 1965. All that needs to be said here is that the effect of ASPIDA on the army was to arouse fears that it was the vehicle for the infiltration of leftists into the army. Also, it was alleged to be supporting Archbishop Makarios in his efforts to reject a NATO solution to the Cyprus issue.<sup>52</sup>

Finally, the army functions as a major interest group in Greek society, with four major differences from other interest groups: (1) the hierarchical structure and chain of command make the army a formidable foe in competition for power and influence; (2) the Greek military possesses the means of repression and violence; (3) the specific type equipment and uniforms give the military a high visibility; and, (4) in their capacity as the representative and national defender of the Greek nation and its interests, the military carry added weight in their access to natural resources and share of the governmental budget.<sup>53</sup>





## II. THE COUP D'ETAT: THE MECHANICS AND STRUCTURE, ITS IDEOLOGY AND REACTION TO IT

### A. MECHANICS OF THE APRIL 21, 1967 COUP D'ETAT

The military takeover was a virtually bloodless operation. It commenced at approximately two AM, April 21, 1967, and, by sunrise, the key points, such as radio stations, communication centers and airfields in Athens, were under army control and the tentacles of military rule were spreading throughout the nation.

The coup, code-named IERAX (The Hawk), put into operation the NATO plan Prometheus II which called for the rapid roundup of communist leaders and other security suspects in the event of war with a communist country.<sup>1</sup> The successful application of this plan depended upon two things: sufficient men and equipment to seize and control the key points, and the allegiance of a high-ranking figure whose name would be signed to the orders executing the contingency plan. The first was provided by one of the coup leaders, Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos, who commanded the only tanks near Athens and also headed the armored training center. The second was provided by the last minute recruitment of the army chief of staff, Lieutenant General Gregorios Spandidakis.<sup>2</sup>

The names of those arrested and detained in the early hours of the coup came from a list several years old which



had been hastily updated. Consequently, many people were arrested who were no threat to the military or the success of the coup, while many others, who may conceivably have been a threat, slept through the night undisturbed.

At six AM on April 21 the ruling junta broadcast to the public the following announcement:

The armed forces have taken over the government of the country. The king, in accordance with Article No. 91 of the Greek constitution "following a proposal by the cabinet, in case of serious trouble or an obvious threat to the public security and order of the country," has ordered with a royal decree the suspension all over the country of Articles No. 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 20, 95, and 97 of the constitution. The king also in accordance with Article No. 91 has formed special courts-martial.<sup>3</sup>

The use of the name of the King in this broadcast was not authorized. The King had neither instigated nor supported the coup. One of the coup leaders, Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos, admitted in a UPI interview on May 1 that the coup had taken place without the knowledge of the King "because we had to protect him from those who would accuse him of being the instigator."<sup>4</sup>

On April 21 it was also announced that the country was considered to be under a "state of siege" in accordance with the terms of Law DXTH of 8 October 1912. These conditions were put into effect with Royal Decree No. 280 of April 21, 1967. (See Appendix A) The state of siege rules stipulated that:

(1) Individuals can be apprehended and arrested without charge. They can be detained for any length of time. (2) There is no bail for political crimes. (3) All citizens, independent of position, can be brought before an emergency court-martial. (4) All gatherings, indoors or outdoors, are forbidden. All gatherings will be dissolved





by force. (5) It is forbidden to form a syndicate [union] or group with labor union aims. Strikes are completely forbidden. (6) It is permitted to search houses, political premises, public buildings, all buildings, day and night, without special warrant. (7) It is forbidden to announce or publish any kind of information in any way through the press, radio and television without censorship beforehand. (8) Letters, telegrams and all means of communication will be censored. (9) Crimes, political crimes as well as those of the press, whether they have to do with private life or not, as well as the crimes to be judged by the court of appeal, will be judged by court-martial. (10) Everyone who commits a crime which should be punished by law, even if it is not against the army, will also be judged by court-martial.<sup>5</sup>

## B. WHY DID THE COUP OCCUR?

There are numerous reasons for the intervention in April 1967. Professor Kourvetaris, in his interview of the Greek officers conducted in the winter of 1968/69, posed the following question: "What do you think was the main issue(s) prior to the 1967 military intervention?" All of the interviewed officers cited one or more of the following three conditions: the communist threat, political decay, or social inequality and decadence of the society at large.<sup>6</sup>

Professor Theodore A. Couloubis cites as contributing factors the following: the polarization of Greek post-war politics between the right and the left; a heritage of short-term, opportunistic, personalistic political parties; the divisions within the defense establishment seen in the conflicting views of ASPIDA and IDEA; a history of U.S. dominance in Greek affairs; and a press that is lacking in social responsibility, biased, highly subjective and inflammatory.<sup>7</sup>





Professor James Brown examined this issue of why the coup occurred and provided some valuable insight. When looking at the economic conditions, he found that in the four years preceding the coup the rate of growth of the Gross National Product averaged 7.5% annually,<sup>8</sup> inflation in 1965 and 1966 averaged about six percent,<sup>9</sup> wages reflected an annual increase of about 8.4% and unemployment was relatively high, especially in the agricultural sector. Brown concludes that economic conditions were not a factor in the coup:

In none of their immediate post-April 21st pronouncements or in the interviews that this writer conducted with varied officials of the government were the economic conditions in Greece during the period of 1963 to 1967 ever mentioned as reasons for their intervention, although the government did place major emphasis on the economy after it took over.<sup>10</sup>

In looking at the political and social conditions, he finds these to be quite unsatisfactory. Between 1965 and April 1967 about eighty percent of the trade unions went on strike at various times -- an estimated 950 strikes.<sup>11</sup> In these and other riots, about 1,200 individuals were injured and about fifteen were killed. Of the injured, three hundred were gendarmerie, who had the main responsibility for keeping public order.<sup>12</sup>

Ironically, in a public opinion poll of Greek citizens during 1965-1966, forty-three percent felt that the most crucial problem was the economy, while only twenty-seven percent said that political problems were worse.<sup>13</sup> This is a reversal of the mainstream military justification for



intervening.

As mentioned earlier, the communist threat was a frequent and major justification given by the military leaders for the intervention, at least in the early days of the coup. The junta leaders, however, failed to produce any evidence to support their contention and the credibility of this justification soon evaporated. Kourvetaris found that the communist threat, real or imagined, was firmly perceived as present and threatening by the army officer corps at large. Kourvetaris observed that: "Those officers who fought the Greek communists in 1944 to 1949 and in the Korean conflict were the most pro-interventionist of the officers. In the words of several: 'We fought the communists in Korea; we defeated them three times in Greece. Yet I was stunned to see them again on the sidewalks of Athens.'" <sup>14</sup> Certainly the junta made every effort to convince the Greek people of the communist threat. A bulky, illustrated booklet published in English by the Panhellenic Confederation of Reserve Officers, entitled: "Why did the Revolution of 21 April take place?" stated that before the coup the communists had controlled "the beds of public houses, the licenses of trifle-sellers, even the frozen chickens" and that the houses of military officers had been marked with yellow dye in preparation for the hour of communist uprising. <sup>15</sup> The regime claimed to have discovered numerous communist-owned caches and seventy three-ton truck loads of bogus uniforms and weapons. Despite promises from



the coup leader, Papadopoulos, none of this was ever produced.<sup>16</sup>

Historical and political developments preceding the coup tend to support the perceptions of military officers that there was a communist threat. The 1956 elections legitimized the EDA, which was a recognized front for the outlawed KKE. In 1958, the EDA received almost twenty-five percent of the vote and became the opposition party. In 1963, the Center Union party of George Papandreou took the reins of government. This change of government was a leftward shift from the ERE of Karamanlis. In addition, Andreas Papandreou, who had rapidly ascended the political ladder, was vocally critical of the crown, NATO and the U.S., all of which the military stood for. Rightly or wrongly, real or perceived, the threat of communist takeover was a major justification of the junta.

Even in the United States there were learned people who believed in the reality of the communist threat in Greece as long as four and five years after the coup. Professor D. George Kousoulas of Howard University, who helped draft the 1968 Greek Constitution, cited a four-step plan of the EDA to gain power, in testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, September 15, 1971. His testimony cites a statement by Manolis Glezos, a key leader in the EDA party and a long-time communist, given May 25, 1966 in a closed strategy conference of the executive committee of EDA. Kousoulas says the EDA planned





to assist the electoral victory of the Center Union party of George Papandreou:

Then EDA was going to put into effect the following four-step plan.

I quote: "Phase one. -- We'll support the Government" -- meaning the Center Union Government which EDA expected would be dominated by Andreas Papandreou.

"Phase two. -- We'll participate in the Government.

"Phase three. -- We'll be the government and they" -- meaning Papandreou -- "would be the participants.

"Phase four. -- We alone shall be the government."

This EDA plan was the well-known, almost classic, process used in Eastern Europe in the late forties for imposing Communist rule.<sup>17</sup>

Politically, the previous two years had been in constant turmoil with repeated changes of government. For this the politicians must bear a major share of the responsibility for the coup. The coup merely administered the coup de grace to the wreckage of the previous multi-party system.

#### C. THE JUNTA LEADERS AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

Table 4 contains the names of the leaders of the coup and the positions they assumed within the government. The three primary figures, who were the initiators and primary executors of the coup, were Colonel George Papadopoulos, Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos and Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos.

At the time of the coup there were twelve to seventeen officers actively involved in its execution with another forty to fifty who willingly followed orders thereby insuring success of the coup. At the insistence of the King,



TABLE 4

NAME, RANK AND GOVERNMENTAL POSITION  
OF THE MAJOR COUP LEADERS

Name	Rank in 1967	Governmental Position
G. Papadopoulos	Colonel	Minister to the Prime Minister
S. Pattakos	Brigadier General	Interior and Security Minister
N. Makarezos	Colonel	Economic Coordination Minister
G. Spandidakis	Lieutenant General	Deputy Prime Minister & Defense Minister
G. Zoitakis	Lieutenant General	Undersecretary for National Defense
J. Ladas	Colonel	Undersecretary for Thessaly
D. Ioannides	Lieutenant Colonel	Commander of the Military Police

SOURCE: James Brown, "Military Intervention and the Politics of Greece," in Soldiers in Politics, eds. Steffen W. Schmidt and Gerald A. Dorfman (Los Altos, CA: Geron-X Inc., 1974), p. 236, Table 12. Also George Zaharopoulos, "Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece," in Greece Under Military Rule, eds. Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1972), p. 31, Table 1.

the junta appointed a civilian Prime Minister, Constantine V. Kollias, the Crown Prosecutor of the Supreme Court. In addition, the majority of the cabinet was composed of civilians, although each ministry contained at least one military member of the "revolution" as secretary or



undersecretary. Loyal officers were rewarded for their support. Many appointments to government positions made sense only when viewed from the standpoint of blood or marriage ties to army officers.<sup>18</sup> In subsequent cabinet reorganizations more military officers were appointed to top ministerial positions.

From the outset the junta went through progressively orchestrated government reorganizations to first consolidate power in the hands of the top three, and later, in the hands of Papadopoulos. By reorganizing the government, Papadopoulos was able to maintain a facade to the rest of the world that the junta was demilitarizing. Initially, the major decisions were made by the thirteen member "Revolutionary Committee" below which was a forty-one member "Revolutionary Council."<sup>19</sup> Both of these organizations operated secretly. The only formal recognition of the Revolutionary Committee was in Article 134 of the 1968 Constitution, where it spoke of the Regent being appointed by "proclamation of the Revolutionary Committee." Once Papadopoulos became Prime Minister, the Revolutionary Committee ceased to function.<sup>20</sup>

At the time of the coup, Papadopoulos was the deputy director of the operations branch of the army general staff, Makarezos was the officer-in-charge of an espionage section in the Greek Central Intelligence Service (Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion - KYP), while Pattakos commanded armored forces in the Athens area.<sup>21</sup> Following the





abortive counter-coup by the King in December 1967, and his subsequent departure to Rome, several changes were made to the military government. On December 20, 1967 Papadopoulos, Pattakos and Makarezos resigned their military commissions.<sup>22</sup> Lt. Gen. Zoitakis was named as Viceroy and Regent of Greece with all the powers of King Constantine. Papadopoulos became Prime Minister and Defense Minister, while Pattakos added the position of Deputy Premier. Lt. Gen. Spandidakis was relieved of his position in the government December 13 for refusing to return from NATO headquarters and lead the armed forces against the King.<sup>23</sup> A fundamental change occurred in the junta in February 1968 when all but two of the military officers resigned their commissions.<sup>24</sup>

Papadopoulos enlarged his cabinet on June 29, 1970 by adding largely nonmilitary men.<sup>25</sup> On July 21, 1970 he assumed the additional position of Acting Foreign Minister following the death of Foreign Minister Panayiotis Pipinelis. Christian Xanthopoulos-Palamas was sworn in as Undersecretary in the Foreign Ministry.<sup>26</sup>

August 26, 1971 witnessed a major reorganization of the junta cabinet, noted by foreign observers as a further "demilitarization" of the government. The move reduced the overall number of ministries, created new ones, reduced the power of the closest army and political associates of Papadopoulos and divided the nation into seven administrative districts under the authority of undersecretaries. Papadopoulos added to his positions of Prime Minister,



Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministers, a newly created Ministry of Government Policy which combined the old Ministry to the Premier and the Economic Coordination Ministry. Pattakos lost his position as Interior Minister, while Makarezos was appointed Second Deputy Premier, but lost control of the abolished Economic Coordination Ministry.<sup>27</sup>

The next major change occurred in June 1973 when the Council of Ministers issued a decree abolishing the monarchy, proclaiming a "presidential parliamentary republic," and naming George Papadopoulos as the provisional President. The remainder of 1973 witnessed rapid preparation for civilian rule (but still under the former army officers): September 9 -- the official closing of all military courts that had been operating since the coup in April 1967; September 14 -- the government appointed an eleven-man constitutional court to screen political parties and candidates for elections; October 1 -- all current cabinet members submitted resignations, and Spyros Markezinis agreed to become the first civilian Prime Minister since Constantine Kollias in 1967. He was to set up an all-civilian cabinet to prepare for parliamentary elections in 1974.<sup>28</sup>

But then the situation degenerated, with student unrest and violence at the Athens Polytechnic, anti-junta sentiment arising in the navy, and rampant inflation all contributing to the November 25, 1973 overthrow of Papadopoulos





and the installation of an even more oppressive dictatorship under Dimitrios Ioannides.

#### D. IDEOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES OF THE JUNTA

It has been widely stated that the junta had no ideology aside from its desire to put Greece back on its feet again after restoring order to the chaotic political arena. Papadopoulos himself termed the regime a "parenthesis" between the old politics and a new system of democracy,<sup>29</sup> and a form of "guided democracy."<sup>30</sup> Certainly, from the things the leaders said, one can glean elements of puritanism, idealism, populism and nationalism.

Professor Christos L. Doumas cites Document SS/116, April 21, 1967, from the Ministry to the Prime Minister, which gave the following objectives of the junta: (1) to promote national unity; (2) to affect a just redistribution of the national income; (3) to bring about justice in taxation; (4) to accelerate economic development; and (5) to improve the lot of "farmers, the workers, professionals, artisans and all persons of toil."<sup>31</sup> The civilian Prime Minister of the junta, Constantine V. Kollias, provided the following political and ideological position in a speech given at ten PM on April 21, 1967:

The salvation of the nation is the superior law....

...We belong to no party and support no particular faction....We are led exclusively by patriotic motives, and we aim at destroying depravity, to clean up public life, to throw out of the state organization the putrefication from which it was threatened.

After the establishment of normal life and the creation of suitable conditions in the shortest amount of





time, the country will return to the parliamentarians on a healthy basis. Then the mission of the new government will be over.<sup>32</sup>

Professor Couloumbis describes the ideology of the military regime based on the framework of one of the major theoreticians of the regime, George Georgalas.<sup>33</sup> First, the military officers considered their action a revolution, and not a coup d'etat, in the sense that a revolution has as its aim the fundamental changing of society while a coup d'etat results only in the change of leadership. Second, the social system was to remain essentially the same, only more healthy and with more equitable distribution of wealth. Third, the economic system was to remain unchanged except to operate more smoothly. Fourth, the intellectual system was to remain based on Greek-Christian values while a wider opening for the young and "technocrats" would facilitate modernization. And, fifth, the political system was to undergo "a complete and absolute revolution" with a complete abandonment of the "old political world."

A great deal can be gleaned from the public statements of the three key members of the junta. Papadopoulos said the following when speaking of the restrictions imposed on the Greek people:

Do not forget that we are before a diseased person whom we have on the operating table, and if the surgeon does not fasten him to the table during the operation, there is the possibility that, instead of restoring his health, we will lead him to death. The restrictions are only the necessary act of fastening the diseased body to the operating table.<sup>34</sup>



Pattakos made the following comment about the armed forces: "The armed forces are the most democratic elements in any country -- they have the most respect for the law. We are taught to obey so that we can command."<sup>35</sup>

In a speech at the University of Jannina on December 6, 1969, Ladas made the following comment about philosophy: "...no other people have any philosophers. The Greeks have exhausted the subject....Foreigners can only imitate them...."<sup>36</sup>

In early 1971 Ladas made the following pronouncement about the quality of art: "Good art is that which is good for the Motherland. Bad art is that which is bad for the Motherland."<sup>37</sup> A simple yardstick.

Papadopoulos, speaking about the Greek peasantry and workers in a speech on December 15, 1969, stated what the basic attitude of the Greek people should be: "The Greek people must eat less, work more and demand less."<sup>38</sup>

Pattakos spoke in the following manner about Dimitrios Stratis, a leader of prisoners on the prison island of Yiaros: "He calls himself a Socialist, but he is a Communist. In Greece, we have right people and wrong people. All those who are against the country are Communists. Stratis is a Communist in his heart and his works. They are all liars."<sup>39</sup>

All of the above quotes display a considerable degree of political naivete and simplistic populism. It seems apparent that the military leaders had good intentions,



but lacked the political acumen to carry them out. Their methods were extreme and counter-productive.

Pattakos on April 27, 1967 ordered the Education Ministry to ban long hair on boys and miniskirts on girls, and to order students to regularly attend Sunday mass and to avoid such entertainment as pinball machines. Pattakos, in a joint statement with the Minister of Public Order, issued the following: "Foreigners with filthy and tattered clothing and wearing beards or long hair will be turned back at the border."<sup>40</sup> At the same time such major issues as drug addiction, sex education, handicapped children and the existence of slums were declared nonexistent in Greece and not investigated.<sup>41</sup>

The ideology of the junta can best be summarized as idealistic, with high hopes and aims for Greece. The colonels were pursuing a "Greece of Christian Greeks." Makarezos wrote in the introduction to the 1970 Greek Government publication The Revolution of 21st April 1967 Builds A New Greece: "...the Greek armed forces took the responsibility of managing the country's affairs under the ancient dictum salus populi suprema et lex [the public safety is supreme and is the law of the land]."<sup>42</sup> Unfortunately, the achievements of the colonels fell considerably short of their aspirations.

#### E. GREEK REACTION TO THE COUP

The military takeover was virtually bloodless. That fact alone seems to have contributed to what became a





largely nonviolent response by the majority of the Greek people, at least in the early months of the coup. One author says that, contrary to other reports, more than fifty percent of the people welcomed the coup, while as many as seventy percent saw it as a necessary evil to restore order to the chaotic political situation.<sup>43</sup> Many Greek citizens, on the other hand, referred to the seven and one-half year military dictatorship as the Katochi, the occupation, a term that was usually reserved for the German occupation of Greece in World War Two.<sup>44</sup> It was even possible to find writers who applauded the takeover believing that "if the center-left bloc had won the May 28th [1967] election the king would have been dethroned, the political voice of the nationalist segment of the population would have been silenced, and the country's foreign alliances terminated."<sup>45</sup>

Reaction to the junta was relatively passive in the first one to two years, with criticism coming mainly from intellectuals, journalists, politicians, human rights advocates and others who, directly or indirectly, were impinged upon, suffered and lost as a result of the coup. Increasing acts of violence and resistance did occur as the period of military rule increased. These will be discussed in a later chapter.

One obvious manifestation of Greek dissatisfaction with the junta was the rising tide of anti-American sentiment. A typical example of the view held by Greeks was that:



"Every Greek inside Greece, and every person of Greek connections outside, painfully believes that Washington installed the dictators who rule or misrule their country and maintain them as a going concern."<sup>46</sup> What led many Greeks to believe in U.S. complicity was the open American opposition to the Center Union party in the two years prior to the coup. Furthermore, it was a commonly accepted view in Greece that everything that occurred in Greece was permitted by the U.S. And the American CIA had a reputation for making or breaking foreign governments. The American CIA also established and bankrolled the KYP (Greek CIA). Certainly, the U.S. took no overt negative actions to oust the junta or convince the Greek people otherwise.

A major, outspoken critic of the junta was Andreas Papandreou. Arrested by the junta, with his political career seemingly ruined and subsequently ejected from Greece, Papandreou certainly had grounds for the bitterness evident in his accusations toward the junta and the U.S. This Greek politician played a major role in convincing many Greeks that the U.S. was directly behind the junta and that the CIA was the vehicle through which the U.S. was pulling the strings in Greece. Responding to an interview question, Papandreou said: "I know for a fact that such a decision [military coup d'etat] was made at the White House in February 1967, during a meeting at which presidential advisor Walt Rostow, presided."<sup>47</sup> In a speech he delivered at Amherst College in the spring of 1971 Papandreou





elaborated on that statement:

There was a meeting in February, 1967 in Washington of a subcommittee of the Security Council, under the chairmanship of W. W. Rostow. In this meeting -- the C.I.A., the Pentagon, the State Department participated -- Rostow ascertained that a victory in Greece for the Center Union Party, of which George Papandreu was the leader, would be contrary to the interest of the United States. The election was due to take place in May, 1967. Since that victory was certain and beyond doubt, something must happen to prevent it. Reportedly, Rostow finished his meeting with the following sentence, "Gentlemen, what we have said today, or rather what we have failed to say, has set the course of events in Greece inevitably." That means that at the Rostow level at least there was a green light for a coup as of February, 1967. The coup occurred in April.<sup>48</sup>

He went on to say:

Cyrus Vance, on the morning of the coup (April 21, 1967) circulated among various governmental offices in Washington, D.C., to assure officials that this coup was "ours," and that concern about it was unnecessary. What is my source of this information? The junta itself. An officer who has now defected from the junta has submitted this evidence to me.<sup>49</sup>

Writing after the November 1973 student uprisings in Athens, which brought about the demise of Papadopoulos, Papandreu exhibited a further tendency to base his rhetoric on his feelings and not on accurate data. Nevertheless, his rhetoric has had and continues to have significant effect on Greek public opinion about the junta and the United States. He praised the November 16, 1973 uprising as "a genuine, if short-lived, social and political revolution." He continued, "it is certain that at least 400 people lost their lives and that at least 1,000 were wounded. Reliable reports reaching us now indicate the existence of mass graves in two army camp locations in the environs of Athens."<sup>50</sup> All other reports that this author has seen





speak of 15-30 deaths, while none mention any mass burial sites.

In that same article written in February 1974, Papandreou said: "...the primary objective is national liberation -- the ousting of the United States and NATO from Greece."<sup>51</sup>

Certainly a major expression of the legitimacy and acceptance of a government was manifest in the level of resistance activity directed against it. Despite considerable violence, resistance by most people to the junta took the form of passive, nonviolent protest, at least among the older generations. Among the intellectuals, protest took the form of a silent strike, that is, failing to produce anything of literary, educational or artistic value. In March 1969, however, the floodgates were opened when the Greek Nobel prize winner, George Seferis, released the following statement:

A regime has been imposed upon us which is entirely opposed to the ideals for which our world fought during the last war. Our spiritual values...have been submerged in the muddy and stagnant waters of a swamp.... Tragedy lies in wait at the end...the longer this abnormal situation lasts, the worse it becomes....<sup>52</sup>

Much of what was produced by Greeks was published outside the country in English and other languages. One of the quirks of the junta was that while the Greek press was censored, foreign books, periodicals and newspapers continued to be sold openly on the streets, so criticism of the junta manifested itself widely in other languages. The following limerick mocks the junta and is typical of the



Greek criticism. It was composed by Greeks in English for American consumption:

Pattakos, Pattakos, national man,  
Make me a fascist as fast as you can.  
Brainwash and grill me,  
For Greece's sake kill me;  
Or send me to Yiaros to make me a man.<sup>53</sup>

Resistance to the coup was manifest in the quality of the people recruited by the junta into the government. Many of the efficient, technically-oriented Greeks did not wish to serve the regime because of differing ideological views and fears of being labelled a collaborator.<sup>54</sup> Prominent Greeks such as Xenophon Zolotas and John Pesmazoglou, Governor and First Deputy Governor of the Bank of Greece, respectively, resigned in 1967 rather than continue under a military government.<sup>55</sup>

More than one assassination attempt was made upon the life of Papadopoulos, starting as early as August 13, 1968.

Numerous underground organizations arose during the seven and one-half years. One such group was formed by political and cultural leaders -- writers, artists, educators, lawyers, scientists, journalists and politicians -- to circumvent the ban on political parties and maintain a resistance. The Society for the Study of Greek Problems, of which John Pesmazoglou was a prime mover, was regarded as perhaps the most effective resistance organization of this type.<sup>56</sup> Two more violence-oriented groups were the Democratic Defense (Demokratiki Amyna - DA) and the Patriotic Front (Patriotiko Metopo - PAM)<sup>57</sup> who jointly issued





a statement in Athens on May 23, 1968: "all foreign tourists who visit Greece will be considered as sympathizers who contribute directly or indirectly to the perpetuation of the dictatorship."<sup>58</sup> An underground organization calling itself the Movement of National Resistance issued a statement July 29, 1969 threatening to kidnap or kill Americans for alleged collaboration with the army-backed Greek Government.<sup>59</sup>

Resistance to the junta existed even within the Greek military. Probably the best known case was the abortive counter-coup in May 1973 in which some thirty-five senior officers, both active and retired, planned to seize a number of ships and use them to force the resignation of the junta. Their arrest prompted the commander of the destroyer Velos, Captain Nicholas Papas, to break away on May 25, 1973 from ongoing NATO exercises off the island of Sardinia and, together with thirty members of his crew, seek and receive political asylum in Italy.<sup>60</sup>

Elements of every segment of society were opposed to the coup. The longer the junta remained in power, the larger and more vocal the anti-junta segments of society became. With their vocalness came increasing criticism of the U.S. as well. The junta was not well-liked and resistance to it was present in both passive and violent forms.

#### F. FOREIGN REACTION TO THE JUNTA

Foreign reaction to the coup ranged from the "rape of democracy," on the one hand, to "the Greeks got what they





deserved since they were unable to handle democratic institutions and political liberty," on the other. Governments around the world were cautious, but not long, in recognizing the new military government.

The British formally recognized the new regime on May 8, when the British Ambassador, Sir Ralph Murray, called on and congratulated the new Prime Minister, Constantine V. Kollias.<sup>61</sup>

Criticism of the junta was quick to develop. On September 21, 1967, Norway, Sweden and Denmark presented a formal complaint of human rights violations in Greece to the European Commission of Human Rights of the Council of Europe. A week later they were joined by the Netherlands. On March 25, 1968 charges of torture were added to the list of grievances. More about these accusations will be said in the following chapter.

Within NATO, pressure was exerted by Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, West Germany, Italy, and Canada against Greece as a member of NATO because of the undemocratic nature of her regime.<sup>62</sup> The U.S. acted openly to resist this pressure on behalf of Greece; Britain sided with the U.S. in this move.<sup>63</sup> The Plenum of the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO voted 26 to 4, with two abstentions, on October 20, 1969 to condemn Greece for its denial of democratic rights.<sup>64</sup>

Following the abortive counter-coup by King Constantine on December 13, 1967, the Athens Ambassadors of Britain,



Italy, France, West Germany and the U.S. ignored an invitation to meet with Papadopoulos on December 14.<sup>65</sup> The first two governments to recognize the new military government, after the departure of the King, were the Congo (Brazzaville) on January 13, 1968 and Turkey on January 20. The U.S. was third on January 23. Ambassador Talbot paid a visit to the Greek Foreign Minister and afterward announced that: "This is a resumption of normal diplomatic relations with the Greek government." State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey reiterated the U.S. position that, even in exile, King Constantine remained the Greek chief of state, but that "relations between the king and the government in Athens are an internal Greek matter about which it is not for the United States government to comment."<sup>66</sup>

Reaction by most foreign governments to the junta was to silently accept them on a business as usual manner. A few were vocally opposed to the regime as in the case of the Scandinavian countries. But, not one foreign government withheld recognition of the colonels.

The reaction and response of the U.S. Government will be discussed in detail in a separate chapter.





### III. THE PRACTICES, POLICIES AND RELATIONS OF THE JUNTA

#### A. THE JUNTA AND POLITICS

In the political arena action by the colonels was swift. The first political party to be abolished was the United Democratic Left (EDA) on April 29. Under Proclamation Nos. 5 and 8 of May 6, No. 16 of June 2, No. 19 of June 14, No. 22 of July 15, No. 28 of September 22 and No. 30 of November 13, 1967, issued by the Chief of the General Staff, 279 associations and organizations were dissolved and banned.<sup>1</sup> These organizations were liberal and leftist, three-fourths of which were labor unions. However, they also included youth, student, athletic, civic and women's organizations.<sup>2</sup> The following day (April 30) all youth organizations affiliated with political parties were outlawed. The new Prime Minister, in reference to students, said: "they were abandoning their education and, instead of being educated to become good citizens, they were educating themselves in mob-rule and sidewalk demonstrations. It was time that [youths] returned to their task and to the way of virtue and duty."<sup>3</sup> On May 27, 1967 the junta closed the headquarters of the right-wing National Unity Party and arrested the leaders,<sup>4</sup> an action demonstrating that political repression was not limited only to the leftists and liberals. On May 6 the junta abolished the constitutional





provisions allowing for election of municipal and village officials; they now became junta appointees. They also disbanded all municipal and village councils.<sup>5</sup> They proceeded to destroy the system of nonpolitical nomarchs (district administrators). More than one-half of the nomarchs were removed and most were replaced with army officers.<sup>6</sup> Tenure of civil servants was abolished, many were removed, and army officers or their relatives and friends replaced them.<sup>7</sup> *Pg 7*

When democracy was restored, and Karamanlis became the Prime Minister once again, 108,000 junta appointees, ranging from village councillor to the President of the Greek Supreme Court, were dismissed by the Karamanlis government, and 400 junta leaders and other collaborators faced trial.<sup>8</sup>

#### 1. The 1968 Constitution

Shortly after seizing power, the colonels appointed a twenty-man committee, the Mitrelias Committee, to draft a new constitution.<sup>9</sup> On July 11, 1968 the first draft of the new 138-article constitution was made public. Papadopoulos unveiled a revised edition on September 16. The revised edition omitted one proposed article which banned Greeks, who had obtained foreign citizenship, from serving in Parliament. This article was intended to insure that Andreas Papandreou, who had been an American citizen before returning to Greece, would never again hold an elected office. The major revision, however, was the amendment of the last article so as to enable the junta to hold in abeyance



twelve articles dealing with personal freedoms until the "aims of the revolution" were achieved. Article 138 said:

The present Constitution, after its approval by the Greek people through referendum, signed by the Cabinet and published in the government gazette, comes into immediate effect, with the exception of the provisions of articles 10, 12, 13 section 1, 14 sections 1-3, 18, 19, 25 sections 2-3, 58 sections 1-2, 60, 111, 112, 121 section 2, the national revolutionary government being authorized to place these provisions into effect through acts published in the government gazette.

The articles cited above pertained to arrest and imprisonment (10); right to trial by a judge in one's own jurisdiction (12); inviolability of the home (13); freedom of speech, press and censorship (14 sections 1-3); right of assembly (18); right to form associations, unions and cooperatives (19); use of the royal decree (25 sections 2-3); political parties (58 sections 1-2); elections to parliament (60); jurisdiction of courts over specific types of cases (111); special laws over courts-martials and juvenile courts (112); and the election of municipal and village officials (121 section 2). In addition, several of the articles dealing with freedoms were qualified, such as Article 9 (2): "Personal liberty is inviolable. No one is prosecuted, arrested, imprisoned or otherwise restricted, except whenever and in whatever way the law rules." and Article 13 (1): "The home of each person is inviolable. No house search can take place except at a time and manner prescribed by law."

By decree on August 6 voting on the 1968 Constitution was made compulsory for all Greeks between the ages of





twenty-one and seventy who lived within three hundred miles of their voting district. A massive propaganda drive was initiated by the junta to insure the passage of the new constitution in the referendum scheduled for September 29. It included the display of banners and posters stating NAI (YES) to the constitution. Electricity bills and incoming mail were even stamped YES TO THE CONSTITUTION.<sup>10</sup> In the zeal to insure victory, an American family in Greece, whose car sported a NO vote bumper sticker, was detained and interrogated by the police. When released they were followed. Driving past the U.S. Embassy in Athens the wife jumped out, ran into the Embassy screaming "Help, help!" A Greek policeman pursued her into the Embassy and was dragging her out when he was stopped. Later the Greek Foreign Minister apologized to the American Ambassador saying, "The Greek Government forbids Americans to meddle in Greek affairs and also forbids Americans to criticize America."<sup>11</sup>

On the day of voting, newspapers carried the banner headlines: "Set the Foundations For the New Democracy! -- Greek People Summoned to Defend the Nation."<sup>12</sup> A few days before the referendum it was common knowledge that provincial governors were told to hold all police chiefs, mayors and village leaders personally responsible for every negative vote cast.<sup>13</sup> Police were used to keep order outside; only soldiers with an officer were inside the voting places to supervise.





The new Greek Constitution was overwhelmingly approved by a vote of ninety-two percent. Information Bulletin No. 26, September 30, 1968, from the Royal Greek Embassy Press and Information Service in Washington, described the outcome in this manner:

By 92.2% the Greek people approved yesterday the country's new constitution in a national referendum, held in absolutely irreproachable conditions of freedom and order throughout the country. Of the total number of 6,508,894 registered voters, 5,042,545 cast their votes. 18,473 of them were invalid votes. Of the valid votes, 4,633,602 were in favor of the constitution and 390,470 against it.<sup>14</sup>

Despite the massive propaganda blitz, a significant number of people saw fit to vote OXI (NO). Various shady, if not outright illegal, practices were observed. Early voters at some polling places witnessed boxes of NO ballots being strewn on the floors of the booths to discourage voters from casting a negative vote,<sup>15</sup> while in outlying districts such as Crete and Macedonia it was reported that only YES ballots were available to voters.<sup>16</sup> Civil servants and social security employees received ballots in specially colored envelopes. In small villages and districts with very few civil servants it was therefore easy to trace NO votes to disloyal public servants.<sup>17</sup> Ballot boxes were taken away in army cars for tabulation and no foreign journalists or observers were admitted at the counting.<sup>18</sup>

Elias P. Demetracopoulos, an anti-junta Greek lobbyist, made the following comment on the 1968 Constitution voting results to the House Foreign Affairs Committee,



July 12, 1971: "...when they [the colonels] come and they have the audacity to present a Stalinistic vote of 92.2 percent -- for 3,000 years the Greeks have not agreed by such a percentage on any issue -- would they agree on Papadopoulos with 92.2 percent?"<sup>19</sup> Incredulity such as this was widely expressed throughout the world.

The Constitution, less the articles held in abeyance, went into effect November 15, 1968. Not until April 9, 1969 were the first three of the suspended articles restored. These concerned the inviolability of private homes, the right of association and the right of assembly.

There are several additional criticisms of the 1968 Constitution. First, the new constitution severely curtailed the powers of the King in several ways. (1) The King was required by Article 43 to appoint as Prime Minister the leader of the party "having the absolute majority in Parliament," and, if no party had a majority, it was up to Parliament, not the King, to elect the leader who would then be appointed by the King. (2) The power of the King to dismiss his ministers was made subject to the recommendation of the Prime Minister. (3) The King could dissolve Parliament only "after having heard the opinion of the Council of the Nation." (Article 46) And, (4) while the King remained as leader of the armed forces, "the administration of the armed forces shall be exercised by the Government." (Article 49)<sup>20</sup>





Second, state supervision over political parties was expanded and further legitimized. Article 58 (2) said: "The character of every party must be approved by the Constitutional Court, which checks as to the conformity of its provisions in relation to the Constitution. No party shall have the right to participate in elections if its charter has not had the aforementioned approval." Furthermore, "The general functioning of the parties...shall be subject to the continuous supervision of the Constitutional Court, which shall have the right to dissolve any party whatsoever for violation of the Constitution or the laws." (Article 58 (4)). To insure the obedience and existence of the correct parties, Article 58 (5) specified that:

Parties whose aims or activities are manifestly or tacitly opposed to the form of government or tend to overthrow the existing social system or endanger the territorial integrity of the state or public security, shall be outlawed and dissolved by decision of the Constitutional Court, as provided by law.<sup>21</sup>

Third, the position of the army was expanded. The authority of the service councils composed of high-ranking military officers over matters of promotion, retirement, assignments, etc. was increased and the Defense Minister was bound by their decisions. The armed forces were charged with defending "the national independence, territorial integrity of the state and the existing political and social system against any insidious attempt." (Article 129 (1)).

Finally, the powers of the existing leaders were strengthened with regards to the future. The first





parliamentary elections, after the constitution was placed into affect, were to be carried out under the provisions of a law to be promulgated by the junta government (Article 135). The provisions of the new constitution, which designated the form of government a crowned democracy, once ratified "may never be revised" (Article 137 (1)) and the nonfundamental provisions of the constitution could only be revised after a period of ten years had elapsed.<sup>22</sup>

## 2. The 1973 Constitution

On June 1, 1973, the Council of Ministers formally abolished the monarchy and proclaimed a new "presidential parliamentary republic" with Papadopoulos as provisional President. The period of the "Revolution of April 21, 1967" was officially proclaimed to have ended.<sup>23</sup> A public referendum held on July 29 approved the Republic and 78.4% of the voters affirmed Papadopoulos as President.<sup>24</sup> This constitutional referendum was conducted under strict surveillance by foreign press and diplomatic observers, and can be considered to be more truly representative of the wishes of the Greek people, although by no means a free election.

During the referendum Papadopoulos permitted the greatest degree of liberalization since the beginning of the coup. He permitted former politicians to organize into a Committee for the Restoration of Democratic Legality, which was a violation of the law banning "revival of old



political passions."<sup>25</sup> On referendum day, the entire front page of the Athens daily Vradnyi above the fold was devoted to an editorial urging the people to vote no and it was overprinted on the Greek word for no, OXI, in eight inch high blue characters.<sup>26</sup>

Under the terms of the plebiscite the president and vice-president were elected for nonrenewable seven year terms. The president, in addition to his broad legislative and executive powers, was given exclusive control over foreign affairs, defense, national security and public order, including the right to appoint the prime minister, ministers and undersecretaries of the specified areas. The new Parliament was reduced to two hundred deputies from a pre-coup level of three hundred, and the president appointed ten percent of the deputies. The president also had the power to decide which matters were of public importance and should be put to a public vote in the future.<sup>27</sup>

#### B. THE JUNTA AND THE ECONOMY

There are several reasons why the junta experienced a significant degree of success in the field of economics, at least until 1972. (1) Monetary stability in Greece in the twelve years prior to the coup had instilled a sense of confidence in the Greek people and encouraged a high degree of savings. This in turn enabled Greek banks to finance housing and hotel construction, in particular, out of current savings investment. (2) Pre-1967 economic growth had created an excess productive capacity in basic





industries in addition to a slack created by the 1966-1967 recession. This was exploited by the colonels. (3) The ongoing boom in the world economy provided an outlet for Greek exports as well as an inflow of invisible earnings from shipping, tourism and remittances from Greek workers abroad.<sup>28</sup> Not until 1972-1973 did the regime run into trouble, when the policies of their predecessors no longer were bearing fruit and their own short-sighted practices headed the economy in a downward direction.

The regime maintained the rate of growth and employment which had started before the coup, but their expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, especially in the non-productive sectors of the economy such as tourism, destroyed the preexisting monetary stability and returned Greece to post-World War Two rates of inflation. Between 1961 and 1971 Greece had experienced the lowest average rate of inflation among all the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). By 1973 it had reversed its position. The consumer price index increased by 15.3% from 1972 to 1973 and by 37.8% from April 1973 to April 1974.<sup>29</sup> In part, the phenomenal increase in the rate of inflation was due to the rate of increase in the amount of currency in circulation, which jumped from 7.1% in 1969 to 28.5% in 1973, and of the money supply, which included currency in circulation and private deposits. This increased from 8.2% in 1969 to 22.7% in 1973; both rates exceeded the rate of increase in real income which was 8.5% and 9.7% respectively.<sup>30</sup>





## 1. Gross National Product

After experiencing a steady annual growth rate of seven to eight percent between 1968 and 1972,<sup>31</sup> the Gross National Product (GNP) in 1974 actually declined by two percent for the first time since World War Two.<sup>32</sup> The junta had prepared a Five-Year Plan for the years 1968-1972 aiming for an increased annual GNP growth rate of 7.5 to 8.5%.<sup>33</sup> With the exception of 1974, the junta managed to stay within the limits of their plan. By the end of 1975, after returning to democracy, the Greek economy had recovered and the Gross Domestic Product reflected an increase of 3.7%.<sup>34</sup>

## 2. Agriculture

The Five-Year Plan projected 5.2% real growth in agriculture. Between 1967 and 1974 agriculture grew at only 1.8% in contrast with 4.2% growth between 1963 and 1966.<sup>35</sup> This decline was largely due to policies of the regime which reduced subsidies and placed severe price controls on agricultural products. In addition, private and public investment in agriculture declined.<sup>36</sup> The contributions of agriculture to the GNP fell from 27.7% in 1958 to 19.5% in 1973, while employment in agriculture fell from 54% to 37.17% of the active population.<sup>37</sup>

## 3. Industry

Industrial production increased at an annual rate of 8.3% between 1967 and 1971. However, this reflected a decline from the ten percent annual rate between 1962 and 1966. The Greek Government attributed the decline to a



slowdown in the building industry.<sup>38</sup> The rate of investment in manufacturing for 1968 to 1971 was about one-half of the 23.5% rate for 1963 to 1966. This was a reflection of the termination of industrial projects initiated before the coup and the relative absence of any newly initiated projects during the rule of the junta.<sup>39</sup>

#### 4. Foreign Investment

The colonels went out of their way to entice foreign investment to Greece. They offered special incentives to foreign businesses: (1) low interest rates and tax concessions to firms with high export potential, and (2) protection through special laws which stipulated that their assets could not be nationalized, profits could be taken out of the country and foreign employees were exempt from taxes.<sup>40</sup> Through these incentives the Government enticed twenty-five firms, eight of which were American, to establish regional supervisory offices in Greece by May 1968.<sup>41</sup> The Chase Manhattan Bank and Bank of America were two of those firms to join First National City Bank of New York and the American Express Company already in Greece.<sup>42</sup> The extent of foreign money involvement in the Greek economy is evident in a 1971 survey of five hundred industrial firms. Twenty-six (8%) were totally owned by foreign interests; fifty-seven (23%) reported "important foreign equity participation." In a sample of the two hundred largest firms, forty-five percent of the total exports were made by firms with "substantial foreign participation."<sup>43</sup>





The most noted example of the colonels' efforts to attract foreign investment was the arrangement with Litton Industries. Three weeks after the coup, the colonels negotiated a deal with Litton Industries to develop the whole geographical region of Western Peloponnesus and Crete<sup>44</sup> by procuring \$840 million in capital for Greece over a twelve year period.<sup>45</sup> The terms of the contract were lucrative. Litton risked nothing. Every month Litton filed invoices with the Greek Government for its costs and, in fifteen days, it got back everything it had paid out plus an eleven percent profit.<sup>46</sup> By May 1969 Litton was to have attracted sixty million dollars in foreign capital. As of December 1968, with two-thirds of the time gone, it had only attracted \$3.5 million.<sup>47</sup> The twelve year contract was cancelled by the Greek Government on October 14, 1969 after Litton failed to fulfill its obligations; however, Litton had lost nothing in the venture.

##### 5. Balance of Trade

The most dramatic failure of the colonels was the rapid increase in the balance of trade deficit. Table 5 presents data on Greek imports, exports and balance of trade. By and large, imports exceeded exports by a better than two-to-one ratio. Net invisible earnings, and long and medium term capital inflows, were insufficient to cover the rising trade deficit. In large this was a reflection of the objective of the regime to support a continued rise in demand as a sign of growth and development with little regard to its composition or consequences.<sup>48</sup>





TABLE 5  
GREEK IMPORTS, EXPORTS AND THE  
BALANCE OF TRADE, 1960-1977  
(in Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Year	Imports (cif)	Exports (fob)	Balance of Trade
1960	702.0	203.2	-498.8
1961	714.1	223.3	-490.8
1962	701.2	250.1	-451.1
1963	804.3	290.1	-514.2
1964	885.1	308.5	-576.6
1965	1133.7	327.8	-805.9
1966	1222.9	406.0	-816.9
1967	1186.3	495.2	-691.1
1968	1394.4	468.2	-926.2
1969	1594.1	553.6	-1040.5
1970	1958.3	642.5	-1315.8
1971	2098.1	662.5	-1435.6
1972	2345.8	870.9	-1474.9
1973	3432.6	1427.1	-2005.5
1974	3807.1	1753.8	-2053.3
1975	4955.1	2144.0	-2811.1
1976	6388.9	2702.0	-3686.9
1977	7262.4	2918.5	-4343.9

SOURCE: The Europa Year Book: A World Survey, Volume I. (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1962-1979).

NOTE: The above figures were converted from drachmas to dollars by the author using a conversion rate as follows: 30 drachma to the dollar for 1960-1973; 34.72 drachma to the dollar for 1974-1977. The conversion rate was provided by the source cited above.



## 6. Miscellaneous

In 1967 the Government enacted a law which introduced severe sanctions for tax evasion. The result was that the number of tax returns in 1967 rose from 327,000 to 601,677. In terms of declared income this reflected an increase from 29,465 million drachma to 58,172 million.<sup>49</sup>

As a consequence of the rabid inflation in 1973, the drachma was revalued upward by ten percent on October 19, 1973 to curb inflation.<sup>50</sup> On December 27, 1973 it was devalued to a rate of 29.3 drachma to the dollar, which was close to its value before the prior revaluation.<sup>51</sup> As of June 18, 1980 the exchange rate was 42.80 drachma to the dollar.

As in political affairs, the colonels lacked expertise in dealing with the economy. Makarezos, the Minister of Economic Coordination, had no formal training or qualifications for that position. He appointed his brother-in-law, Alexander Matthaïou, to the position of Minister of Agriculture. In an interview, Maurice Goldbloom asked Matthaïou whether or not Greece belonged to the International Wheat Agreement. Matthaïou replied that he had never heard of it. When Goldbloom explained what it was, Matthaïou said he was sure Greece was not a member. But, as Goldbloom departed, an interpreter caught up to him in the street to say that they had called another ministry and found out that Greece was indeed a member.<sup>52</sup>



## 7. Greece and the European Economic Community

Quick reaction to the military takeover came from the European Parliament of the European Economic Community (EEC). On May 11, 1967, the European Parliament went on record in opposition to the coup. It (1) expressed its concern over the suspension of democratic life in Greece; (2) declared its solidarity with the Greek people; (3) stated that relations would not return to normal until civil liberties and rights were restored in Greece; (4) delayed the accession by Greece to full membership until the Greek Parliament was able to negotiate freely; (5) expressed the hope that democratic life would return rapidly to Greece; (6) stressed that Greece respect the European Covenant on Human Rights; (7) demanded that the civil rights of politicians and political prisoners be returned; and (8) charged the various branches of the EEC to follow developments in Greece and keep the European Parliament informed.<sup>53</sup> The European Community and the Council of Europe were the only two external organizations to take real, substantive steps against the junta.

The European Community (EC) took steps against the junta in June 1967, by freezing negotiations for the eventual full accession of Greece to the EEC. Moreover, they suspended the unused credits of \$56 million out of the \$125 million credits previously granted by the European Investment Bank.<sup>54</sup> The seven and one-half year hiatus that followed caused a substantial loss of outside





investment and aggravated the problems of the Greek economy. Even though the motives of the EC for the freeze were political, the colonels did desire full membership in the EC, whereas they scorned the actions of the Council of Europe. They dropped hints that Greece was getting closer to the EC throughout the dictatorship. In May 1970, Makarezos announced that, as a consequence of the dramatic economic progress in Greece, full membership in the EC was feasible by 1972, however, he completely ignored the political considerations. Once the presidential republic was proclaimed on June 1, 1973, Makarezos stated that normalization with the EC could no longer be delayed.<sup>55</sup>

Not until the military junta was deposed and democracy restored under Karamanlis were relations with the European Community restored to normal. Greek associate membership in the EC was reactivated in December 1974 and application for full membership made on June 12, 1975.<sup>56</sup> On December 21, 1978 the EC approved full membership for Greece. Karamanlis signed the treaty of accession on May 28, 1979; it was ratified by the Greek Parliament on June 28, and full membership in the European Community is scheduled to take effect January 1, 1981.<sup>57</sup>

### C. THE JUNTA AND THE MILITARY

The effect of the junta on the Greek military is important for two reasons: first, it was the military which executed the coup and possessed the means for sustaining or overthrowing the military rulers. Second, and perhaps



more importantly, it is imperative to examine how Papadopoulos dealt with the military since it was primarily for the sake of the Greek military contribution to the NATO alliance that the U.S. Government maintained relations with the Greek military government.

Sir Hugh Greene, former Director-General of the British Broadcasting Corporation and Chairman, European-Atlantic Action Committee on Greece, testified to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 14, 1971 that:

...out of 6399 serving Army officers at the time of the coup in April 1967 (excluding certain auxiliary corps), 2577 were retired by May 1970, the majority of them for political, not professional reasons....

. . . . .

The command structure and discipline of the army have been undermined, first by promotions on the grounds of political loyalty and not professional merit and second by the formation of cells of junior officers especially loyal to the regime who exercise command functions over the heads of the senior officers formally in charge.<sup>58</sup>

Greene went on to say that the regime had weakened the Greek armed forces through extensive purges and the promotion of rivalry between the services, to the extent that it was a "fundamental error to regard the Greek junta as a particularly reliable member of the NATO from a military point of view."<sup>59</sup>

Colonel Oliver K. Marshall (Retired), formerly Military Attaché to the American Embassy in Athens, gave the following testimony to the same committee on July 12, 1971: "The Greek officers, all of them, the Greek Army, took great pride in being part of NATO and took great pride in having





American equipment -- of being a part of the Western military establishment. The junta, in large increments, retired all of those people."<sup>60</sup>

There was abundant criticism of the handling of the military by the junta from Greeks themselves. A statement by twenty former Greek ministers, October 27, 1970 to the North Atlantic Assembly at the Hague, said that deportees to prison islands in the Aegean Sea included "brave and distinguished generals, admirals, officers of the army, navy and airforce of both high and low rank, some of them decorated by member-countries of NATO, including the United States."<sup>61</sup> In an interview in the Baltimore Sun, June 27, 1971, with Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, leader of the conservative National Radical Union party and Prime Minister of Greece when the coup occurred, Kanellopoulos said that "some 3,000 to 4,000 officers, many seniors included, have been retired in the past four years."<sup>62</sup> Professor John Zighdis echoed the same sentiments and criticisms in testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee March 27, 1974, saying that the removal for political reasons of practically all the senior officers with war experience and modern professional education had severely weakened the Greek armed forces.<sup>63</sup>

Despite seemingly abundant indicators of a severely degraded Greek military capability to effectively contribute to NATO security in that region, little investigation was made by U.S. officials to examine the accuracy of these





charges. Colonel James E. Campbell, Chief of the U.S. Army Section of JUSMAGG, stated to members of the House Armed Services Committee January 12, 1972 that the Greeks at that time were still using M-1 rifles and M-48 tanks, while the U.S. Army had gone from the M-1 to the M-14 and was then using the M-16.<sup>64</sup> It appears that the Administration was willing to accept a weakened Greek participation in NATO as the preferable alternative to no Greek participation. The allegiance of a weakened Greece to the North Atlantic Alliance and the continued availability of bases and facilities to American forces appears to have prompted the Administration to turn a blind eye to the degradation of capabilities within the Greek armed forces.

#### D. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE JUNTA

The area of foreign relations was one of the more successful endeavors by the colonels in terms of expanding relations. While encountering increasing alienation and ostracism from Western Europe, they cultivated closer ties with Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Despite cooled relations in the West, no government withheld recognition of the military junta of April 21, 1967 or the republic of June 1, 1973.<sup>65</sup>

In many Western European countries contacts with Greek officials cooled to the extent of avoiding social contacts with Greek diplomats. Greek embassies and consulates in Germany, Italy, Sweden and Denmark experienced demonstrations and even bomb attacks.<sup>66</sup> Except for a brief visit by



Makarezos to Paris in 1969 and two or three other working visits by other members to London or Washington, as of September 1971 no junta minister had officially visited a Western European country. Not one Western European minister, with the exception of the Spanish Foreign Minister in August 1971, had come to Greece officially.<sup>67</sup>

Greek relations with the U.S. were of a love-hate type, underscored by Congressional criticism of Administration dealings with the junta. The U.S.-Greek relationship will be examined in detail in Chapter Four.

Improved Balkan relations and closer ties with neighboring communist countries were the biggest foreign relations achievements of the colonels. This is ironic in two ways: in part, the colonels were driven in that direction by U.S. and Western intransigence toward them, and it is ironic that the junta saw fit to become chummy with the communists who were the archtypical foes of Greece when the coup was executed.

Initially, the Greek Government on May 15, 1967 announced that it was closing its border with Yugoslavia effective November 13, 1967, thereby abrogating a 1959 treaty with Yugoslavia. The cessation of free movement over the border was a form of protest over the fact that the communist countries were permitting demonstrations against the Greek junta in front of the Greek embassies in those countries.<sup>68</sup> This ban did not last long, however.





On March 10, 1970, Greece and Bulgaria signed a five-year trade agreement providing for trade of \$25 million.<sup>69</sup> This was the culmination of negotiations initiated on January 24, 1970. This settling of long standing disputes with Bulgaria was tied to general U.S.-U.S.S.R. détente and the fact that the superpowers gave the green light for the Greek-Bulgarian détente.

In part, it also was due to Greek ties to the Soviet Union. In mid-December 1969 the junta signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for Soviet aid in planning and erecting an electrical plant in Macedonia. In January 1970 a whole series of deals were concluded with the Soviets:

(1) January 20 -- decision to admit Soviet goods at reduced tariffs, (2) January 22 -- awarding of a contract to the Soviet Union to conduct a peat survey in Northern Greece in preparation for building an electrical power plant,<sup>70</sup> and (3) the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union. In November 1972, the Greeks signed a preliminary agreement with the Russians to build an \$89 million electric power plant comprised of three 125-megawatt generators at Philippi in Northern Greece.<sup>71</sup>

Since 1940, Greece and Albania had been in a technical state of war stemming from the Italian invasion of Greece through Albanian soil. Following a 1970 agreement to resume trade relations and restore telephone connections, an agreement to resume diplomatic relations was signed on May 6, 1971, and diplomatic relations resumed on November





16.<sup>72</sup> The first formal trade pact between the two nations was signed October 30, 1972 and provided for exchange of goods worth \$8 million annually.<sup>73</sup>

Mutual visits were conducted between Greece and the other Balkan countries. On September 9, 1970, the Greek Deputy Foreign Minister, Christian Xanthopoulos-Palamas, visited Belgrade, the first official Greek visit to Yugoslavia since the coup. A few months later the Yugoslav Foreign Minister visited Athens.<sup>74</sup>

Greek ties with Romania, briefly interrupted by the coup, were resumed by the visit of the Greek Minister of Trade to Bucharest in October 1969. The Romanians paid a return visit in December 1970. A five-year trade treaty was also signed.<sup>75</sup>

The colonels sought increased contact with black African countries. Pattakos visited Egypt and Ethiopia in February 1971, Libya in March, Congo-Kinshasa and the Central African Republic in May. In April, Bokassa of the Central African Republic, had visited Athens. He was one of only two heads of state to visit Greece between April 1967 and the end of 1971. The other was the Greek-born President of Panama.<sup>76</sup>

Greece has traditionally had good relations with the Middle East Arab countries. The ties go back to the long common experience of subjugation by the Ottoman Turks. There are large, prosperous Greek communities in many Arab countries and many Arabs share the Greek Orthodox religion. Along with Spain, Greece was the only Mediterranean



country not to recognize Israel de jure.<sup>77</sup> In efforts to insure continued U.S. favor, and, at the expense of some Arab support, the junta appointed a full ambassador to Tel Aviv as a "diplomatic agent."<sup>78</sup>

#### E. THE JUNTA AND THE PRESS

The Greek press has always been an important factor in Greek life. Greeks enjoy reading their daily newspaper. The importance of the press also lies in the fact that, at the time of the coup, radio was controlled by the Government and the country was basically without television.<sup>79</sup> Consequently, there was heavy reliance on newspapers.

The Greek press has always been rabidly partisan, frequently having interests that are tied with specific political parties. The press is mostly privately-owned, lacking in financial independence.<sup>80</sup> Since the 1950's the most powerful newspapers were those belonging to the Lambrakis, Vlachos and Botsis groups. The Lambrakis papers were the largest and backed liberal and left-of-center parties, whereas the Vlachos and Botsis papers were conservative and supported Karamanlis and the King.<sup>81</sup>

Within three weeks of the coup, six of the fifteen Athens dailies were shut down, including the communist papers Avghi (Dawn) and Dimokratiki Allaghi (Democratic Change); a liberal, democratic, center party paper Eleftheria (Freedom); two Vlachos papers Kathimerini (Daily) and Messimvrini (Noon); and a left-of-center paper Athinaiki (Athens). Two more papers collapsed shortly





thereafter, Ethnikos Kiryx (National Herald) and Ethnos (Nation), although the latter was resurrected by the junta.<sup>82</sup> The following papers continued to operate after the junta seized power: the extreme right-wing Estia (Hearth) and Eleftheros Kosmos (Free World), the latter being the only paper to openly support the regime from the outset; the Botsis' brothers royalist papers Akropolis and Apoyevmatini (Afternoon); the conservative Vradyni (Evening); and three centrist papers, Ethnos (Nation), Ta Nea (The News) and To Vima (The Tribune), the latter two belonging to Lambrakis.<sup>83</sup>

Of the papers still publishing after the coup, Eleftheros Kosmos was widely recognized as the voice of the junta.<sup>84</sup> The Vlachos papers were voluntarily closed by their owner, Helen Vlachos, rather than continue to publish under censorship. Helen Vlachos, an outspoken critic of the junta, was arrested by the junta on September 28, 1967 for her views. She was kept under house arrest until she managed to escape to England on December 15, 1967 amidst the confusion of the attempted royal counter-coup by the King.<sup>85</sup>

Strict censorship and pre-censorship were immediately imposed by Papadopoulos after the coup in April. A decree on April 27, 1967, establishing the Press Service, contained extensive lists of what should and what should not be printed. The papers were forbidden to publish: anything disrespectful to the royal family, critical of the





government or anyone in it, criticism of foreign heads of state, anything historical which may rouse the people or criticize other countries or regimes, etc. They were instructed to print speeches and communiques of the King, royal family or leading members of the government, communiques of the government Information Service, photographs submitted by the government and, at least, one commentary per day referring to the government and its work.<sup>86</sup>

Not only did the censors dictate the texts of the stories, but they specified their placement on the pages, headlines and type sizes, creating a comic spectacle of identical, supposedly competing newspapers.<sup>87</sup> Papadopoulos eased restrictions somewhat in February 1968, reducing the number of obligatory items. On May 10, he exempted the pro-junta paper Eleftheros Kosmos from all censorship as an experiment, and, on May 12, all Greek magazines were freed of censorship.<sup>88</sup> On October 2, 1969, the press was declared free of censorship, with the exception of publications concerned with security, the economy and pre-coup politics. The censorship office was disbanded although papers were still required to produce their first copies at the Press Ministry.<sup>89</sup> It did not take long for opposition to the regime to appear in print. In the summer of 1970, a number of Greek intellectuals published Dekaokto Keimena (Eighteen Texts) containing poems, essays, and short stories critical of the junta. This was followed in the spring of 1971 with Nea Keimena (New Texts).<sup>90</sup>



Professor Couloumbis informed the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 12, 1971 that: "The circulation of the newspapers indicates that newspapers which have taken a critical, or mildly critical, position of the government are selling much better, sometimes 10 to 1 in ratio to the newspapers that are for the regime."<sup>91</sup> This phenomenon reflected the mainstream of public opinion.

Controls over the press closely approximated the general liberalizing measures of the junta. As relaxation of controls occurred, increased demands for more freedoms were heard, especially from university students. As a consequence of student violence on November 18, 1973, which precipitated the ouster of Papadopoulos, Proclamation No. 7 broadcast by the Athens Armed Forces radio, essentially returned the press to 1967 style censorship and control.<sup>92</sup>

Following return to democracy in 1974, the number of Athens newspapers rapidly increased to thirteen. For the first time since World War Two, the press included communist newspapers: Rizospastis of the KKE (Exterior) and I Avyi, a joint daily of the KKE (Interior) and the EDA.<sup>93</sup>

#### F. THE JUNTA AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Criticism of the junta for human rights violations was quick to appear. On May 5, 1967 the Danish and Norwegian delegations to the North Atlantic Council in Paris distributed notes criticizing the military dictatorship as a "flagrant violation of the principles of parliamentary democracy."<sup>94</sup> While the figures may vary, it is safe to





say that approximately six to seven thousand people were rounded up on April 21 and 22 and herded into stadiums used as holding facilities, prisons and concentration camps.<sup>95</sup> Many people were arrested for offenses committed before the coup, offenses which had been perfectly legal actions at the time such as making financial contributions to a left-wing organization.<sup>96</sup> Three islands in the Aegean Sea, Leros, Yiaros, and Agios, were hastily and crudely converted into prison isles. As for the number of prisoners, in a letter from the Greek representative to the Council of Europe, dated April 29, 1968, the Greek Government reported that, since the coup on April 21, 1967, 6,848 communists had been deported and "as a result of various acts of clemency, 4,411 persons have been released; the number of deported persons currently amounts to 2,437."<sup>97</sup> [underlining in source]

Civil liberties were curtailed by a series of proclamations issued by the Chief of the General Staff. Proclamation No. 1 of April 22, 1967 prohibited "all open air gatherings of more than five persons and all indoor gatherings apart from public entertainments."<sup>98</sup> Proclamation No. 14 of May 29, 1967 stated that "indoor gatherings were allowed with the permission of the competent public authority."<sup>99</sup> Proclamation No. 26 in latter 1967 modified the restrictions on freedom of assembly to allow additional gatherings. It stipulated that all of the following were authorized:





aa indoor gatherings of persons attending a lecture with authorisation of the competent military authority; bb open air gatherings of a social or religious nature (weddings, etc.); cc private indoor gatherings of a social nature or for amusement (receptions); dd meetings of the boards of directors and general meetings of juridicial persons; ee public entertainments.<sup>100</sup>

Violations of human rights can best be understood in the context of Greek relations with the Council of Europe following the coup. Greece had signed the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1950 under the auspices of the Council of Europe.<sup>101</sup> Article 15 of that Convention provided that a nation may abrogate its responsibilities and gave the circumstances under which it may do so as follows:

(1) In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention...

. . . . .

(3) Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor....<sup>102</sup>

The junta notified the Secretary-General on May 3, 1967 of Royal Decree No. 280 in which it exercised this right. The junta justified the suspension of human liberties with reasons falling under the following headings: (1) communist danger, (2) crisis of constitutional government, and (3) crisis of public order.<sup>103</sup> The Council of Europe was not notified of the reasons for the derogation until September 19, 1967, four months after the notice of derogation on May 3.



On September 20 and 27, 1967, the governments of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands filed complaint Numbers 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67 respectively against Greece with the Commission of Human Rights charging that Greece had violated Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the Convention on Human Rights. On March 25, 1968, amended pleas were filed which added violations of Articles 3 and 7 of the Convention and Articles 1 and 3 of the First Protocol. The European Commission of Human Rights conducted a two-year investigation into the charges and produced a two-volume, four-part, 1200-page report on the violations of human rights in Greece. It was presented to the eighteen member Council of Europe on November 18, 1969. Although the findings were required to be kept secret, reports of the investigation were leaked to the press almost on a daily basis, and, shortly after its delivery to the Council, copies marked "Secret" were widely available.<sup>104</sup> The study listed 213 prima facie cases of torture. It also refuted the justification of impending communist overthrow cited by the junta:

The Commission has not found that the evidence adduced by the respondent Government shows that a displacement of the lawful Government by force of arms by the Communists and their allies was imminent on 21st April, 1967; indeed, there is evidence indicating that it was neither planned at that time, nor seriously anticipated by either the military or police authorities.<sup>105</sup>

Furthermore, the report said the Commission did not accept:





...that the street demonstrations, strikes and work stoppages in the first months of 1967 attained the magnitude of a public emergency....

. . . . .

The picture of strikes and work stoppages does not differ markedly from that in many other countries in Europe over a similar period;...<sup>106</sup>

In conclusion, the Greek Government failed to satisfy the Commission of Human Rights "that there was on 21st April, 1967, a public emergency threatening the life of the Greek nation."<sup>107</sup>

From the first signs of opposition to their practices, the junta took the offensive against the Council. In written observations to the Council of Europe on December 16, 1967, the Greek Government submitted that the Commission of Human Rights was not competent to examine the applications filed by Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands, because they concerned the actions of a revolutionary government.<sup>108</sup>

On December 12, 1969, the Council of Europe met to vote on the Greek case. However, before it came to a vote, the Greek Foreign Minister, Panayiotis Pipinelis, denounced the Statute of the Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and withdrew Greece from the Council of Europe.

The expulsion of Greece from the Council was the first step in isolating the military regime. It did draw reaction from the colonels. On the one hand, the colonels spoke sarcastically of their condemnation by the Council.

Pattakos said: "That makes as much impression on us as a





mosquito on the horns of a bull. Such things as the Council of Europe we write off on the soles of our worn-out shoes."<sup>109</sup> The colonels called the expulsion a victory and led the nation in celebrating its freedom from "outside foreign interference."<sup>110</sup> On the other hand, the colonels took note of this foreign condemnation by attempting to refute the expulsion action. In 1970, the junta published their case in a three-volume set entitled The Greek Case Before the Commission of Human Rights of the Council of Europe.

Perhaps more importantly, according to the Athens daily newspaper Eleftheros Kosmos the "Pipinelis Timetable" for the implementation of the still suspended guarantees and principles of the 1968 Constitution was withdrawn on December 15, 1967 by Papadopoulos, three days after the expulsion.<sup>111</sup>

#### G. THE JUNTA AND EDUCATION

The colonels introduced comprehensive reforms in the field of education, literature and culture, which unfortunately fell far short of their lofty intentions. Before the coup, September 1964 had been a time of major reform in Greek education. The junta managed to undo most of the good this reform had brought about. The national budget for education declined from 11.3% in 1967 to 9.2% in 1970.<sup>112</sup> During the years of the junta, the route to higher education became a narrowing bottleneck. In 1964,



45.7% of all university candidates were offered seats. This declined to 41.9% in April 1967, 28.4% in September 1968, and 25.8% in September 1970. In absolute numbers, whereas 14,650 candidates failed to obtain seats in 1964, the number increased to 39,840 in 1970.<sup>113</sup>

Following is a shortened list of the 1964 reforms and the effect the colonels had on them:<sup>114</sup> (1) the provision of free public education for all at all levels of education was retained, but the colonels introduced a stamp tax on diplomas and certificates. (2) Whereas the 1964 reform raised the drop-out age from twelve to fifteen, the colonels reduced it back to twelve in 1967. (3) The number of compulsory years of education was reduced from nine to six.<sup>115</sup> (4) The teaching and equal status of dimotiki Greek with katharevousa was abolished. Only katharevousa was to be taught or used in schools. This was promulgated by Royal Decree No. 129 of September 5, 1967.<sup>116</sup> (5) The increased emphasis placed on physical sciences and mathematics and the introduction of new subjects such as economics, law and sociology to primary and secondary schools was abolished by the junta. The pre-1964 curricula, syllabuses and textbooks were reintroduced. (6) Choice of subjects in the secondary education curricula, permitted in the 1964 reforms, was abolished in 1967, but reintroduced to certain schools in 1971. (7) Teachers training colleges, which had been reorganized and the period of study extended from two to three years, were abolished by the colonels, although in 1971 a



new three year course was again introduced. (8) The 1964 reform established a Pedagogical Institute to develop educational research and undertake in-service training of teachers. The junta abolished this and returned to the pre-1964 Board of Education which operated according to 1914 regulations which did not include educational research as a duty of the Board. (9) Free meal service for primary school children was abolished. Surveying this list it is hardly surprising that the colonels said that a major educational reform was necessary before they would permit a return to democracy.

The junta managed to propagate other equally absurd decrees. On June 21, 1967 it was decreed that ten percent of all candidates to institutions of higher learning, starting with the 1967-1968 academic year, would be admitted "solely on the grounds of high moral character and reproachless behavior."<sup>117</sup> Decree Law 93 of January 1969, called the "Student Code," decreed that any student convicted by the courts for a political offense would be permanently banned from any further chance of higher education. Deportation by administrative order also carried the same penalty, and a student could be expelled if "his conduct and his ideas are incompatible with 'national ideals.'"<sup>118</sup>

At the primary and secondary education level, more than 250 teachers were dismissed from state schools together with about fifty officials from the Ministry of Education.<sup>119</sup>





The junta abolished, degraded or merged some 2,500 primary schools in September 1970, mostly in small often isolated villages.<sup>120</sup> Elitist education, patterned on the British public schools, was established for the top-notch students, schools such as Anavryta near Athens and Anargyrios on the island of Spetses.<sup>121</sup>

Dismissal of teachers in the secondary schools was often based on ridiculous and asinine charges such as listening to the national anthem with one's hands in his pockets or praising the athletic achievements of Russians to a team of school athletes.<sup>122</sup>

Universities were particularly hard hit by the junta. Constitutional Acts "Theta" (No. 9) of July 18, 1967 and "Iota" (No. 10) of August 29, 1967 suspended the job security of the Civil Service so that the public administration could be "cleansed." The mandatory retirement age of professors was lowered from 70 to 65 by Constitutional Act "Iota Epsilon" (No. 15) of December 19, 1967. Between these Acts the universities lost about one-third of their teaching staff.<sup>123</sup> Even more insulting was that many of these university professors discovered that they had lost their jobs by first reading about it in the "Government Gazette." Furthermore, Constitutional Act "Delta" (No. 4) of May 23, 1967 forbade appeal to the higher courts. (See Appendix B) Constitutional Act "Epsilon" (No. 5) cited the following reasons for dismissal: "if they [professors] behaved in a way incompatible with their capacity as



functionaries and professors or lecturers;" "if their conduct in general has been improper with regard to the moral standing required;" if "they have acted for other purposes incompatible with what is understood as professorship;" or "if their acts and behavior prove that they are not animated by the appropriate spirit, conforming with the existing regime and its national ideals." (See Appendix C)

In the cultural and literary arena, the junta maintained an equally dismal record. The music of Tschaikovsky, Prokofiev and all other Russian composers was banned.<sup>124</sup> The junta banned 1,046 books, both foreign and Greek, including such authors as Euripides, Sophocles, Aeschylus, Aristotle to Jean-Paul Sartre, Thomas Mann, T.S. Eliot, Albert Camus and others. Hundreds of films were banned, including Seven Days in May, Fahrenheit 451 and Zorba the Greek as well as all films by the Greek actress Melina Mercouri.<sup>125</sup> Previously mentioned was the suspension of the ban on the sale of foreign publications in Greece. The junta decided it was less costly to allow their sale and thereby encourage tourism, consequently one could find just about any of the banned authors in English or French, for example, but not in Greek. A side effect of this policy was that many tourists were impressed by the high degree of free speech in Greece, thinking that what was available in their own language was also available in Greek.

One writer aptly described the actions of the colonels in the field of education in this way: "It is not what has



been done by the 'Revolutionary' government in education that counts, but what has been undone and what has not been done."<sup>126</sup>

#### H. THE JUNTA AND THE COURTS

In May 1968, the junta moved against the courts, specifically the Greek Council of State (Institution of Justice), which is analogous to the U.S. Supreme Court. Constitutional Act "Kappa Delta" (No. 24) of May 28, 1968 suspended the life tenure of judges and prosecutors for three days. (See Appendix D) By Act No. 94 of the Council of Ministers on May 28, and a Royal Decree on May 29, the President of the Supreme Court, Stylianos Mavromichalis, the Attorney General at the Supreme Court, Andreas Toussis, and twenty-eight others were dismissed. These judges were dismissed for not possessing the moral stature required in exercising their office, lack of healthy social principles or general behavior deemed incompatible with the duties and dignity of their office. Despite a ban against appeal, a number of the dismissed judicial officers appealed to the Greek Council of State, which ruled on June 24, 1969, that the dismissal was illegal. Papadopoulos was furious. He denounced the action of the Council as a coup d'etat, stated that he was ignoring the decision and demanded the resignation of Michael Stasinopoulos, the President of the Council. When Stasinopoulos refused to resign, he was ousted on June 27, 1969 by a decree nailed to the door of his home. Within





three days the Council vice-president and sixteen other members of the twenty-five man Council resigned in protest. The Government on July 4, 1969 passed a law retroactive to June 1 stating that the "decisions of any tribunal, issued on any case exempted from its jurisdiction, are nonexistent and not to be enforced."<sup>127</sup> In this manner, the junta placed itself completely outside the jurisdiction of the Greek Supreme Court.

## I. IOANNIDES, CYPRUS AND THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY

### 1. Ioannides

On November 25, 1973, Papadopoulos was brought down due to a combination of factors: (1) the inability of Papadopoulos to handle the student unrest and violence earlier in the month; (2) the personal power aggrandizement of Papadopoulos as evidenced by his elimination of the monarch, establishment of a republic and self-appointment as president; (3) the presence of corruption in the government; and (4) indications that the economy was increasingly beyond the control of Papadopoulos.<sup>128</sup> The leader of this counter coup on November 25, 1973, was the head of the Greek military police, Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannides. He announced a return to the "Revolution of April 21, 1967."<sup>129</sup> General Phaedon Gizikis was sworn in as President of the Republic. Ioannides operated behind the scenes.

Ioannides was even more draconic than Papadopoulos, closing newspapers without explanation and reopening island prison camps to which new prisoners were sent.<sup>130</sup>



## 2. Cyprus

Cyprus has been a perennial problem for Greece. The roots of the dispute involving Greece, Turkey and Cyprus go back to the struggle between Hellenism and the Ottoman Empire, specifically the Greek view of Cyprus as an "isolated outpost of Hellenism" following the mass exodus of Greeks from Western Anatolia in 1922.<sup>131</sup> In February 1959 the Zurich and London Agreements were concluded. It established Cyprus as an independent state in 1960, and constitutionally guaranteed that status by giving Greece, Turkey and Britain the right to physically intervene to maintain the constitutional status quo.<sup>132</sup>

Violence had erupted in Cyprus in December 1963 over an attempt by Archbishop Makarios to amend the 1960 Cypriot Constitution which had given Turkish Cypriots veto power.<sup>133</sup> In 1967 Cyprus again threatened to bring Greece and Turkey to war. George Papandreou had surreptitiously increased the number of Greek forces on Cyprus after the 1963 incident to 10,000, which is far above the 950 limit imposed by the Zurich and London Agreement. Between the efforts of Cyrus Vance, then U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary, who was appointed by President Johnson as special aide, and the responsible actions of Papadopoulos, this crisis was also defused.

There were indicators that Cyprus was heating up again as early as February 1974, but they were largely ignored.<sup>134</sup> On June 2, 1974, Makarios finally did heed





the warnings of pending assault against Cyprus as well as assassination attempts against himself, by sending a very inflammatory letter to the Greek President, accusing the Greek military government of plotting these actions.<sup>135</sup> Within a few days the text of the letter was published in the Greek newspaper Apoyevmatini. Makarios demanded the withdrawal of Greek officers from Cyprus, a demand that placed Ioannides in the position of either complying and thereby eliminating the most pro-enosis (union with Greece) element on Cyprus, or refusing and risking war. A council of high-ranking Greek officers including the President, Commanders-in-Chief of the three services, and Ioannides, unanimously opted to depose Makarios.<sup>136</sup>

The coup attempt, Operation Aphrodite, was launched under the tactical leadership of the Greek head of the Cypriot National Guard. On July 15, the notorious thug and killer of Turks, Nikos Sampson, was sworn in as the new President of Cyprus.\*

The Turkish reaction was quick to follow; they invaded Cyprus on July 20. Several ineffectual ceasefires, arranged by British and U.S. negotiators, failed. The Greek Government decided to use Greek submarines and airplanes to sink the Turkish fleet, however, the only actual assistance provided was some two hundred elite troops sent

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\*The first choice for president of Cyprus refused. The second and third choices were out of the country. Sampson was the fourth choice.<sup>137</sup>





to hold the airport on Cyprus.<sup>138</sup> The Turks did believe, however, that the Greek fleet was sailing to the aid of Cyprus and they proceeded to sink one and damage two warships, only to realize the vessels were Turkish, not Greek.<sup>139</sup>

Joseph Sisco, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, managed to get the Greek military chiefs to side with him in not going to war with Turkey. Ioannides was convinced to step aside and, with the following broadcast at seven PM on July 23, 1974, the seven year, three month, and two day long military dictatorship came to an end:

The Greek armed forces, in view of the situation in which the country finds itself, have decided to entrust a civilian government with the running of the country.<sup>140</sup>

### 3. Return to Democracy

Constantine Karamanlis returned from exile on July 24, 1974 to accept the position of Prime Minister. He moved swiftly and fairly to restore order to Greece. On August 1, by "constitutional act," the 1968 and 1973 Constitutions were annulled and the 1952 Constitution was restored with the exception of the articles pertaining to the King which were held in abeyance.<sup>141</sup> On July 26, the military police were stripped of their power to arrest and interrogate civilians; July 29, all regional commissars and ministerial general secretaries appointed since the 1967 coup were dismissed. Junta appointed city and town mayors were dismissed at a later date. On August 6, all



university lecturers and professors appointed under the junta were dismissed and those dismissed by them were reinstated. On August 12, the authority of the Defense Minister was restored and the seven member Supreme Council of National Defense was reconstituted.<sup>142</sup> Amnesty was given to all political prisoners and Greek citizenship and passports were returned to all who had been deprived of them by the junta.<sup>143</sup>

The junta leaders were tried and on August 23, 1975, sentence was passed. Papadopoulos, Makarezos and Pattakos were given death sentences, later commuted to life imprisonment by Karamanlis. Life imprisonment was handed to Ioannides, Spandidakis, Zoitakis, Ladas and four others. The remainder received jail sentences of five to twenty years. Two went free.<sup>144</sup>

Elections were held in October 1974. Karamanlis and his New Democracy party received 54% of the vote and 220 out of 300 Parliament seats. The Greek communist party was legalized and, although split into three factions, they presented a unified front in the elections drawing nine percent of the vote. Andreas Papandreou organized the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panellinion Sosialistikon Kinima - PASOK) and received 13%, following the Center Union (EK) with 20%.

On November 8, 1974, the Greek people decided in an impeccably conducted referendum that the country should be a republic, and not a monarchy. Table 6 provides the



TABLE 6  
GREEK REFERENDA ON STATUS AS A REPUBLIC  
VERSUS MONARCHY, 1920-1974

Year	Republic	Monarchy
1920	1%	99%
1924	69.95%	30.05%
1935	2.12%	97.80%
1946	10%	70%
1973	74.65%	21.20%
1974	69.20%	30.80%

SOURCE: Basil Markesinis, "Recent Political and Constitutional Developments in Greece," Parliamentary Affairs 28 (Summer 1975): 270.

NOTE: Percentages reflect total valid votes cast.

results of the 1974 referendum in comparison to previous votes which were heavily rigged.

The Council of Europe readmitted Greece on November 28, 1974.





#### IV. THE AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GREEK COLONELS

##### A. THREE PERSPECTIVES

The preceding chapters in this thesis examined the period of the junta and established that it was neither democratic nor a "parenthesis" in normal parliamentary-style political life. In fact, had Papadopoulos not been overthrown by Ioannides for liberalizing too rapidly, he could conceivably have remained in power for a total of thirteen years as stipulated in the 1973 Constitution. The movement in Greece toward democracy during the dictatorship was agonizingly slow. The consequences of the junta were harsh and touched virtually everyone, whether it was through the lengthy tenure of martial law and press censorship or the individual act of arrest, detainment or torture. As people everywhere, the Greeks did not take kindly to this deprivation of freedom by self-appointed, middle-grade army officers.

This chapter will examine the relationship of the United States to the colonels, from the perspective of the three major American bureaucratic actors involved: the Executive Branch, the American Embassy in Athens, and the Legislative Branch. The affect of this relationship will be examined from the vantage point of the American and Greek public as well as the colonels themselves.



## 1. Executive Branch

The form and substance of the response by the American Government to the coup in Greece has been the subject of a great deal of question and suspicion. On the surface, the Administration and Embassy in Greece appear to have been caught by surprise by the coup on April 21st. When looked at in greater depth, however, it becomes apparent that only the timing was a surprise and that ample evidence existed pointing to the high probability of a coup in the very near future.

Laurence Stern in his book The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy states that the American CIA had for some time been reporting on the activities of the National Union of Young Officers (EENA) headed by Colonel George Papadopoulos. The fact that these reports ceased in mid-January 1967 aroused the suspicion of Charilaos Lagoudakis, a veteran analyst in the State Department Office of Intelligence and Research. On February 6, 1967, he submitted a memo to his superior, entitled "The Right Wing Conspiratorial Group in the Greek Armed Forces." It said:

Since June 19, 1965, RNA [Near East desk] has seen some 15 CIA reports from various sources on the so-called "Rightist Greek Military Conspiratorial Group." The latest report was dated January 23, 1967. These reports state that the "conspiratorial group" is ready to stage a military coup when, in its view, a dictatorship would become necessary as the only alternative to Center Union control of Parliament.

. . . . .



...it would be useful to have further information on this rightist group which may now be preparing for a possible coup.<sup>1</sup>

The American Embassy had been approached by the King of Greece regarding the probable U.S. response to an "extra-parliamentary solution" to the political turmoil and prospect of victory by George Papandreou and the Center Union party in the May 28, 1967 elections. The Embassy response was that it "would depend on the circumstances."<sup>2</sup> Laurence Stern quotes from a memo drafted by an Embassy staff member to the Political Officer, Kay Bracken, during the week of April 17, 1967. This memo was still in draft form when the coup was executed.

...I sincerely believe that the direction in which we are heading is extremely dangerous at a minimum and potentially disastrous for American interests in Greece. ...Important political elements -- the Palace, the ERE hard core, the military, the conservative establishment -- are determined that they will not permit the Papandreous to come to power.

. . . . .

The pro-dictatorship group would be unlikely to give us much or any advance warning that they were moving into a constitutional deviation. They could guess that we might be opposed to the idea, and they would therefore wish to present us with a fait accompli, assuming that we would eventually have to accept a de facto situation. We might wake up one morning, say three weeks from now, to find a dictatorship already installed and functioning....<sup>3</sup>

Evidence exists to indicate that a "big coup" led by high-ranking Greek military officers was either in the making or planned as a contingency. The execution of a coup by middle-grade officers, a "little coup," appears to have been a surprise. The fact that many of the military leaders of the "big coup" were locked up in the hours





following the takeover, and that the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Phillips Talbot, learned of the coup from the nephew of the Greek Prime Minister, Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, supports this contention.<sup>4</sup> Colonel Oliver K. Marshall (Retired), Military Attaché at the Embassy in Athens in April 1967, testified to the House Foreign Affairs Committee July 12, 1971 that:

We thought that the military was going to make some kind of overture to the King, who might or might not give his blessing, to some kind of a state of siege -- a state of military control...

What did happen was a mutiny by colonels against general officers to effect their own version of this plan, and this we were not aware of.<sup>5</sup>

Following the coup, Ambassador Talbot pleaded with Washington for a strong denunciation of the coup, but was unsuccessful in getting it.<sup>6</sup> The State Department first considered a message drafted April 23 stating that: "The U.S. by tradition is opposed to the change of democratic government by force," but this was overruled by Secretary of State Dean Rusk as too strong.<sup>7</sup>

Not until April 28, 1967, seven days after the coup, did the State Department issue its first statement on the military takeover in Greece. Secretary of State Rusk said:

We have followed closely the situation in Greece since the military takeover there last Friday [April 21].

I am encouraged to see that King Constantine [on April 26] in his first public statement since last Friday has called for an early return to parliamentary government. We are now awaiting concrete evidence...<sup>8</sup>



With this statement the Administration adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude toward the military dictatorship, and, with minor changes, that is essentially the attitude maintained throughout the seven and one-half years of military rule in Greece.

That this position was continued by the Nixon Administration is evident in the "Secretary's Foreign Policy Statement 1969-1970 (March 1971)" in which the Secretary of State stated that:

U.S. policy toward Greece since the Administration came into office has been guided by two principal and parallel objectives: to maintain mutually beneficial relations based on historically warm and close ties and the Greek role in European and Mediterranean security; and to encourage Greece toward an early restoration of representative government.-- the expressed intention of the present Greek regime.<sup>9</sup>

In June 1970, Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, expressed the dilemma faced by the State Department in formulating its policy toward Greece:

...the establishment of an authoritarian government in Greece in April 1967,..., has posed a dilemma for U.S. policy. We disagree with the political system which prevails in Greece and consider a return to parliamentary rule essential to the long-term stability and prosperity of Greece. At the same time, we must preserve our important strategic interests in Greece as a valuable geographic area in the critical Eastern Mediterranean region.<sup>10</sup>

In testimony to a different committee in 1970, Davies cited the choices the Administration felt it had, and the option it chose to follow:

The U.S. Government was faced with three basic choices. We could continue our relations as we had before the change in government, or we could cut it off





completely, cut off our relations completely, or we could follow a course of coolness toward that Government until it returned to constitutional procedures. We opted for the latter course.<sup>11</sup>

One year after the coup, Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 17, 1968, stressed the geostrategic value of Greece to the U.S. and NATO:

The obligations imposed on us by the NATO alliance are far more important than the kind of government they have in Greece or what we think of it...If our military aid to our allies was determined by the kind of government they maintained at the moment, then NATO would disintegrate.<sup>12</sup>

The overriding importance of Greece to NATO was reiterated March 11, 1970 by Lieutenant General Robert H. Warren, the Administrator of the Military Assistance Program, who, in testimony to the House Committee on Appropriations, said: "Her role in NATO is the main reason we continue to support Greece."<sup>13</sup>

Throughout the entire seven year dictatorship the Administration maintained its belief in a continued relationship as the best means of influencing a return to democracy. Davies told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1970 that: "...there is a trend toward constitutional government....I believe that it is the quiet but persistent influence applied by the U.S. Government and Ambassador Tasca which have brought about this trend, and we would like to see it accelerated."<sup>14</sup>

The most visible manifestation of U.S. Government dealings with the colonels, however, came in the form of





military assistance. Unlike "quiet but persistent influence," military aid was concrete and, therefore, highly visible. Immediately following the coup in April 1967, the Administration had imposed an embargo on heavy military equipment shipments to Greece. In October 1968, following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Administration elected to lift its embargo on an exception basis. In justifying this action, Davies gave the following reason:

...the fear was, as I recall, that the Soviets would move militarily to stamp out the expansion of nationalism which was glowing not only in Czechoslovakia but also brightly in Rumania, and the thought was that the demonstration of NATO solidarity might be a factor in influencing Soviet tactics within the Soviet bloc.<sup>15</sup>

Interestingly enough, this exception to the arms embargo was made by the United States on behalf of NATO, but without first consulting any other NATO country.

In February 1970, while the embargo was still in effect, the Administration approved the loan renewals of five destroyers and one submarine to the Greek navy. The rationale for this decision was given by a State Department spokesman as follows: "Since these ships were already in the Greek navy, their loan was 'not really related' to the arms embargo on military equipment to Greece."<sup>16</sup>

In September 1970 the arms embargo against Greece was lifted permanently. Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 27, 1971:

I am not supporting the attitude of the [Greek] Government, but I am simply saying that our military considerations are overriding. Furthermore, I think we



have a better chance to influence the [Greek] Government to change if we continue to work with them than if we turn our back on them.<sup>17</sup>

The State Department position on lifting the embargo was spelled out in a pamphlet released in August 1971 entitled "Greece: U.S. Policy Dilemma." It was based on statements made by Rodger P. Davies to the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 12, 1971:

...it became evident that our partial suspension of military assistance was weakening Greece's ability to meet its NATO obligations and was weakening the credibility of NATO cohesion...we concluded after careful study that any progress being made was quite independent of our assistance policy.

Indeed, we have come to recognize as a general proposition that withholding military or economic assistance is an ineffective tactic in persuading foreign governments to move in directions we consider desirable.<sup>18</sup>

Davies went on to say that: "The military relationship with Greece overrides the nature, I think, of the regime."<sup>19</sup> The State Department was aware, however, of the implications of lifting the arms embargo. Davies replied in the affirmative to the following question by Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal: "You do acknowledge that having once embargoed military assistance the affirmative act of renewing it obviously might be construed as a political act?"<sup>20</sup>

Throughout the remainder of the dictatorship in Greece the Administration became increasingly impervious to the mounting opposition to its policies. It clung tenaciously to its continued relationship with the colonels





for the sake of NATO and U.S. national security while believing that the U.S. should not interfere in the evolution of Greek affairs beyond "quiet but persistent influence." Secretary of State William Rogers made the following statement in September 1972:

We believe that a democratic system offers the best hope for achieving the spiritual and material aspirations of people everywhere. But the choice, except as it applies to our own country, is not ours to make. It would be the ultimate arrogance of power to think that we can, or should, impose our will on others -- to threaten or coerce others even in the name of conscience. The kind of government other countries have must, in the final analysis, be what their people want or will permit.<sup>21</sup>

For some reason, the desire by the Administration to avoid coercive methods ignored the fact that there are various forms that coercive measures can take, and that coercion can simply involve the denial of ongoing or future aid. Thomas R. Wheelock in his article "Arms for Israel: The Limit of Leverage" lists six forms in which military aid can be employed as a coercive tool in order of ascending severity. (1) Deny requests for the most sophisticated items of weaponry. (2) Deny requested increases in military aid. (3) Suspend delivery of selected weaponry and/or supplies. (4) Suspend all deliveries of supplies and/or weaponry. (5) Reduce current levels of military aid. And, (6) terminate all such aid.<sup>22</sup> It appears that the Administration became convinced that NATO, national security and the military relationship were overriding, therefore the withholding of military assistance was discontinued as a policy tool in pressuring the colonels





to restore democratic rule. The actions were not carried far enough. It is ironic that only a few years later the State Department reversed its position, that withholding military assistance was an ineffective tactic, by imposing an arms embargo against Turkey for its part in the Cyprus debacle.

The Cyprus debacle in 1974, which brought down the Greek junta, triggered the third in a series of State Department efforts to prevent war between the two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. The first two were in 1963-1964 and 1967. These incidents were brought to a halt with stop-gap measures that were considered unsatisfactory by all parties involved. On the day of the abortive coup attempt against the Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios, State Department spokesman Robert Anderson said: "Our policy remains that of supporting the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and its constitutional arrangements and we urge all other states to support a similar policy."<sup>23</sup> While European nations were denouncing the actions of the Greek colonels in Cyprus, and the subsequent Turkish activities, the State Department did not utter a word of criticism. On July 18, Anderson was asked about a meeting of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with Makarios: "Was the secretary meeting with Makarios on Monday, July 22, as a private citizen, as Archbishop, or as President of Cyprus?" Anderson said, "He's meeting with Archbishop Makarios on Monday."<sup>24</sup> [emphasis in source]



Not until August 13, 1974, almost one month after the coup attempt against Makarios, did the State Department take a position on the Turkish claims in this dispute, and when it did it signalled a tilt toward Turkey:

The United States position is as follows: we recognize the position of the Turkish community on Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection. We have supported a greater degree of autonomy for them. The parties are negotiating on one or more Turkish autonomous areas.<sup>25</sup>

Secretary of State Kissinger received considerable criticism for the manner in which the Administration handled this Cyprus incident. On August 15, 1974, Congressman John Brademas and other congressmen confronted Kissinger in his office. Brademas told Kissinger, "We are placing the blame squarely on you, sir. We are not assigning responsibility for the failure of U.S. policy in Greece and Cyprus to President Ford. We feel it is yours."<sup>26</sup>

Kissinger, himself, seems to have admitted failure in Cyprus. In the February 28, 1977 issue of Time magazine, he said: "If I had ever had twelve hours and been able to pick out an intelligence report, I would have seen that the situation needed attention."<sup>27</sup> In all fairness to Kissinger, however, it must be said that the world was in a vast state of disarray during the Cyprus situation in 1974. Kissinger was preoccupied with charges of involvement in wiretapping, Watergate and the resignation of President Nixon. The Vietnam War was slowly dragging to a close. OPEC was raising the price of oil. Nixon and Kissinger had knowledge of and had approved a secretly negotiated \$1.1





billion grain sale to the Soviet Union, an action which became very controversial when made public. All of this impinged upon the conduct of American foreign relations and undoubtedly contributed to the ill-pursued and deleterious relation with the colonels.

## 2. The American Embassy

The involvement of the American Embassy in Athens under Phillips Talbot during the early stages of the coup has already been discussed in the previous section. When Talbot departed Greece in January 1969, the post of Ambassador remained vacant for approximately a year as a mild form of protest to the colonels. On August 28, 1969, President Nixon announced the appointment of Henry J. Tasca to be the new Ambassador to Greece; in a congressional protest, his appointment was not confirmed until December 8, 1969. He arrived in Greece in January 1970.

Tasca soon became known for his support of the junta and was repeatedly criticized by Congress. Upon his arrival in Greece, he returned to the U.S. those employees of the Embassy who were considered unfriendly to the military regime.<sup>28</sup>

Congressional committees issued several reports which were highly critical of Tasca and the American Embassy. One of the most critical was an unpublished staff study prepared November 14, 1971 by Clifford P. Hackett, Staff Director of the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Hackett identified several





stages or phases in the relationship of the Embassy to the colonels. Between April 1967 and January 1969, when Talbot departed, the Embassy maintained some distance from the Greek Government while continuing to see the opposition leaders. After January 1969 until the arrival of the new Ambassador, Henry J. Tasca, Chargé d'affaires Roswell McClelland conducted business along the same lines. Throughout both periods the CIA and U.S. military maintained close ties and contacts with Greek military and coup leaders.

Between spring 1970 and spring 1971, Tasca saw no opposition leaders and personally directed political reporting from the Embassy which was considered "highly favorable to the colonels." Hackett reported that: "It now seems clear that Ambassador Tasca's assignment in Athens was to 'justify' full resumption of aid."<sup>29</sup> Not until following the spring of 1971 did Tasca resume contact with opposition leaders and visit King Constantine in Rome for the first time.

Hackett reported that:

Athens is seen as a very undesirable post (despite its amenities) where assignment means service under an ambassador who has seriously erred in his perceptions of political developments and where political reporting would be subordinated to the exigencies of rescuing that ambassador and his career from those errors.

The political reporting has, in the judgement of several embassy officers, been tailored to fit the present Ambassador's preconceptions of what he hoped would be a trend toward constitutional government.<sup>30</sup>



A report prepared March 4, 1971 by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that: "...the general attitude of the Embassy is defensive about the regime -- quick to praise during the period before the embargo was lifted but slow to criticize now that the embargo has been ended and the regime in default [sic] on its assurances."<sup>31</sup> It went on to make the following observation:

...we noted that in Embassy meetings the coup and its aftermath was often referred to as the "revolution." Those Greeks opposed to the regime in Athens refer not to the "revolution" but to the "junta" or the "Colonels." Others, less partisan, refer to the "government," or the "leadership" or the "regime." It is only those who support the government who refer to the "revolution." The term is certainly not neutral.<sup>32</sup>

Professor Theodore A. Couloumbis, in testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 12, 1971 said: "In my visit with [Greek] political leaders, Ambassador Henry Tasca was considered to be pro-junta by a number of them."<sup>33</sup>

Tasca justified his relationship with the colonels to the same congressional committee on August 3, 1971, in the following manner:

I do not see any conflict between our short-term interests and our long-term interests because it is our view that the short-term interest is reconcilable with the long-term interest in the sense that our policy provides for encouraging in every appropriate way the Greek Government and Greek regime to get back to democratic government, and that is how you would take care of the longer term.<sup>34</sup>

Tasca told the House Armed Services Committee on January 12, 1972, that he believed the junta was moving





toward democratic government and that the U.S. should not interfere:

In 1968 they [the colonels] adopted a constitution that at least some of the opposition here and abroad, including Karamanlis, would be prepared to see implemented. Papandreou wouldn't accept it, but his idea of what he wants the United States to do is to use armed forces to kick this regime out and put him back in so that he can kick the United States out.

. . . . .

...How do you get back to democracy? You encourage them and talk to them privately and make statements publicly. The council of Europe put them under great pressure and other countries; but these fellows are soldiers, and don't let anybody tell you otherwise; they all come out of a combat background. They know what they want, and they are tough and nobody is going to push them around easily.<sup>35</sup>

Within a few days of the 1974 Cyprus debacle and the downfall of the military dictatorship, Tasca was replaced by Jack B. Kubisch. This was deemed necessary in light of the many Greek politicians and newspapers who, after the restoration of democracy and lifting of censorship, had demanded his removal from office because of his apparent sympathies with the military regime.<sup>36</sup>

### 3. Legislative Branch

Congressional involvement in the handling of U.S. relations with the Greek colonels by the Administration became more prevalent and was transformed from virtual silence to increasingly more vocal criticism as the duration of the dictatorship lengthened. On July 30, 1969, fifty congressmen signed a letter to Secretary of State William Rogers. It said in part:





We are writing to you because of our deep concern over the situation in Greece, the only European nation in the Western Alliance in the post World War II period to fall to a military coup.

. . . . .

Accordingly, we respectfully urge your consideration of the following action:

. . . . .

2. That a clearer sign of U.S. moral and political disapproval of the dictatorship be given and sustained.

3. That U.S. military aid to Greece should not be increased, and indeed, should be curtailed.<sup>37</sup>

The letter contained the signatures of several Congressmen and Senators who became recognized for their stand against the Greek junta. Many of them became known as members of the influential Greek lobby. John Brademas was known as the "Chief Greek."<sup>38</sup> Others included Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Don Edwards, Donald Fraser, Senators Claiborne Pell, Paul Sarbanes, Thomas Eagleton, and J. William Fulbright. The junta, however, was not without its supporters in Congress. Among them were Congressmen Ed Derwinski and Roman Pucinski, Peter Kyros and Gus Yatron. Less than two weeks before the fall of the junta in July 1974, Derwinski and Yatron were given decorations by the junta during their visit to Athens.<sup>39</sup>

The advent of 1970 found the Administration increasingly having to justify itself, and defend its policy toward Greece. Congressman Donald Riegle directed the following criticism at Rodger Davies in a House hearing by the Committee on Appropriations in April 1970: "...I think we are going to have to...exercise more pressure in places



like Greece in behalf of the ideals that we profess to believe in....I don't think that we are doing enough to move that regime in the right direction."<sup>40</sup>

In June 1970, congressmen began to outright accuse the Administration of directly supporting the colonels and thereby keeping them in power. Senator J. William Fulbright said: "It is quite obvious they say we do support them, we give them money, and we give them arms and this tends to keep them in and to defeat what you say is our purpose, which is to return to parliamentary government..."<sup>41</sup>

Even some State Department personnel believed this to be the case. Alfred G. Vigderman, on the Greek desk at the State Department and an aide to Rodger Davies, replied to a question from Senator Claiborne Pell about the degree to which the Greek people feel the U.S. Government supports the colonels: "I am convinced that a respectable portion of them do believe, in fact, that the Government is supported by the United States."<sup>42</sup> Davies, in testimony July 12, 1971 to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said: "It is probably true that a great many of the Greek people have interpreted our continuing working relationship with their government as evidence of across-the-board support for the government."<sup>43</sup>

The first of several highly critical congressional studies and reports on Administration policy toward Greece was released in March 1971. It followed a February visit to Greece by Senate investigators James G. Lowenstein and





Richard M. Moose. They reported that:

Indeed, despite the embargo, lifted briefly in the fall of 1968 after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Greece received even larger amounts of U.S. military assistance, taking all categories combined, during the three years and five months the embargo was in effect than in the equivalent period before the embargo was imposed.

. . . . .

...the average total military assistance in the three fiscal years preceding the embargo was about \$95.2 million a year while the average total program in the three fiscal years in which the embargo was in effect was about \$106.9 million a year....

. . . . .

The embargo of major weapons did not, of course, affect the regime's military capability internally. The United States continued to provide small arms, ammunition, communications equipment, and trucks which<sup>44</sup> could be used by the Army for internal security purposes.

Moose and Lowenstein went on to say that:

The Embassy appears to have operated on the assumption that the regime was sincere in its declared intention to return to parliamentary democracy and that the continuation of the arms embargo was harmful to the development of the kind of relationship which would permit the United States to exercise some persuasion on the Greek regime...<sup>45</sup>

The study mission report concluded by saying:

"Indeed, the regime seems to have been able to exert more leverage on us with regard to military assistance than we have been willing to exert on the regime with regard to political reform."<sup>46</sup>

In June 1970 Senator Vance Hartke introduced an amendment to the Military Sales Act to terminate aid to Greece. The Administration opposed this and lobbied against it. On June 29, the Hartke Amendment was defeated by a vote of fifty to forty-two.<sup>47</sup>





In July 1971 the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted to terminate military and economic aid to Greece until the internal situation in Greece improved. This amendment, introduced by Congressman Wayne L. Hays, directed the Administration to halt all military assistance to Greece until the regime restored constitutional rule to Greece. However, it contained the proviso that President Nixon, by reporting in writing to Congress, could override the ban in the interests of national security. If he exercised this option, military aid was to be limited to \$80 million for the fiscal year. This amendment passed the House on August 3, 1971, but due to intense White House and Pentagon pressure, was voted down in the Senate. This was the first legislative sanction to pass either side of Congress against the colonels, but it did not pass both.

The White House felt justified in continuing military assistance to Greece because some Greek politicians felt that arms supplies should be kept separate from other attempts to speed up the return to democracy. Moose and Lowenstein reported that: "A number of opposition leaders told us that they had not objected to the resumption of heavy arms aid on the ground that no patriotic Greek could oppose the provision of U.S. arms to help safeguard the security of their country."<sup>48</sup> Former Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff was quoted by Rodger Davies as having said in a television interview that: "...the the delivery of arms must be judged independently of the



fact if [sic] there is either democracy or dictatorship here."<sup>49</sup>

Benjamin Rosenthal voiced a widely held belief in Congress in a hearing by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 3, 1971:

From my own point of view, for whatever it is worth, and from the point of view of American interests, U.S. aid ought to generally stand for certain principles beginning with Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence. All of the actions we take in world affairs ought to relate to the great principles that have built this democracy. As a general principle we simply cannot support military dictatorships, particularly those who have been in 4 years.<sup>50</sup>

In the same hearing Congressman Lee H. Hamilton said:

The thing that bothers me is that the signal that comes across to most of us is that we are pursuing our military objectives much more vigorously than we are pursuing our political objective in Greece. At least it is much more visible. It certainly appears to be more visible to the people of Greece.<sup>51</sup>

One visible manifestation of the military objective was home-porting in Athens approved by the Administration on May 6, 1972. This accord was signed by representatives of the Greek and U.S. navies in Athens on January 8, 1973. Six destroyers from the Sixth Fleet had already arrived in September 1972. The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on Europe and the Near East issued a report on December 30, 1972 denouncing the decision to home-port in Athens at that time as "a serious mistake" and "a serious disservice to American relations with the Greek people, to our ties with our NATO allies, and, most importantly, to our own democratic traditions."<sup>52</sup>





Senator Claiborne Pell directed the following criticism at Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, in an April 3, 1973 hearing on State Department Appropriations Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1974:

The danger to me is that the very fact that we are home-ported there means to the Greek people one more embrace by the United States for their regime, and will give them the impression that we support it. It seems so peculiar that we have a base there and we combine with them in NATO when the very preamble to the NATO Treaty ...negates everything for which Greece stands at this time.<sup>53</sup>

Congressman Donald M. Fraser, speaking about home-  
porting in Athens, said May 1, 1973: "It seems to me the Pentagon still runs the State Department in many major policy areas....And I think they showed it on the home-  
porting matter."<sup>54</sup>

Lowenstein and Moose drew the following conclusion in their 1971 report:

For the United States, the principal conclusion from our report is that we have pursued a faulty policy since 1967 from which we must now extricate ourselves. There is no easy way to do this. Damage has already occurred to American interests in Greece and more will occur before the present situation ends. To redeem U.S. interests and terminate an unfortunate appearance of support for authoritarian rule, we recommend the following actions:

A) A public announcement that the U.S. aircraft carrier scheduled to homeport in Greece this summer will not be deployed under existing circumstances,...

B) The assignment of a new American ambassador who comes free of identification with past American policies, either with their design in Washington or their execution in Greece....<sup>55</sup>

In hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in August 1974, following the Cyprus debacle and





the downfall of the colonels, Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal said: "The bitter summary conclusion these many pages yield is that the United States chose to ignore the fate of democracy in Greece in order to maintain its military base rights in that country."<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, he said: "There is no doubt that Greece holds the United States directly responsible for these events [the coup and Cyprus] both for sins of commission and of omission."<sup>57</sup>

A January 1975 study mission of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to Greece concluded:

The misadventure of the Greek colonels in Cyprus in July 1974 would probably never have occurred if the United States had assessed more carefully its own national interests with Greece since 1967. The Athens junta was led to believe by the implicit American support they received that anything would be tolerated as long as American military bases were continued.<sup>58</sup>

Furthermore, it said:

When European countries questioned American and NATO policy during this period, the United States sought quiescence; when American congressional critics wondered what had happened to the alliance of democracy which NATO was intended to be, senior American officials testified that such concerns had to be balanced by military base considerations.<sup>59</sup>

Senator Claiborne Pell, in a November 1975 report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, concluded:

...The widespread public belief is that the United States at best condoned, and at worst conspired in the 1967 coup by the Colonels; that the United States supported instead of tolerated the reign of the junta; and finally that the United States, directly or indirectly bears a responsibility for the junta's ill-conceived Cyprus coup...<sup>60</sup>



## B. REACTION TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE COLONELS

### 1. American Public

The relationship of the U.S. to the colonels has variously been characterized by the American public as "too busy elsewhere,"<sup>61</sup> "unimaginative, sadly irresponsible, and ultimately inexplicable do-nothing policy,"<sup>62</sup> and a naive acceptance of the Colonels.<sup>63</sup>

Professor George Anastaplo, a lecturer at the University of Chicago, was a frequent critic of the U.S. relationship with the colonels. In an article printed in the Congressional Record in July 1969 he said: "The United States will not be able to escape either the responsibility for or the consequences of whatever happens in Greece."<sup>64</sup> Earlier, in April 1969, he said:

I suspect that the underlying cause of difficulty for the United States in recent years has been the lack of a clear policy for Greece. Even as late as August [1968] several officials I talked with in the American Embassy in Athens were honestly puzzled as to just what the policy of the United States Government was toward the government of the colonels.<sup>65</sup>

Professors Theodore A. Couloubis of American University and Nikolaos A. Stavrou of Howard University analyzed U.S. policy toward Greece in an article in the Congressional Record, September 1, 1970, entitled "The Military Arm of Our Foreign Policy Takes Over Its Diplomatic Brain." They cited six indicators that U.S. policy toward Greece was inordinately dominated by military considerations holding sway over all others: (1) over the years economic aid to Greece declined and finally ceased,





while military aid did not; (2) up to 1970 at least two to three percent of the entire Greek officer corps were trained in the U.S. each year; (3) the presence of U.S. bases and personnel in Greece; (4) frequent visits of Sixth Fleet vessels discharging large numbers of sailors for rest and relaxation; (5) frequent joint NATO exercises in which the Greeks participate; and (6) the Greek CIA (KYP) was established and funded by the American CIA until the coup in 1967.<sup>66</sup> They concluded their analysis in the following manner:

The paradoxical conclusion of this paper is that the U.S. by paying greater attention to political factors in the determination of our foreign policy toward Greece, will protect even better our short as well as long range strategic objectives in this most vitally located area of the Mediterranean Sea. By abandoning sterile, short-sighted, tactical objectives on the Greek situation the United States will gain a significant victory in the political, economic as well as the strategic dimension.<sup>67</sup>

As early as March 1969 U.S. policy and decision makers were being warned of the consequences of the U.S. relationship with the colonels: "Now, another ominous fact of Greek politics is emerging, a growing anti-Americanism, even among influential elements in Greece who could once be counted upon as most sympathetic to the United States."<sup>68</sup>

One of the more ringing indictments of U.S. foreign policy toward the colonels put it this way:

...the United States did not develop policies specifically designed for Greece. Rather, Greece was viewed more as a means to wider strategic ends in the East-West confrontation. The strategically located junior NATO partner was, therefore, handled by American policy makers as military real estate or a way station





in the American lifelines to Israel and oil. Political considerations, long-range interests, morality, and law were dismissed as mere "theology" and as variables that were totally irrelevant for busy, practical, hard-hitting, and tough-minded men who were charged with the "awesome responsibility" of managing the international system.<sup>69</sup>

Professor Panayiotis Vatikiotis in his book Greece:

A Political Essay said essentially the same thing:

Basically there has been no American policy toward Greece as such. Rather there have been global considerations in American policy such as the containment of communism,...by employing a panoply of alliances, bases, and subsidiary arrangements throughout the world. Greece, one might say has been one of these arrangements. To this extent, U.S. policy in Greece from the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to the present, correct or faulty, has been a function of wider interests and concerns.<sup>70</sup>

## 2. Greek Public

Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, received a letter on December 2, 1969 signed by thirty-two Greek politicians. It said:

Our primary duty is to make clear to you...it has become the common belief of all Greeks that the military dictatorship...even if it were not imposed on us with the inducement of some of the U.S. agencies in Greece, remains in power after two and a half years as a result of the tolerance, if not the positive support, of the U.S. Government.<sup>71</sup>

In a speech to the North Atlantic Assembly November 6, 1970, reprinted in hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee July 14, 1971, Dimitrios Papaspyrou, Speaker of the last Greek Parliament before the coup, said: "I know...the argument which says that the Alliance, which is in danger of losing the whole Mediterranean, is in greater need of the territory of Greece than the nine million Greeks who live there.



But, Gentlemen, beware: if you lose the people, it is certain that, one day, you will lose the territory also."<sup>72</sup>

Senate investigators Moose and Lowenstein found during their visit to Greece in February 1971 that one Greek critic voiced the opinion of many they heard when he said: "Is the Junta deceiving the Embassy, is the Embassy deceiving the State Department, or is the State Department deceiving the Congress?"<sup>73</sup> Their report of the rising tide of anti-American sentiment was confirmed by Hackett in his report later that same year. Hackett found that there was unity among opposition leaders on the following points: "The American government exerts a considerable (most say decisive) influence on the longevity of the regime." And,

The basic error of American policy since 1967, and especially since the arrival of Ambassador Tasca, has been a single-minded reliance on the short-term military-strategic advantages of Greece as a naval and air base complex without regard for the long-term interest of the United States in obtaining an early return of representative and popular government to Greece.<sup>74</sup>

Professor John Zighdis, testifying to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 27, 1974, opened by pleading with Congress to cease support of the regime by lending it credibility and respect and aid. To cease "friendly persuasion" and take more overt actions to abolish the dictatorship. He said:

Had the allies, and specifically the United States, fulfilled their [NATO] treaty obligations to defend democracy and freedom, neither the imposition nor the survival of the dictatorship would have been possible.

. . . . .

...Expressions of U.S. disapproval of the coup were seen as mere lip service by the Greek people who





felt that their intelligence was being insulted...by contradictory words versus deeds.<sup>75</sup>

Many Greeks felt that the excuse of providing military aid to the junta as a means of enabling the U.S. to influence them to return to democracy was a worn-out cliché. There were other factors which made the U.S. an accomplice in Greek eyes: continuing American tourism; private American firms making lucrative investments; and the absence of even a single statement from the State Department or White House denouncing the junta.<sup>76</sup>

These few examples of Greek criticism of the U.S. relationship to the colonels will suffice to illustrate the widespread sentiment among Greek citizens. Very few were in a position to speak so freely, and many of those who did, did so at great risk. In various ways, though, this anti-American sentiment managed to make itself felt, not least of which was the increasing incidence of violence in the form of bombings directed against American-owned or affiliated property in Greece.

### 3. The Colonels

The colonels were quick to use every means available to broadcast their ties with the U.S. as a means of legitimization. Visits by U.S. officials, mainly military, were photographed and displayed widely in the state-censored newspapers. At the same time the junta leadership made light of their dependence on the U.S. in contemptuous remarks such as this comment by Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos: "If there is any prospect of war the Americans





will come begging us to take their tanks and planes. If not, what we have is ample for domestic purposes."<sup>77</sup>

Pattakos also stated his belief that American military aid was neither extensive nor essential for Greek domestic needs and in the event of war NATO would have no choice but to defend Greece.<sup>78</sup> They even went so far as to warn the U.S. that it would have to maintain aid shipments if it "wanted Greece to stay outside the Iron Curtain."<sup>79</sup>

The reaction of the colonels to the U.S. vacillated from hot to cold. They proceeded to purge the Greek military of many senior, experienced officers who supported Greek membership in NATO, in their efforts to mold a politically reliable military machine. The colonels established extensive trading relations with neighboring East European countries and the Soviet Union. The subsequent chapter will illuminate the extent to which the colonels sought alternative sources of economic and military assistance. All of these actions can be taken as signs of a weakened relationship with the U.S.



V. INDICATORS OF THE AMERICAN  
RELATIONSHIP WITH GREECE

A. THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

1. Post-World War Two To The Coup

The American military-strategic interest in Greece commenced in 1947 with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine. It was formalized in 1952 when Greece became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The preamble to that treaty contains the following words: "To safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of [our] peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."<sup>1</sup> Together with the wording of the Truman Doctrine, which said: "This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States,"<sup>2</sup> the action of the United States toward the Greek colonels stood in sharp contradistinction to these pledges of support for democratic principles, and was the source of considerable criticism. Laurence Stern encapsulated that criticism when he said: "In the case of Greece and Turkey the military relationships conceived in the name of NATO became the driving imperatives of foreign policy, with powerful blandishments of money and weaponry, rather than a component



of a policy in which social and humanitarian considerations were given serious weight."<sup>3</sup>

Table 7 furnishes data on the size of U.S. economic and military aid to Greece from 1946 to 1966. This table illustrates several points. While military aid tapered down and remained relatively constant, averaging between \$50 and \$100 million annually, economic aid followed a steady and sharp decrease to virtually zero. Second, while this was occurring, military aid remained larger than economic. The cumulative figures illustrate the overall larger size of military versus economic aid -- \$1,741 million and \$1,166 million, respectively.

In addition to monetary assistance, 11,229 Greek military personnel were trained in the U.S. between 1947 and 1969 as well as another 1,965 Greeks being trained in other overseas installations.<sup>4</sup> This training was conducted under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Considering that the Greek officer corps at any one time is only about 11,000, the size of these training figures take on even greater significance.

Not only was the U.S. role as arms supplier to Greece massive in dollar value and numbers of items, it was nearly the only source for Greece. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports that, between 1950 and the coup in 1967, Greece received only nine major arms transfers from foreign countries other than the U.S., out of a total of fifty-seven.<sup>5</sup> These arms





TABLE 7  
U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO  
GREECE, 1946-1966  
(in Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Years	Total Economic	Total Military
1946-1948	-	198.4
1949-1952	706.7	323.5
1953-1957	188.0	433.7
1958	27.7	143.4
1959	20.7	89.2
1960	56.6	116.7
1961	20.4	42.8
1962	46.4	34.9
1963	48.7	92.7
1964	24.8	83.1
1965	27.1	104.0
1966	- 0.7	78.7
Grand Total	1,166.4	1,741.1

SOURCE: U.S. overseas loans and grants and assistance from international organizations, AID special report, prepared yearly for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, quoted in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Greece, Spain, and the Southern NATO Strategy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st sess., July 12, 14, 19, 21, August 3, September 9 and 15, 1971, p. 481.

transfers included all types of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and armored fighting vehicles.

Table 8 on the following page provides a selective list of arms transfers to Greece from the U.S., by type



TABLE 8

SELECTIVE LIST OF U.S. ARMS TRANSFERS TO GREECE  
BY TYPE AND NUMBER OF ITEMS, 1946-1974

Type of Equipment	Number Delivered
tactical aircraft	586
destroyers	8
submarines	3
tanks (all types)	1,259
armored personnel carriers	1,134
self-propelled artillery	287
towed artillery	746
NIKE missiles	236
HAWK missiles	157
Honest John missiles	420
recoilless rifles (90-106-mm)	1,372
mortars (81-mm-4.2-inch)	1,015
machineguns	4,218
rifles	187,765
$\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks	10,894
$2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks	16,416
tactical radios	6,014

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications Related to NATO and the Middle East. Prepared for the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 94th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 1975, p. 50.

NOTE: Grants only. Items shown are representative. Military Assistance Program Data, Defense Security Assistance Agency, as of August 7, 1974.



and number of equipment, for the years 1946 to 1974. This data illustrates both the size of the military commitment to Greece and the extensive range of weaponry included.

## 2. During the Junta (1967-1974)

Almost immediately after the execution of the coup the U.S. Government imposed an embargo on shipments of heavy arms to Greece. However, it was a selective suspension of the delivery of major military items programmed for Greece under MAP. The suspended items included ships, aircraft, military helicopters, tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, missiles and tank ammunition. It is paradoxical that the items suspended were the hardware with which Greece was to fulfill its role in NATO, yet the Greek role in NATO was the primary justification given by the Administration for the policy it pursued toward Greece. Those types of weapons which were of use for internal security, such as small arms and ammunition, were never halted.

In any case, the arms embargo existed in little more than name. On October 21, 1968 the U.S. Government announced the partial resumption of heavy arms shipments to Greece in response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The military equipment released in this exception was valued at approximately \$28 million and included F-5, F-102 and F-104 aircraft, HU-16 Maritime Patrol aircraft, T-33 and T-41 trainer aircraft, 90-mm cartridges and 175-mm self-propelled artillery pieces.<sup>6</sup> The first portion of this package, which also happened to be the first items of





major military hardware delivered since the coup, was sent to Greece by cargo vessel on February 17, 1969.<sup>7</sup> It consisted of five F-104 Starfighter aircraft.

The next major exception to the arms embargo occurred on February 3, 1970 when the U.S. renewed the loan of six warships -- five destroyers and one submarine -- to the Greek navy. The submarine and two destroyer loans had expired in 1967; the remainder in 1969.<sup>8</sup>

On September 22, 1970, State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey announced the lifting of the arms embargo:

The administration has now decided to resume normal military shipments to Greece. The resumption of such shipments will enhance the ability of the Greek forces to carry out their responsibilities in defense of the NATO area, and thus contribute importantly to the cohesion and strength of the southern flank of NATO....

Although the United States had hoped for a more rapid return to representative government in Greece, the trend toward a constitutional order is established. Major sections of the Constitution have been implemented, and partial restoration of civil rights has been accomplished.<sup>9</sup>

Two major examples will serve to illustrate that arms sales to Greece were not long in returning to their usual levels. Following negotiations, State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray III announced March 29, 1972 that the U.S. and Greece had signed an agreement for the U.S. to sell Greece thirty-six Phantom jet aircraft. Greece was to pay a \$2.5 million down payment on each aircraft and the remaining \$2.5 million per aircraft would be financed through foreign military sales (FMS) credits.<sup>10</sup>



TABLE 9

## U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO

GREECE, 1967-1974

(U.S. Fiscal Years -- in Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Year	Total Economic	Total Military
1967	1.7	76.3
1968	0.7	46.7
1969	-	82.1
1970	-	39.9
1971	-	64.6
1972	-	83.3
1973	-	70.0
1974	-	67.5
Grand Total	2.4	530.4

SOURCES: Data for 1967-1972 taken from U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 2d sess., July 24, 1974, p. 1323. Data for 1973 and 1974 taken from U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1976, Part 4. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st sess., December 4, 1975, p. 458.

On June 14, 1974, the U.S. concluded a major arms deal to sell \$400 million worth of aircraft to Greece. The agreement included sixty A-7D aircraft and about eighteen C-130 transport aircraft as well as some training aircraft.<sup>11</sup>

In Fiscal Year 1972, for example, approximately eighty-six percent of all funds proposed for grants of



military assistance for Europe was earmarked for Greece and Turkey.<sup>12</sup> Table 9 on the preceding page provides data on economic and military assistance to Greece for the years of the junta, 1967-1974. Even more evident than with Table 7 on page 142, is the predominance of military over economic aid.

### 3. Official Military Visits to Greece

On February 15, 1968, less than one year after the coup, Ambassador Talbot invited Papadopoulos and other prominent members of the junta on board the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Franklin D. Roosevelt during a port call. During this occasion of handshakes and smiles, with numerous photographers present, Papadopoulos was told by Admiral H. Rivero that it was an honor to have him aboard.<sup>13</sup>

The presence and activities of military personnel in their distinctive uniforms, especially high-ranking military officers, served as an important indicator and advertisement of the relationship between the two nations. On numerous occasions association of the junta leaders with American officers was given wide publicity and exploited. The American military mission in Greece was aware of their importance in conveying a signal of approval or disapproval as evident in this statement by Colonel Austin C. Ayotte, Chief of Staff, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Greece (JUSMAGG): "Our influence with the Greeks in military matters is great, and they respect our judgement. As noted earlier, the United States is enjoying full benefits





of several U.S. interests in Greece."<sup>14</sup> An American major general told a visiting Congressman at the U.S. Embassy in Athens: "It's [the junta] the best damn Government since Pericles."<sup>15</sup>

Lowenstein and Moose reported that there were an average of about 2,000 U.S. fleet personnel ashore per day in Greek ports.<sup>16</sup> Ambassador Tasca told a Special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that: "We had over 500 fleet visits last year [1971];...since I have been here we hardly have had any incidents at all. If people didn't like America, we would feel that very quickly."<sup>17</sup> Table 10 provides data on the magnitude of the official visits to Greece by general and flag officers during the first three and one-half years of the junta.

Sir Hugh Greene, in speaking of possible sanctions against Greece, to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 14, 1971, said:

I do think that the cessation of what happens -- if I may be allowed to call it "public love-making" -- between members of the administration in the United States, or U.S. officials, generals and admirals, with the regime, would be noted immediately by the regime and would be noted by the people of Greece as indicating that the United States was withdrawing its support from the regime.<sup>18</sup>

Clifford P. Hackett reported that:

The Greek Government has vigorously and successfully exploited every conceivable sign of American support for the regime including: wide publicity for every visiting American general and admiral, of which there have been many; special publicity for senior American civilian officials...; the serenades of the Prime Minister by Christmas carolers of the American grade school for the past two Christmas Eves (an honor never given any prime minister before Papadopoulos);...<sup>19</sup>



TABLE 10

OFFICIAL VISITS TO GREECE BY U.S. GENERAL AND FLAG  
OFFICERS, APRIL 1967 TO JUNE 1970

Year/Name	No. of Visits	Year/Name	No. of Visits
<u>1967</u>		<u>1967</u>	
GEN D.A. Burchinal	1	RADM L.R. Geis	2
ADM J.S. McCain, Jr.	1	RADM R.W. Paine	2
VADM W.I. Martin	2	RADM J.E. Dacey	1
<u>1968</u>		<u>1968</u>	
MG G. Ruhlen	1	VADM J.A. Tyree	1
MG W.E. Greer	1	VADM W.I. Martin	1
GEN T.W. Parker	1	VADM D.C. Richardson	3
GEN J.H. Polk	1	RADM V.G. Lambert	2
MG W.H. Craig	1	RADM L.R. Geis	1
BG A. Hurow	1	RADM W.E. Lemos	2
MG E. Helton	1	RADM J.F. Calvert	3
GEN D.A. Burchinal	1	RADM V.P. Healey	5
LTG R.H. Warren	1	RADM E.C. Outlaw	2
<u>1969</u>		<u>1969</u>	
GEN A.J. Goodpaster	1	RADM W.E. Lemos	1
ADM W.F.A. Wendt	2	RADM P.M. Charbonnet	1
GEN J.L. Throckmorton	1	RADM J.M. James	3
MG W.A. Enemark	1	RADM P.B. Armstrong	3
LTG H.M. Exton	1	RADM F.H. Price	1
RADM D.W. Wulzen	1	RADM R.E. Spreen	3
MG A.J. Bowley	1	RADM E.W. Dobie, Jr.	1
MG R.B. Martin	1	RADM E.C. Outlaw	1
MG R. Forbes	1	RADM A.F. Fleming	2
RADM Cassell	1	MG N.O. Ohman	1
MG J.N. Ewbank	1	MG J.T. Scepanisky	1
BG E.B. Edwards	1	LTG H.J. Lemley	1
VADM D.C. Richardson	3		
<u>1970</u>		<u>1970</u>	
GEN D.A. Burchinal	1	RADM G.C. Talley	4
BG L.F. Boyle	1	RADM E.W. Dobie, Jr.	2
MG R.H. Anthis	1	RADM L.E. Hubbell	5
VADM D.C. Richardson	3	RADM A.F. Fleming	1
RADM W.H. House	2		

(Table continued on next page)



TABLE 10 -- Continued

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Total Visits for 1967 (after April)	9
Total Visits for 1968	29
Total Visits for 1969	35
Total Visits for 1970 (through June)	20
Grand Total of Visits April 1967 to June 1970	93

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SOURCE: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad Part 7, Greece and Turkey. Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2d sess., June 9 and 11, 1970, pp. 1839-1840.

Hackett also found most Greek opposition leaders in accordance that an end to high-level and well-publicized visits by American military and civilian officials would contribute significantly to the downfall of the junta.

#### 4. U.S. Base Rights

Table 11 provides a list of the major U.S./NATO bases and facilities in Greece. The value to the U.S. of these facilities was enhanced shortly after the coup by the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War in which the junta granted the U.S. overflight and base rights and blanket use of the landing facilities on Crete. Additional windfalls to the junta were the appearance of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and rapid Soviet naval expansion. All of these combined to intensify the dependence of the Sixth Fleet on Greek harbors and facilities.





TABLE 11

## MAJOR U.S./NATO BASES AND FACILITIES IN GREECE

Type	Location
Airbases:	
Combat	Classified
Transport/reconnaissance	Athens
General purpose	Iraklion (Crete)
Naval bases and facilities:	Souda Bay (Crete)
Storage facilities:	
Ammunition depot	Souda Bay (Crete)
Miscellaneous	Souda Bay (Crete)
Nuclear weapons	Classified
Training sites:	
Missile range	Namfi (Crete)
Air weapons range	Tymbakion (Crete)
Amphibious training sites	Various locations
NADGE sites	Larrisa, Pilion, Hortiatis, Vitsi, Ismaros
Communications sites:	
ACE High	Athens, Kefallnia, Vitsi, Larrisa, Ismaros, Ziros (Crete)
Defense Communications System broadband	Thessaloniki area (4), Athens area (7), Nea Makri, Crete (2)
Joint U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (JUSMAAG)	Athens

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications Related to NATO and the Middle East. Prepared for the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 1975, p. 62.

Between 1972 and 1975 a segment of the U.S. Sixth Fleet was able to home-port in Athens. The U.S. Navy motive



in this action was an attempt to stem the rising divorce rate among sailors in the fleet by creating an accessible home life conducive to solving retention problems. Originally a squadron of destroyers was home-ported and the intention was to home-port an aircraft carrier also. A 1974 Congressional study mission to Greece concluded that: "The fact that the United States continued to press, in the name of NATO, its naval and air base rights during the dictatorship, make our country more culpable in the eyes of many Greeks..."<sup>20</sup> It went on to say that:

In the 1967-72 period, the official U.S. position toward Greece was, briefly, that the United States regretted the imposition of military rule in Greece but has no responsibility for the events of 1967. The United States hoped the present military government would fulfill its commitment to a restoration of Greek democracy since only through such a restoration could the country gain the stability it needed as a member of the NATO alliance. Meanwhile, however, the United States had to continue to protect its short term interests in retaining the military base rights in the country which were important for both NATO and for American policy in the Middle East.<sup>21</sup>

That statement quite well highlights the nature of the military interest in Greece pursued in the tangible form of base and facilities rights. The success or failure of that strategy can be derived from the fact that the Greek Government denied the U.S. usage of bases in Greece to replenish Israeli forces in the October 1973 Middle East war. In August 1974, Greece withdrew from all but the political wing of NATO and even now U.S. base rights are tenuous, pending final approval of a U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) initialled July 28, 1977.



## 5. Proliferation of Foreign (Non-U.S.) Arms Suppliers to Greece

An important indicator of the failure of the American pursuit of its military interest in Greece was the proliferation of foreign (non-U.S.) arms suppliers to Greece. This is an especially stark indicator when contrasted with the virtual sole supplier status of the U.S. before the junta. Between 1967 and 1974 twenty-five out of fifty-four major Greek arms deals were with foreign countries other than the U.S.<sup>22</sup> In the seventeen years before the coup, Greece had received sixteen percent of her arms from countries other than the U.S., whereas in the eight years spanned by the junta forty-six percent of Greek military hardware was supplied by non-U.S. foreign nations. In other words, in one-half the time, three times the number of arms deals were concluded with foreign nations other than the U.S.

In 1964 the governments of Canada, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and Britain had pledged varying amounts of aid for the Greek military budget. However, because of the coup, no aid was supplied in the ensuing years, although most of these countries did sell them equipment.<sup>23</sup> Between 1954 and 1968 seven countries besides the U.S. had supplied military assistance to Greece totalling about \$35.9 million. The seven countries were Belgium, Canada, West Germany, Norway, Spain, Britain and Italy with the biggest contributors being Canada and West Germany.<sup>24</sup>





The French and the Germans were the two major arms sellers to Greece during the junta. In May 1970, West Germany began delivery of a total of forty Nord 2501 Noratlas military transport aircraft.<sup>25</sup> The Washington Post on August 29, 1970 reported that Greece had secretly bought fifty AMX-30 tanks from France at a price of \$33 million.<sup>26</sup> This was confirmed in the SIPRI register of arms suppliers to Greece as being concluded in 1971. Some of the more major arms deals included French Mirage F-1 aircraft, French Aerospatiale MM-38 Exocet missiles, French and German torpedo boats and gun boats, German submarines and additional French AMX-30 tanks and armored personnel carriers. Table 12 provides a breakdown of the dollar

TABLE 12  
FOREIGN ARMS SUPPLIERS AND VALUE OF ARMS  
TRANSFERS TO GREECE, 1973-1977  
(in Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Country	Value
United States	\$878
France	\$360
Federal Republic of Germany	\$ 90
Italy	\$ 40
Canada	\$ 10
Others	\$ 30

SOURCE: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1978), p. 155.



TABLE 13

## FOREIGN (NON-U.S.) ARMS SUPPLIERS TO GREECE, 1967-1974

Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1967	8	Sud Alouette II	France	
1967	17	Republic F-84F	FRG	NATO aid
1967	6	Republic RF-84F	FRG	NATO aid
1967	(400)	MBB Bo 810 Cobra 2000	FRG	NATO aid
1967	6	Fast patrol boat	Norway	
(1967)	(30)	M-47 Patton	FRG	NATO aid
1968	1	Vosper torpedo boat	FRG	NATO aid
1968	1	Vosper torpedo boat	FRG	NATO aid
(1968-70)	(12)	M-44	FRG	NATO aid
(1968-70)	(12)	M-52	FRG	NATO aid
1969	6	Agusta-Bell 205A	Italy	
1969	8	Grumman HU-16B Albatross	Norway	
1969	5	Coastal minesweeper	Belgium	
1969	5	Torpedo boat	FRG	
1970	40	Nord 2501 Noratlas	FRG	
1971	6	Republic F-84	Netherlands	NATO aid
1971	55	AMX-30	France	
1972	3	Lockheed T-33	Netherlands	NATO aid
1972	50	Aerospatiale MM-38 Exocet	France	
1972	4	Fast gunboat	France	
1972-73	4	Submarine	FRG	
...	40	Mirage F-1	France	
...	2	Canadair CL-215	Canada	
...	130	AMX-30	France	
...	100+	APC	France	

SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Trade Registers: The Arms Trade With The Third World (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1975), pp. 124-126.

NOTE: ( ) indicates uncertain data  
... indicates data not available



value of arms transfers to Greece by supplier for the years 1973 to 1977. Table 13 presents a summary of the foreign (non-U.S.) arms deals concluded during the years of the junta, concentrating only on selected major items of equipment.

#### 6. The Greek Arms Industry

Besides turning to foreign, non-U.S. suppliers for military hardware, the colonels planted the seeds of what has become a burgeoning indigenous arms industry in Greece. Before the coup Greece possessed virtually no domestic arms production capability. The colonels were instrumental in establishing an industry that not only provides large quantities of military equipment for domestic use, but for export markets as well.

In the May 1974 Facts on File, Greece is reported to have signed contracts with a French shipyard for the construction and purchase of four Combattante 3 guided-missile patrol boats.<sup>27</sup> Since 1974 Greece has made considerable purchases of foreign (non-U.S.) military hardware that enabled a transfer of technology which has been integrated into the Greek arms industry. The Greek parliament also ratified legislation to establish an indigenous arms industry in order to attain greater self-sufficiency. Vassilios Georgousopoulos, a retired admiral who heads the Greek War Industry Department, in a 1977 interview said:

A priority listing of war supply production factories exists, the beginning being made with simple conventional weapons and reaching highly sophisticated equipment. We are starting with the production of nitrocellulose used





in explosives, all types of gun powder, conventional ammunition, light arms, electronic equipment, armored vehicles and tanks, missile carrying gunboats, small civilian aircraft and fighter plane spare parts, and will then proceed into sophisticated equipment like ballistic and guided missiles and jet fighters.<sup>28</sup>

He also said the Greek arms industry would be export-oriented and could meet nonmilitary needs in time of tranquility.

The Greeks are well on their way to accomplishing their goal. In November 1975, following negotiations originated under the colonels, a contract was signed with four U.S. companies establishing Hellenic Aerospace Industry (HAI) Limited. This \$300 million enterprise involves Lockheed Aircraft International A.G. for the management function and control, Lockheed Aircraft Service Company which is responsible for identifying equipment and systems requirements, General Electric Company to build the engine facility at the plant, and the Westinghouse Electronic Corporation for the aviation electronics (avionics) equipment and installations.

Established as a modern aircraft maintenance and overhaul facility, HAI provides these services to the Greek Air Force and state-operated Olympic Airlines. It is expanding to include other foreign commercial and military air fleets. It includes an aircraft depot, an electronics depot and flight line support facility, utility and ancillary buildings covering 457 acres and employing 1,500 people, expected to increase to 2,500 within four years. On May 30, 1979 the plant delivered the first overhauled F-4E



Phantom to the Hellenic Air Force. The ultimate objective is to be able to produce eighty percent of the components for small civilian aircraft and sophisticated jet fighters, including jet engines.<sup>29</sup>

Besides the construction of four French patrol boats in Greek shipyards, the Hellenic Shipyards are currently constructing a series of ten steel patrol craft.<sup>30</sup> This shipyard will soon be building ships up to 15,000 tons. The Athens Domestic Service, February 29, 1980, reported that the Greek Skaramangas shipyard had launched the second of six missile boats being built to French specifications.<sup>31</sup>

In March 1979 the Greek Government bought controlling shares in the previously Austrian-owned Steyr army truck plant in Greece. Beginning in 1978 Greece started producing tanks and armored fighting vehicles. The tank factory was the end result of negotiations begun in 1976 with the British company Vickers.<sup>32</sup> At a recent parade in Athens, Greek-produced Marathon and Leonidas armored fighting vehicles were proudly displayed.<sup>33</sup>

In terms of small arms, Greece signed a contract with West Germany to produce Hecklar and Koch G3/H3 GmbH (Oberndorf-Neckar) rifles to be used mainly by Greek forces, although an eye is on the export market in Africa. The production target is 30,000 rifles annually.<sup>34</sup> In mid-1977, \$2 million was allocated to establish a factory to produce FAL 7.62-mm rifles and Falo light machineguns.





One hundred percent of the rifles were to be produced for export, while fifty percent of the machineguns would be exported and the remainder used by the Greek military.

Besides equipment the Greek military is expanding its role as a trainer. Since 1962 Greece has trained Libyan air force cadets as well as providing a small Greek military detachment to Libya to assist in maintaining their high performance combat aircraft.<sup>35</sup>

The Greek Defense Minister disclosed in the newsletter Greece: A Monthly Record of January 1980, that the Greek small arms manufacturing plant is now receiving sizeable export orders, and that by 1981, will be capable of turning out medium and heavy machineguns and barrels for 10-mm and 35-mm anti-aircraft guns.<sup>36</sup> He cited other new Greek defense-related industry capabilities including advanced naval construction, missile fuel manufacture, modern telecommunications equipment and ammunition. All of this is indicative of a bustling and growing arms industry; an arms industry that received its impetus during the reign of the colonels. Furthermore, it evidences a lessened dependence on the U.S. for military hardware, and consequently a weakening of ties.

#### B. THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP

American assistance to Greece in the immediate post-World War Two years was substantial. However, it tapered down and by 1969 ceased altogether. The greatest amount of economic aid was furnished between 1949





and 1952 in the amount of \$706.7 million, with an additional \$188 million from 1953-1957.<sup>37</sup> This assistance was motivated by the American desire to see the Greek economy rebuilt in order to withstand the pressures of communism. In this sense it was politically motivated.

There are several reasons for the halt in economic assistance. Foremost was the attainment of economic strength in Greece itself. Equally important was the Greek association with the European Economic Community (EEC). Although this association was frozen for the duration of the junta in Greece, it was anticipated that it would resume once democracy was restored. On May 6, 1980 the last of the nine EEC parliaments ratified the acceptance of Greece as a full member as of January 1, 1981.<sup>38</sup> A tertiary reason for the cessation of economic aid, and with it weakening of economic ties, was the increased Greek economic ties with her neighboring Balkan countries, particularly the East European countries and the Soviet Union.

Up until the time of the colonels the American business investment in Greece had been substantial. Senate investigators Lowenstein and Moose found that between 1953 and 1971 U.S. business investment in Greece constituted the single largest share of Greek foreign capital, some forty percent. U.S. tourists to Greece constituted over twenty-five percent of the Greek tourist trade and sixty percent of its tourist receipts.<sup>39</sup>



## 1. Greek Trade With the U.S.

Greek trade with the U.S. is an indicator of the economic relationship between the two countries. Table 14 provides data on Greek trade with the U.S. for the years 1960 through 1977. It is apparent in this data that Greek trade with the U.S. as a percentage of the Greek total trade has declined significantly since 1960. In 1977 the Greek-U.S. trade value was approximately one-third the value of seventeen years earlier. In part this can be attributed to the Greek turn toward other European countries as a result of EEC ties. However, the decline commenced most significantly in the early to middle years of the junta, when the association with the EEC was frozen, and undoubtedly reflects the foreign policy of the colonels. As the economic ties with her Balkan neighbors and the Soviet Union strengthened, a corresponding weakening of economic ties with the U.S. occurred.

## 2. Greek Tourist Trade

Table 15 provides data on the total number of tourists visiting Greece, the number of U.S. tourists and the percentage of U.S. tourists in relation to the total for the years 1960 through 1979. The most obvious characteristic is that during six of the eight years spanned by the junta U.S. tourists constituted the largest percentage ever in the nineteen year period, ranging from 23.5% to 29.8%. When viewed from the Greek perspective this increase in U.S. tourists conveyed to the Greek public that the U.S.



TABLE 14

GREEK TRADE WITH THE U.S. -- IMPORTS  
AND EXPORTS, 1960-1977  
(in Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Year	Imports (cif)		Exports (fob)	
	U.S.	U.S. as % of Total	U.S.	U.S. as % of Total
1960	94.8	13.5	27.3	13.4
1961	81.0	11.3	32.4	14.5
1962	67.2	9.6	19.2	7.7
1963	84.6	10.5	54.9	18.9
1964	101.0	11.4	44.9	14.6
1965	112.7	9.9	31.2	9.5
1966	131.2	10.7	42.6	10.5
1967	100.1	8.4	65.1	13.1
1968	106.8	7.7	47.6	10.2
1969	151.9	9.5	54.1	9.8
1970	116.0	5.9	48.3	7.5
1971	139.1	6.6	59.4	9.0
1972	145.6	6.2	85.0	9.7
1973	287.3	8.4	91.9	6.4
1974	348.6	9.2	106.2	6.1
1975	365.5	7.4	108.5	5.1
1976	434.5	6.8	154.4	5.7
1977	371.0	5.1	135.5	4.6

SOURCE: The Europa Year Book: A World Survey, Volume I (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1962-1979).

NOTE: The above figures are converted from drachmas using the following exchange rate as given in the source cited above. 1960-1973 -- 30 dr/\$1; 1974-1977 -- 34.72 dr/\$1.





TABLE 15

## NUMBER OF TOURISTS TO GREECE, 1960-1979

Year	Total Tourists	U.S. Tourists	U.S. as % of Total
1960	315,805	not available	-
1961	410,909	93,875	22.8
1962	508,821	108,448	21.3
1963	644,032	147,561	22.9
1964	649,091	140,935	21.7
1965	816,261	172,475	21.1
1966	966,890	195,346	20.2
1967	821,073	179,246	21.8
1968	786,804	201,875	25.7
1969	1,047,813	311,796	29.8
1970	1,252,875	304,681	24.3
1971	1,781,578	438,981	24.6
1972	2,234,219	548,141	24.5
1973	2,620,103	615,606	23.5
1974	1,766,111	371,795	21.1
1975	2,642,623	458,575	17.4
1976	3,672,054	493,008	13.4
1977	3,961,112	598,470	15.1
1978	4,532,411	513,181	11.3
1979	5,800,000	601,456	10.4

SOURCES: (1) Greece, National Statistical Service, Statistical Yearbook of Greece cited in Greece, National Tourist Organization, Statistical Data (n.p., n.d.).

(2) United Nations, United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1960-1975 (New York: United Nations, 1961-1976).

(3) The Europa Year Book 1979: A World Survey, Volume I (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1979).

(4) Greece, Greece: A Monthly Record (Washington, D.C.: Greek Embassy Press and Information Office, February-March 1980).



was not very serious about backing up with substantial action its professed dissatisfaction with the military government. In other words, the American public found Greece a tempting vacation spot regardless of the type of government.

The decrease in total and U.S. tourists in 1967 and 1974 can be attributed to a reaction to the turbulence manifested in the coup in April 1967 and the Cyprus debacle and downfall of the colonels in 1974. In both instances the numbers of tourists increased significantly the following years.

Table 16 furnishes data on the size of the tourist contribution to the Greek balance of trade. For each year shown credits have exceeded debits and there has been a generally steady increase in the balance surplus.

### 3. Conclusions

Several conclusions can be drawn from this examination of the American economic interest in Greece. (1) While the level of economic assistance provided Greece was declining, and ceased altogether in 1969, military assistance remained relatively constant at amounts around \$50 to \$100 million per year in recent years. This tends to substantiate the argument that the military interest in Greece was more important than the economic interest. (2) In the 1950's and early 1960's U.S. trade with Greece was of greater value and size than in more recent years. This declining trend reflects the Greek shift toward



TABLE 16  
GREEK TOURISM RECEIPTS, 1960-1978  
(in Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Year	Credit	Debit	Balance
1960	49.3	18.8	+30.5
1961	62.5	19.3	+43.2
1962	76.0	21.8	+54.2
1963	95.4	27.5	+67.9
1964	90.9	38.6	+52.3
1965	107.6	41.5	+61.1
1966	143.4	40.6	+102.8
1967	126.8	40.7	+86.1
1968	120.3	42.5	+77.8
1969	149.5	47.9	+101.6
1970	193.5	55.3	+138.2
1971	305.3	73.7	+231.6
1972	392.7	95.8	+296.9
1973	514.9	113.3	+401.6
1974	447.6	129.1	+318.5
1975	643.6	154.8	+488.8
1976	823.7	150.7	+673.0
1977	980.6	164.0	+816.6
1978	1,326.3	223.8	+1,102.5

SOURCE: Bank of Greece, cited in Greece, National Tourist Organization, Statistical Data (n.p., n.d.).

European trading partners, and a concomitant deterioration in the Greek-U.S. trade relationship. (3) The statistics on numbers of tourists to Greece and tourist receipts reflect several things. The high percentage of U.S.





tourists visiting Greece during the years of the junta stand in contradiction of official U.S. displeasure with the colonels. It was not only a reflection of business as usual, but more than usual. Since the end of the junta, U.S. tourists to Greece have been the lowest percentage for five consecutive years. While this probably reflects in part the weakened U.S. dollar vis-a-vis other European currencies, it is reasonable to deduce that after the demise of the junta, the Greek welcome for U.S. tourists was considerably cooler and therefore contributed to the decline. And, (4) while the coup in 1967 and Cyprus in 1974 caused a momentary drop in the number of tourists and tourist receipts, the numbers quickly rose again. Unrest and uncertainty impaired the tourist industry briefly, but the presence of a military dictatorship failed to deter foreign visitors for very long, especially Americans.

#### C. THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP

The American involvement in Greek political life was most pronounced in the late 1940's and early 1950's. At first the U.S. supported and strove for the leadership of centrist and left-of-center political parties as the most likely means of preventing the spread of communism. By 1952 this was no longer seen as a feasible course of action. Blatant U.S. interference was evident in the example discussed in Chapter One where the U.S. Ambassador took out a newspaper ad in an Athens daily officially endorsing a right-wing, conservative candidate for Prime Minister. It



also carried a thinly veiled threat that should this advice not be heeded it was likely that American aid to Greece may be altered.

As with the economic relationship, political ties to Greece have taken a back seat to the military-strategic relationship, although to a lesser extent. The U.S. Government since the 1950's through the Embassy in Athens has made known its support of center-right, conservative leaders and parties, such as Karamanlis, and its opposition to left-of-center candidates such as George and Andreas Papandreou. This line of reasoning insured that the King, the army and the conservative establishment remained loyal to the U.S. and as centers of power in Greek politics. Conversely, it alienated the center-left elements.

#### 1. Official Civilian Visits to Greece

As with the presence of U.S. generals and admirals associating with the junta leaders, high-ranking civilian officials conveyed a signal of how the U.S. Government viewed the ruling military leadership in Greece. This factor did not go unnoticed by the Greek public or the American public. Typical criticisms included this statement by Congressman Brademas, who said July 14, 1971 that the U.S. should "cease the policy wherein U.S. Government officials of the highest rank say warm and gracious things about the junta." Elsewhere, he said, "American officials in Greece don't have to get their pictures taken with their arms around junta officials."<sup>40</sup>



Besides the message conveyed within Greece, U.S. officials expressed themselves in ways that were obviously biased toward the junta. The New York Times of May 15, 1971 attributed the following statement to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Martin J. Hillenbrand: "The United States told the Council of Europe today that the four-year-old Greek military-backed regime received broad support from the people despite what the United States called disappointingly slow progress toward greater democratic freedom."<sup>41</sup>

The first official civilian visit to Greece was not until May 20, 1970, when Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans paid an official call. An official announcement quoted the secretary as expressing his "deep admiration" for the Greek armed forces.<sup>42</sup>

One of the most controversial visits was that of Secretary of Commerce Maurice H. Stans, who in a speech to the Hellenic-American Chamber of Commerce in Athens, April 23, 1971, was reported to have expressed appreciation for the "sense of security that the government of Greece" rendered U.S. investments in Greece. He also stated that President Nixon "has warm regards for the people of Greece, for the wonderful way in which Greece has kept its commitments to NATO and for the way in which the two countries are working together."<sup>43</sup> Stans later stated that he was misquoted and misunderstood, but by then the damage had been done.





TABLE 17

MAJOR OFFICIAL VISITS TO GREECE BY HIGH-  
RANKING CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, 1967-1974

Date	Name	Position	Note
May 1970	Robert C. Seamans	Secretary of the Air Force	first formal visit by U.S. since coup
Sep 1970	G. Warren Nutter	Asst. Secretary of Defense	precede lifting of arms embargo
Oct 1970	Melvin R. Laird	Secretary of Defense	follow lifting of arms embargo
Apr 1971	Maurice H. Stans	Secretary of Commerce	
Oct 1971	Spiro T. Agnew	Vice President	
Jul 1972	William P. Rogers	Secretary of State	

SOURCE: Facts on File; World News Digest (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1970-1972).

Vice President Spiro T. Agnew toasted Papadopoulos on his visit to Greece October 17, 1971. He also told newsmen on his plane enroute to Greece that he would stress Nixon Administration support for continued military aid to Greece.<sup>44</sup>

Table 17 lists the names, dates and positions of six major official visits, ranging from the Vice President to an Assistant Secretary of Defense. As with the visits of military generals and admirals discussed in an earlier



section, official visits by these high-ranking civilian officials were well-publicized by the junta. Ample criticism existed that these visits rendered State Department denunciations virtually worthless to the ordinary Greek citizen. Certainly it conveyed a signal to the colonels that the U.S. was only criticizing them to appease the anti-junta segments of society, while in the daily affairs of government relations were expected to continue as normal.

## 2. Anti-Junta/Anti-U.S. Resistance and Violence

A second indicator of the success or failure of the political relationship with the colonels was the level of violence directed against the junta and against U.S. owned or affiliated property. The political relationship, in this case, included the military ties with the colonels. Table 18 provides a chronology of the violent incidents as they appeared in Facts on File and several other sources. Those incidents marked with an asterisk indicate incidents that are affiliated with Americans. This chronology raises two points. First, the list is lengthy, not all-inclusive and contains violent or potentially violent activities. This tends to contradict those people who believed that the Greek resistance to the junta was virtually passive. Second, there are a number of cases where the U.S. Embassy was the target of extremist activity. This activity clearly contradicts the statement by Ambassador Tasca to Congress on January 12, 1972: "...since I have been here



TABLE 18

## CHRONOLOGY OF ANTI-JUNTA/ANTI-U.S. VIOLENCE, 1967-1974

Date	Incident
*May 18, 1969	bomb explodes at U.S. airbase commissary
*May 18, 1969	bomb destroys 2 U.S.-owned cars
*May 19, 1969	bomb destroys 1 U.S.-owned car
*May 19, 1969	bomb damages building housing American Express and Litton Industries offices
*Jul 23, 1969	unexploded bomb found inside U.S. Information Service Library in Athens
Jul 26, 1969	bomb explodes in Athens Constitution Square cafe injuring six people
*Jul 28, 1969	bombs destroy/damage 8 U.S.-owned cars
*Aug 9, 1969	bomb explodes in Olympic Airways office injuring 7 including 2 U.S. tourists
Sep 13, 1969	bomb explodes in Athens office of <u>Nea Politeia</u>
Sep 22, 1969	bomb explodes in Athens city hall and central post office
Oct 7, 1969	bomb destroys car of brother of Minister of Economic Coordination
Oct 18, 1969	8 bombs explode near Athens Constitution Square
*Jan 5, 1970	unexploded bomb found in U.S. Embassy in Athens
May 2, 1970	bomb damages headquarters of pro-junta Greek General Confederation of Labor
*Sep 2, 1970	bomb explodes in U.S. Embassy parking lot killing 2 people (not U.S. citizens)
*Oct 4, 1970	bomb explodes in Athens National Gardens near visiting U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
*Nov 26, 1970	bomb damages bronze statue of President Harry S. Truman
Nov 26, 1970	2 bombs found and defused near radio station
*Jan 1, 1971	bomb explodes at Athens hotel used by U.S. Air Force
*Jan 1, 1971	bomb explodes at American servicemen's club in Athens
*Feb 7, 1971	bombs damage 3 cars in Athens (2 U.S.-owned)
Mar 11, 1971	bomb explodes outside printing office of <u>Estia</u>
Mar 13, 1971	bomb explodes at Esso-Pappas Oil Company
Mar 23, 1971	bomb explodes outside Athens department store owned by an advisor to Papadopoulos





TABLE 18 -- Continued

Date	Incident
Apr 21, 1971	bomb explodes in Athens cement company office
Apr 21, 1971	bomb destroys car outside Athens cathedral
Apr 26, 1971	bomb explodes outside HQ of General Confederation of Labor
*Apr 26, 1971	bomb explodes outside HQ of U.S. Air Force group in Greece
May 11, 1971	Athens police arrest 4 people possessing bombs
May 14, 1971	bomb explodes killing 1 policeman, injuring 1
Jul 8, 1971	bomb damages railway tracks and tank truck at Esso-Pappas Oil Company
*Jul 1971	bombs planted in U.S.-owned cars at Iraklion
*Oct 16, 1971	2 bombs explode near Athens airport to protest arrival of Vice President Spiro Agnew
*Feb 17, 1972	3 bombs destroy 3 U.S.-owned cars in Athens
*Apr 20, 1972	2 bombs damage U.S.-owned cars in Pireaus and Athens
Apr 21, 1972	4 bombs explode in Athens
*May 13, 1972	2 bombs destroy cars of U.S. diplomats
*Aug 29, 1972	bomb explodes inside U.S. Embassy in Athens
*Dec 7, 1972	2 bombs damage 2 U.S.-owned cars in Athens
*Jan 18-20, 1973	bombs damage 7 U.S. official cars in Athens area

SOURCES: (1) Facts on File: World News Digest (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1967-1974).

(2) Peter Schwab and George D. Frangos, eds., Greece Under the Junta (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1970).

(3) George Yannopoulos, "The State of the Opposition Forces Since the Military Coup." In Greece Under Military Rule, pp. 163-190. Edited by Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1972).

(4) Thomas W. Pew, "Conversations in Greece," The Nation 212 (January 18, 1971): 75.

\*Indicates acts of violence towards U.S. citizens, U.S. affiliated property or activities connected with the U.S.



we hardly have had any incidents at all. If people didn't like America, we would feel that very quickly."<sup>45</sup> Either this means that Ambassador Tasca was unbelievably out of touch with reality in Greece, or he was making every effort to play down and ignore the presence of anti-American sentiment for the sake of the continued American relationship with the Greek colonels. In either case it was undesirable.

### 3. United Nations Voting -- Percentage Correspondence of Greece, United Nations Average, NATO Average and Warsaw Pact Average With the United States


The third and final indicator of the Greek-U.S. political relationship is presented in Figure 1, with supporting data in Appendix E. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the percentage correspondence in United Nations General Assembly voting between Greece, the United Nations average, the NATO average, the Warsaw Pact average and the United States for the years 1960 through 1977.

Several observations can be made from this graph. In the early 1960's the percentage of correspondence in voting between the U.S. and Greece was much higher than it was in the late 1970's. While all the percentages depicted, except the Warsaw Pact average, reflect a decreasing trend in correspondence with the U.S., the Greek trend has followed a steeper decline. Between 1967 and 1974 when the military dictatorship was in power, the percentage of correspondence remained relatively constant around fifty percent, ranging from a high of fifty-five percent to a



FIGURE 1

UNITED NATIONS VOTING -- PERCENTAGE CORRESPONDENCE  
OF GREECE, UN AVERAGE, NATO AVERAGE AND  
WARSAW PACT AVERAGE WITH THE U.S.



SOURCE: Rodney G. Tomlinson, "United Nations Roll Call Votes, 1960-1963, 1965-1977." U.S. Naval Academy: Automated Data Base, 1979. (Data furnished to USNA by the U.S. Department of State).

NOTES: (1) See Appendix 3 for supporting statistics.

(2) No recorded roll call vote was taken in 1964.

(3) Legend: — Greece

— . — NATO average

----- UN average

..... Warsaw Pact average






low of forty-three percent. While this data does not support a convergence in voting between the colonels and the U.S., it does reflect a degree of continuity and constancy. Perhaps the most significant aspect to this graph is the percentage of correspondence for 1975, 1976 and 1977. Those years were the first time that the level of correspondence fell below forty percent, reaching an all-time low of twenty-nine percent in 1976. While in 1977 Greece rebounded to thirty-nine percent, it was the first time that Greece had fallen below the United Nations average.

The fact that Greece, the United Nations average and the NATO average have all followed a steadily decreasing degree of correspondence with the U.S., while the Warsaw Pact has followed a slight upward trend of convergence, is an interesting phenomenon that can perhaps be understood as dissatisfaction with the U.S. position and policies by her allies and agreement by her opponents. The steepness of the Greek pattern is in part explainable by the fact that Greece usually sided with the Arab nations either abstaining or casting an opposing vote over issues in which the U.S. sided with Israel.

#### 4. Conclusions

The observations gathered from these three indicators tend to signify that the U.S. political relationship toward Greece was not well-served by the policies with the Greek colonels. They illustrate that there has been a





decline in the nature and strength of the Greek-U.S. political relationship, and that the decline originates with the time-frame of the military dictatorship. The conclusion to be drawn is that the American political relationship with Greece has now taken on a different character and it is therefore necessary to maintain political relations with Greece in a different manner than in the past in order to prevent further erosion and damage.



## VI. CONCLUSION

Two major points are evident from the preceding examination of the most recent military dictatorship in Greek history: (1) the regime of the colonels was both harsh in its practices and detested by the vast majority of Greeks, and (2) the American relationship with Greece was ill-served by the policies established and carried out by the U.S. Government. The regime has ended. Greece will, as it has in the past, overcome the internal effects of the seven and one-half years of military rule. In terms of Greek-American relations, however, the era of the colonels was a watershed. In the twenty years preceding the 1967 coup d'etat, Greece and the United States were intimately bound together in numerous spheres, foremost among them the military-strategic relationship embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With the advent of the military dictatorship the strength in the relationship between Greece and the U.S. has diminished. Furthermore, the relationship has been undermined by additional external variables such as growing Greek ties with the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries. Internally, the Greek Left, personified in the figure of Andreas Papandreou, has had considerable success in exploiting the widespread resentment among Greeks of the U.S. for its role in the lengthy hiatus in democratic practices. Electoral





gains and public opinion polls continue to register gains for the Left, while the Center and Right continue to decline in popularity.

A brief examination of several current issues in Greece will clarify the damage done to the Greek-American relationship by the military rule: (1) the political leadership of the country, (2) current geographical disputes, specifically in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, and (3) the status of the Greek relation with NATO.

(1) Greek politics, since the demise of the junta, have witnessed electoral and popular gains by the Left, specifically the socialist PASOK party of Andreas Papandreu. These gains have occurred at the expense of the New Democracy party of Constantine Karamanlis. Of perhaps even greater concern, however, has been the declining popularity of the Center, giving rise to greater polarization of Greek politics between the Left and the Right. Table 19 furnishes data on the two post-junta elections in Greece: November 17, 1974 and November 20, 1977. As a result of the 1977 elections, Andreas Papandreu leads the largest opposition party in Parliament.

Papandreu is a very vocal critic of the U.S., NATO and the West. There is no shortage of evidence elucidating his position. The Greek newspaper, Eleftherotipia, April 10, 1980, discussed the details of a meeting between Papandreu and several visiting U.S. Senators. The report said that Papandreu "explained PASOK's unshaken position



TABLE 19

## POST-JUNTA ELECTION RESULTS, 1974 AND 1977\*

Party/Coalition Name	1974	1977
	%/Seats	%/Seats
National Rally (EP) (National Democratic Union) (EDE)	1.1/0	6.82/1
New Democracy (ND)	54.37/220	41.85/172
Neo-Liberal Party	-	1.08/2
Union of the Democratic Center (Center Union/New Forces)	20.52/60	11.95/15
Panhellenic Socialist Movement	13.58/12	25.33/93
Alliance of Progressive and Left-Wing Forces** (United Left)***	9.45/8	2.72/2
Communist Party of Greece (KKE)	-	9.36/11
Others	0.98/0	0.89/0

SOURCES: (1) Nicos Mouzelis, "On the Greek Elections," New Left Review 108 (March 1978): 61.

(2) Marios L. Evriviades, "Greece After Dictatorship," Current History 77 (November 1979): 163.

(3) Richard Clogg, "Greece: The End of Consensus Politics?" The World Today 34 (May 1978): 189.

\*Party-coalition titles in parentheses are designations used in the 1974 elections.

\*\*The Alliance of Progressive and Left-Wing Forces in the 1977 elections consisted of the Communist Party of the Interior and four other smaller parties.

\*\*\*The United Left (EA) in the 1974 elections consisted of the Communist Party of Greece (Moscow-oriented), Communist Party of the Interior (Eurocommunist-oriented) and the United Democratic Left (EDA). This precarious alliance disintegrated immediately after the election.



on the immediate withdrawal of Greece from NATO and on the closing of U.S. bases..." Papandreou also recounted "the role and responsibility of the United States for the 7-year dictatorship, for the Cyprus tragedy and the Aegean issue and stressed that the balance of power in the area is primarily the work of America." Papandreou outlined to the Senators the position of his party should they come to power: "...the main line of our course will be to strengthen national independence, implement a nonaligned foreign policy and place Greece within the sphere of the nonaligned."<sup>1</sup>

A Papandreou electoral victory, with its consequences for Greek-American relations, becomes even more probable when seen in light of the current status of the ruling New Democracy party. Constantine Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece since 1974 and leader of the New Democracy party, was recently elected to succeed Constantine Tsatsos as President of Greece, a position that is largely ornamental. He was sworn in on May 15, 1980. The election of Karamanlis to the position of President (on the third round of balloting in Parliament, which yielded a slim three vote edge) was accomplished in the face of abstention by Papandreou and his ninety-three PASOK deputies. Even worse than the obvious lack of unanimity in the election of Karamanlis, is the serious rift that developed within the majority New Democracy party over a successor to the leadership of the party and the position of Prime Minister.





George Rallis, with the support of the moderate faction, received 88 votes, while Evangelos Averoff, supported by the conservative faction, received 84; however, three members of the party abstained from voting.<sup>2</sup>

Since Greek politics are highly dependent on charismatic personalities, the charisma of Papandreu, combined with the rift in the New Democracy party, could conceivably overshadow the new Prime Minister, George Rallis, and result in a PASOK victory in the next elections which must be held by November 1981 at the latest.

(2) Central to the restoration of a mutually satisfying relationship between Greece and the U.S. is the resolution of the two major territorial disputes between Greece and Turkey: Cyprus and the Aegean. Cyprus has been the object of dispute between Greece and Turkey for many years. However, the present situation -- Turkish occupation of approximately forty percent of the island and the displacement of thousands of Greek Cypriots -- stems directly from the malicious activities of the Greek colonels. The Aegean Sea dispute, on the other hand, arose primarily with the 1974 Cyprus incident and is multi-faceted, including seabed mineral rights, territorial boundaries and aerial overflight rights.

The history, legalities and positions of the two antagonists in these disputes lie outside the scope of this thesis. The important point is that these ongoing disputes have damaged the relationship of the U.S. with both Greece



and Turkey, and the longer the disputes continue unresolved, the greater the damage is likely to be. These geographical disputes have contributed to a loss of American prestige in both countries and to a decline in influence; they have added fuel to the anti-American sentiment; they have contributed to a weakening of the southern flank of NATO; and they have contributed to the higher cost the U.S. must now pay to maintain a military presence in both countries.

(3) At the present time, the Greek relationship with NATO remains virtually unchanged from its status in August 1974 when Karamanlis notified NATO that Greece was withdrawing from the military section of the Alliance, but would remain politically attached. This action was part of the Greek backlash to their experiences under the dictatorship and the perceived American complicity with the colonels. Currently, Greece does not belong to the NATO Defense Planning Committee and does not assign troops to NATO commanders. She does, however, belong to the NATO Military Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, the Budget Committee, the High Level Group and the Special Group. Greece also maintains liaison with all NATO commands except Izmir, Turkey.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the lack of progress in reintegrating Greece into NATO, there has been considerable activity on this front. As early as fourteen months after the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus (August 20, 1974), Karamanlis commenced negotiations to reenter the military wing of



NATO. Various plans and terms have been proposed, but all have failed either because of Turkish veto or rejection of the terms by the Greek Parliament. The most recent plan was submitted in February 1980 by General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; however, it was rejected by Greece. Appendix F contains a chronology of the negotiations to return Greece to full status in NATO.

In the absence of normal Greek relations with NATO, the U.S. has continued bilateral negotiations for base rights in Greece in exchange for U.S. military aid. Following two and one-half years of negotiations, a new Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between the U.S. and Greece was initialled July 28, 1977. This agreement committed the U.S. to provide Greece \$700 million in military assistance over four years, of which \$140 million was in the form of grant aid.<sup>4</sup> These amounts are calculated on a ratio of 7 to 10 believed to be adequate by the Administration to maintain the balance of power between Greece and Turkey, respectively. Unfortunately, this agreement, initialled almost three years ago, is still pending approval by the Greek Parliament, and military relations continue on the basis of mutual consent to the expired DCA. The fact that a negotiated settlement of a new DCA has not been concluded after three years reflects the seriousness of Greek misgivings over continued military relations with the U.S., especially when put in light of the continued failure to fully reintegrate Greece into NATO.





In summary, it is obvious from this brief examination of several current issues in Greece today that the position of the U.S. in Greece is considerably inferior to what it was before the coup and that the probability is high that Greek-U.S. relations may weaken even further in the near future. The predicament in which the U.S. now finds itself is a direct consequence of the years of military rule in Greece and the pursuit of a policy by the U.S. that was based excessively on military considerations, was short-sighted in planning and execution, and was unmindful of the democratic principles upon which this nation was founded. Under these circumstances, anti-American sentiment in Greece is quite understandable, arising as it does from the activities of the junta and the indefensible record of U.S. policies toward these dictators. While the bond between the U.S. and Greece has been strained and weakened, the differences are not hopelessly irreconcilable. A conscious effort must be made to cultivate a new relationship with Greece based on broader, mutually satisfactory terms, rather than solely on narrow military-strategic objectives. Anti-American sentiment in Greece can be reversed, but only with long-term efforts aimed at restoring strength to the Greek-U.S. relationship. In all probability this will require risks and, perhaps, short-term losses. It will necessitate opening a meaningful dialog with the long-ostracized Greek Left and recognition of a more independent role for Greece. Rather than looking backward in hopes of restoring



the pre-coup status quo, the U.S. must look ahead with the aim of forging a new relationship.



## APPENDIX A

### ROYAL DECREE NUMBER 280

#### Article 1

On the proposals of the Council of Ministers, we hereby bring into effect throughout the territory the Martial Law Act DXTH of 8th October, 1912, as amended by Section 8 of Legislative Decree 4234/1962, by Act 2839/1941 and by the Legislative Decree of 9th-11th November, 1922.

#### Article 2

1. From the date of publication of this Decree we suspend throughout the territory the application of Articles 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 20, 95 and 97 of the Constitution.

2. Military tribunals which are already in existence, military tribunals as may be set up as extraordinary measure, and the competent military authorities shall exercise the jurisdiction, provided for by Act DXTH as amended, and, in particular, in accordance with the decisions of the Minister of National Defense.

#### Article 3

Cases pending before the Criminal Courts shall not be transmitted to the Military Tribunals, unless the Military Judicial Authority sees fit to request transmission thereof.

#### Article 4

This Decree shall enter into force as from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.

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SOURCE: Council of Europe, European Commission of Human Rights, The Greek Case: Report of the Commission, Vol. I, Part I, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1969, p. 30.





## APPENDIX B

### CONSTITUTIONAL ACT "DELTA" (NO. 4)

Concerning the restriction of the right to appeal to and request annulment from the Council of State.

#### THE CABINET COUNCIL

having in mind the suspension through Constitutional Act "B" of the regulations of article 101 of the Constitution and the fulfilment of the intended aim, i.e. to render the Public Services healthy the soonest possible, decides:

#### Article 1

It is from now on inadmissible to appeal to the Council of State or to request, according to article 83, paragraph 1, point c) of the Constitution, annulment against any administrative Act, issued from April 21st until publication of the present, or against those acts which will be issued from now on, on subjects connected with the condition of service and the position of the functionaries in general or judicial functionaries, the employees of state enterprises and agencies belonging to them, to those belonging to the Army, the State Safety Police and the Church (clergymen or priests of any rank), as well as against any administrative act issued or to be issued in execution of the Obligatory Law 4/1967 as it has been later modified.

#### Article 2

The above mentioned regulation applies also to the appeals and requests of annulments already pending with the Council of State against administrative Acts issued after April 21st, 1967.



### Article 3

The validity of the regulations of the present act can be abrogated or suspended, in whole or in part, by decisions of the Cabinet Council, published in the Gazette of the Government.

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SOURCE: Council of Europe, European Commission of Human Rights, The Greek Case: Report of the Commission, Vol. I, Part 2, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1969, pp. 245-246.



## APPENDIX C

### ARTICLE ONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACT "EPSILON" (NO. 5)

#### Article 1

Professors or Lecturers of the Highest Educational Establishments can be placed under temporary suspension for a duration of up to six (6) months, which can be prolonged once for the same period, for one of the following reasons:

a) If they have behaved in a way incompatible with their capacity as functionaries and professors or lecturers of Highest Establishments, or if their conduct in general has been improper with regard to the moral standing required of Highest Educational Instructors.

b) If certain of their acts and occupations, besides those in the institution they serve, prove that they have not been dedicated to their science and to their position but that they have acted for other purposes incompatible with what is understood as professorship, and whereby they have been exposed to various commentaries.

c) If they have not possessed the necessary qualities for the position they hold or have taken over a professor's position without previous choice by the Institution; then the present paragraph is specially applicable.

d) If their acts and behavior prove that they are not animated by the appropriate spirit, conforming with the existing regime and its national ideals.

e) If they have entered into the service in an irregular way and without the previous recommendation to the chair or the position of professor of the Institution they serve, or without previous recommendation about promotion to the chair of professor.

The choice of professors, made by committees according to the law for newly established Educational Institutions is considered as regular. The same is valid for the promotion, made by common consent of the proper Institution, of an extraordinary professor to the rank of regular professor for the same chair.





As irregular choice is considered the appointment or re-appointment or transfer to a chair of professor without previous decision of the proper Schools or the proper Association of professors and irrespectively of whether this was allowed by the Laws in force at that time.

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SOURCE: Council of Europe, European Commission of Human Rights, The Greek Case: Report of the Commission, Vol. I, Part 2, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1969, pp. 247-248.



## APPENDIX D

### ARTICLE ONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACT "KAPPA DELTA"

(NO. 24) OF 28TH MAY, 1968

#### Article 1

1. Within three days from the publication of the present Official Gazette, the life tenure and permanency of Ordinary Justice administrators under Article 88 of the Constitution is hereby suspended. They can be dismissed within this delay if:

a) for any reason whatsoever they do not possess the moral stature required for exercising their office;

b) they are not imbibed with healthy social principles, or else, if their general conduct within society or the body of Law cannot be deemed as being compatible with their duties and the dignity of their office, this resulting in a lowering of their prestige among their colleagues and the public.

2. The dismissal of judicial functionaries referred to in the preceding paragraphs will be affected by decision of the Council of Ministers, following an inquiry into the elements of their case, by Royal Decree proposed by it.

3. Dismissals under the present are not subject to recourse or plea for annulment before the Council of State, or lawsuit for damages before Ordinary Courts.

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SOURCE: Council of Europe, European Commission of Human Rights, The Greek Case: Report of the Commission, Vol. I, Part 2, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1969, pp. 303-304.



## APPENDIX E

### UNITED NATIONS VOTING -- PERCENTAGE CORRESPONDENCE OF GREECE, UN AVERAGE, NATO AVERAGE AND WARSAW PACT AVERAGE WITH THE U.S.

Year	Greece	UN Average	NATO Average	Warsaw Pact Average
1960	78.4	50.9	76.1	22.4
1961	89.3	51.2	84.3	13.6
1962	80.0	48.3	85.0	18.2
1963	74.1	44.4	67.6	18.0
1965	47.5	44.9	68.9	23.3
1966	71.7	46.9	75.9	20.6
1967	45.5	35.2	68.1	16.1
1968	52.5	37.8	70.3	14.7
1969	53.3	41.2	70.0	19.4
1970	47.8	41.8	64.6	19.6
1971	48.8	43.0	58.7	28.6
1972	55.0	38.5	65.3	30.1
1973	50.3	33.4	53.6	33.7
1974	43.1	39.7	62.7	37.1
1975	37.3	33.4	58.2	24.5
1976	29.1	28.0	51.8	23.4
1977	39.0	39.9	61.2	29.8

SOURCE: Rodney G. Tomlinson, "United Nations Roll Call Votes, 1960-1963, 1965-1977." U.S. Naval Academy: Automated Data Base, 1979. (Data furnished to USNA by the U.S. Department of State).

NOTE: No recorded roll call vote was taken in 1964.





## APPENDIX F

### CHRONOLOGY OF THE EFFORT TO REINTEGRATE

#### GREECE INTO NATO

1. "The course of negotiations for Greece's return to the NATO military wing has been cloaked with absolute secrecy by both the Greek and the allied sides."
2. August 28, 1974 -- letter from Prime Minister Karamanlis announcing his decision to "withdraw from the NATO military wing but remain a member of the alliance."
3. The Greek Government asked to return to NATO fourteen months after the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
4. July 1978 -- the Haig-Davos Agreement reached with two main characteristics:
  - a) the agreement was not a final action, i.e. it was "a feasible framework for Greece's return to the NATO unified military structure under temporary military arrangements until such time as the remaining political issues were finally resolved."
  - b) Greece was to return under the conditions in force prior to withdrawal in August 1974, not under Greek desires to follow the Norwegian model in retaining operational control of Greek forces in peacetime.
5. August 1978 -- the NATO International Military Staff unanimously approved the Haig-Davos Agreement, however Turkey wanted a new status for the allied collective defense of Aegean airspace, and that Greece accept the reinstatement of zones of responsibility and the concept of task forces for naval defense of the Aegean.
6. August and September 1978 -- the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate lifted the arms embargo against Turkey.
7. March 2, 1979 -- a new meeting between Generals Haig and Davos. Greece made some concessions including reduction of national airspace for NATO military purposes from 10 to 6 nautical miles.



8. March 12, 1979 -- Haig met with Turkish General Evren who specified that Turkey would officially consider the Greek proposals in a new agreement different from that of July 1978.

9. May 6, 1979 -- meeting between Haig and Davos at Verona, Italy. Haig gave Davos proposals containing the Turkish demand for total renegotiation of zones of responsibility in the Aegean. It contained two basic aims of the Turks:

a) the establishment of new boundaries for the command and control of air defense in the Aegean.

b) the establishment of task forces for naval defense of the Aegean Sea.

10. The Verona plan was rejected by the Greek Government.

11. May 29, 1979 -- Haig submitted a new plan to the Greek Government that was a variation of the Verona plan, however the essential points remained the same. The new plan was submitted "to avoid having the final settlement of this complex issue as a prerequisite for Greece's immediate return to the unified military structure (of NATO)."

12. June 1979 -- Davos requested NATO experts come to Greece to clarify several points.

13. June 29, 1979 -- Haig replaced by General Rogers.

14. September 10, 1979 -- NATO experts arrived in Greece; they failed to satisfy the Greek questions.

15. November 8, 1979 -- Rogers submitted a new variation of the Verona plan. This plan was rejected by the Greek Government.

16. February 11, 1980 -- a new plan submitted by Rogers. "The preamble stresses that until bilateral issues between Greece and Turkey are resolved, Greece's return will be only temporary."

17. February 1980 -- the latest Rogers' plan rejected by the Greek Government.

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SOURCE: To Vima [Athens newspaper], March 16, 1980 as cited in U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Edition, Western Europe. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 19, 1980, pp. S1-S6.





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## CHAPTER V

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
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